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This thesis explores the impact international trade and commercial 
agreements had on the economic and industrial development of Cork during the 
first industrial revolution. From the Act of Union onwards Cork moved from a 
region where trade became increasingly reliant on Britain at the expense of trade 
that had been cultivated over the eighteenth century with the Americas and 
Europe.  The legislative underpinnings of Cork’s trade is the focus of this research 
and how this changed after the Act of Union.  
It begins by examining the transatlantic trade of Cork city and the issues 
faced in the West Indies trade due to the growth of the United States. It will also 
consider the impact of the Napoleonic Wars on Cork’s trade with both the Americas 
and continental Europe. The conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars saw the United 
Kingdom negotiate treaties and agreements that would have a direct impact upon 
Cork’s merchants. This thesis will address the degree to which the mercantile 
community in Cork were able to influence policy that directly impacted upon their 
trade networks. It will then examine the trade between Cork and the United 
Kingdom and assess the impact of the Union on the ability of Cork’s merchants to 
affect political change. The operation of the Committee of Merchants in Cork is 
detailed and their responses to the changing nature of international trade. The 
thesis finishes by examining the underdevelopment of Cork’s transportation 
networks. This work will place Cork’s international trade in both its national and 
international context and argues that Cork’s mercantile community were overly 
reliant on protectionist legislation to further Cork’s trade as opposed to investment 
in industrial development. 
Volumetric data on the trade of Cork city has been transcribed and made 
available in a relational database to support the arguments made in this thesis and 
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This thesis examines the changing nature of Cork’s international trade 
during the first industrial revolution, from the mid-1780s to the mid-1840s. Cork’s 
trade during this time was fundamentally at the whim of political decision making in 
Westminster despite a vocal and active local Committee of Merchants. That group, 
founded for the regulation of the butter trade in 1769, had become the de-facto 
representative organisation for the merchants of Cork by the end of the eighteenth 
century. Despite promoting legislation that had potential benefits for Cork’s 
international trade, they were both limited in their ability to affect political change 
and more concerned with preserving protective duties than developing new and 
existing foreign trade routes. This examination contextualises the early nineteenth 
century trade in Cork city in light of a rapidly changing international environment.  
The focus centres on legislation and treaties passed by Westminster that 
directly impacted upon Cork’s international trade, as well as the efforts made by 
the Committee of Merchants to forward the interests of Cork’s mercantile 
community. The structure of the chapters reflects the nature of Cork’s international 
trade. Chapter One examines the trans-Atlantic trade from Cork, where Cork’s 
expertise in provisioning was of great importance for the supply of Caribbean 
colonies. It also looks at how the nature of British foreign relations with the United 
States of America was a perennial issue for Cork’s trans-Atlantic trade. Chapter Two 
considers the changing nature of Cork’s trade with Europe, with the focus on Cork’s 
main continental trading partner at this time, Portugal. Chapter Three assesses the 
nature of Cork’s trade with Britain, focusing on how the changing political 
relationship between Ireland and Britain from the free trade movement to the Act 
of Union fundamentally altered the nature of Irish trade. The final chapter 
examines the efficacy of the Committee of Merchants as a body and the crucial 




Context and historiography 
The thesis places Cork’s international trade in the context of Ireland’s 
changing relationship with Britain and the wider geo-political activities of the 
United Kingdom during the first industrial revolution. Cork’s trade depended on 
political activities in Westminster both in terms of the regulatory legislation passed 
in Britain as well as British foreign policy. Cork occupied a niche role in international 
trade for much of the eighteenth century. The success of the provisioning trade 
relied heavily on the colonial activities of European powers, most importantly those 
of Britain but also of Portugal and France. Trade with Continental Europe was 
subject to the political relationship Britain had with those countries at the time and, 
as in the case of Portugal, Irish trade relationships constituted a secondary concern. 
Cork’s trade with Portugal was its most stable on the Continent due to the 
longstanding political relationship between Britain and Portugal. Conversely trade 
with France was incredibly volatile as conflicts repeatedly disrupted Anglo-Franco 
relations. Furthermore, the important trade with the West Indian colonies was only 
successful so long as the capabilities of the United States to provision these islands 
remained underdeveloped. The opening decades of the nineteenth century saw 
widespread disruption to both Cork’s Continental trade and its West Indian trade as 
the effects of both European warfare, with its related trade restrictions, and the 
growth of the American economy upset established trade patterns. Bertie 
Mandelblatt has previously assessed some of these issues with reference to 
Ireland’s trade with France, noting that provisioning networks were closely aligned 
to national affiliations making them vulnerable to intra-European warfare.1 
While Mandelblatt’s assessment is accurate with respect to the 
development of Cork’s trade networks into the nineteenth century, it overlooks the 
impact of fundamental political and legislative changes during this period. The 
proximity of England combined with developments in transportation technology 
had important repercussions for the changing nature of Cork’s international trade. 
                                                     
1 Bertie Mandelblatt, ‘A Transatlantic Commodity: Irish Salt Beef in the French Atlantic World’ in 
History Workshop Journal, lxiii, no. 1 (2007), p. 40. 
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This was so evident that Léonce de Lavergne argued that ‘had Ireland been cast in a 
more distant part of the ocean, in place of so near to her powerful sister, her career 
would have been a brilliant one.’2 However, Cork and England always had strong 
trade links. I argue here that more important than the proximity of Britain was the 
inaction of Cork’s mercantile community to push for the further development of 
profitable international trade connections. In the main, they were overly reliant on 
protective duties and legislation to preserve and develop networks and they did not 
invest in the necessary infrastructure to create a sustained international trade, such 
as their own mercantile fleet. They remained dependent on shipping under British 
account as well as access to British credit. There was a misbelief that the Act of 
Union would strengthen Ireland’s external trade by granting her free access to 
British markets whilst protecting them from external competition. Irish merchants 
underestimated the ultimate direction of the free trade movement. 
This is not to solely blame Cork’s merchants for their growing dependence 
on the British market. As denizens of a small provincial city they were very much 
subject to changes in policy in Westminster and, despite some success lobbying for 
their interests, they lacked the political and economic clout to force serious 
legislative changes. The development of Cork’s international trade was very much a 
by-product of legislative restrictions put in place in the seventeenth century that 
had pushed the merchants to focus on provisioning rather than livestock export. 
Conversely this trade was incredibly vulnerable to changes in British foreign 
relations and policy. Having such a large proportion of the local economy based 
upon supplying a limited range of goods left them very susceptible to changing 
tastes and requirements. This issue Cork’s butter merchants would learn to their 
detriment through the decline of their trade in the late nineteenth century. 
Although Cork was a wealthy and prosperous city by early nineteenth century Irish 
standards its commerce remained primarily based on agriculture. The limited 
industrial enterprises there were never in a position to compete with the larger and 
more efficient industrial mechanisms in Britain. 
                                                     
2 Léonce de Lavergne, The Rural Economy of England, Scotland, and Ireland, 1855, p. 361  
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In an article on the Industrial Revolution Patrick O’Brien identifies a salient 
issue in terms of regional studies. He argues that historians undertaking regional 
approaches need to fit their research into the wider national contemporary 
concerns.3 He writes with reference to the industrial revolution in Britain, but the 
same point applies to Irish historiography of the nineteenth century. Much valuable 
work has been produced on Irish industrial and societal development in that period, 
but it needs to be concious of not just the national Irish issues, but also the broader 
context of the Act of Union and political developments in Britain. Cork’s trade did 
not exist separately from the United Kingdom. Its development was intrinsically 
linked to British politics. The transformation of eighteenth-century Cork into a 
premier provisioning port supplying the Atlantic colonies resulted from a 
combination of restrictions placed on Irish exports to Britain at the end of the 
seventeenth century, the rapid expansion of the Atlantic economy over the course 
of the eighteenth century and a fortuitously located harbour. The Woollen Acts, 
Navigation Acts and the Cattle Acts shaped the nature of Irish international trade. 
Despite a short term depression after the enactment of the Cattle Acts in 1667 by 
1701 it had boosted the development of a strong provisions trade out of Cork.4  
What was especially important for the development of Cork’s trade networks over 
the eighteenth century was that the Navigation Acts only stifled direct trade, not 
outward trade.5 This enabled Cork’s merchants to develop a thriving transhipment 
trade. The revocation of these pieces of legislation had a significant impact on the 
nature of Irish political engagement with Britain up to the Union. 
The thesis also addresses the level of reciprocity of Cork’s foreign trade. A 
one-way trade has some benefits, but in the Atlantic economy of the eighteenth 
and early nineteenth century the real value was in the return of valuable crops from 
the New World. Cork sent out a narrow range of produce and imported a large 
quantity of luxury items, such as tobacco and sugar. However, the bulk of these 
                                                     
3 Patrick K O’Brien, ‘Modern Conceptions of the Industrial Revolution’ in The Industrial Revolution 
and British Society (Cambridge, 1993), p. 16. 
4 Mark McCarthy, ‘The Forging of an Atlantic Port City: Socio-Economic and Physical Transformations 
in Cork, 1660–1700’ in Urban History, xxviii, no. 01 (2001), p. 28. 
5 L. M. Cullen, Economy, Trade and Irish Merchants at Home and Abroad, 1600-1988 (Dublin, 
Ireland ; Portland, OR, 2012), p. 103. 
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luxury goods were imported via Britain rather than directly from the colonies. For 
most of the eighteenth century this was due to the restrictive Navigation Acts. This 
was despite the majority of these restrictions being rescinded by the 1780s and 
there was no prohibition on Cork undertaking direct trade with either the West 
Indies or the East Indies. In 1855 Léonce de Lavergne asserted that ‘a country is 
enriched through its exports when it receives something in exchange… but when, as 
in Ireland, there is a constant export, and no return, it is ruinous.’6 Whether this was 
true for Cork, bearing in mind its large harbour devoted to international trade, will 
be assessed to see the real benefits and opportunities that accrued from 
international trade. No other city in Ireland was as well-positioned economically 
and geographically to take advantage of a flourishing import trade with the 
expanding economies outside of Europe. Why this remained underdeveloped in 
Cork is a puzzling anomaly considering the ready advantages conferred on Cork city 
by the nature and very structure of the trans-Atlantic economy. 
This research builds upon the excellent work undertaken on Cork’s 
indigenous industries by Andy Bielenberg, David Dickson and Colin Rynne. I move 
the focus away from local innovations and developments and instead examine the 
international consumers of Cork’s produce.7 One of the major influences in 
examining Cork’s trade in this manner was derived from Thomas Truxes’s work on 
Irish-American trade during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.8 This 
research places Cork city firmly in the appropriate international context. I argue 
that despite creating the basis for a strong trade network over the eighteenth 
century, the development of these connections was hindered by both legislation 
and treaties passed by Westminster as well as the limited vision and foresight of the 
Committee of Merchants. The current consensus is that Cork’s industrial base 
                                                     
6 Lavergne, The Rural Economy of England, Scotland, and Ireland, p. 353. 
7 Andy Bielenberg, Cork’s Industrial Revolution 1780-1880 : Development or Decline? (Cork :, 1991); 
David Dickson, Old World Colony: Cork and South Munster 1630-1830 (Cork, 2005); Colin. Rynne and 
Royal Irish Academy., The Industrial Archaeology of Cork city and its Environs, 1750-1930 (Dublin :, 
1991). 
8 Thomas M. Truxes, Irish-American Trade, 1660-1783 (Cambridge [England] ; New York, 1988); 
Thomas M. Truxes, ‘Ireland, New York, and the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World’ in American 
Journal of Irish Studies, viii, New York University (2011), pp 9–40. 
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stagnated over the course of the nineteenth century due to an inability match 
increased British competition, a weakening regional dominance and a lack of 
mineral resources.9 This is the same trend Louis Cullen identified for Irish trade 
overall during this period. He asserts that Ireland’s proximity to Britain combined 
with reductions in transportation costs left the nascent industrial developments of 
the eighteenth century very vulnerable to competition.10 My thesis supports this 
view, but examines these changes through the effect of Britain’s relationship with 
the wider world and an increasingly conservative mercantile body in the case of 
Cork. 
In terms of legislative influences on the development of international trade 
from Ireland the most immediate concern is the impact of the Act of Union. The 
Union has had a dominant influence on the development of the modern Irish state. 
It has also prompted debate and discussion from its first conception up to the 
modern era: To what extent did the Union shape Irish industrial and economic 
development? Was it ultimately the source of the de-industrialisation and 
marginalisation of Ireland or did the ultimate reversion of the gains that nascent 
Irish industries made in the eighteenth century result from a more complicated 
confluence of factors? Was the decline in Irish industry due to the commercial 
aspects of the Act of Union or was it part of a longer term restructuring of trade? 
The extent to which the changes in Cork’s international trade can be attributed to 
the Union will be examined through the lens of broader legislative and diplomatic 
changes made at Westminster. The city’s commercial merchants were heavily 
reliant on British shipping and finance and it is likely that this was a far more 
important factor in the gradual restructuring of Cork’s trade routes towards Britain 
and away from trans-Atlantic trade. Restrictions on trade with the European 
continent and the growing economic development of the United States also 
influenced this restructuring. 
                                                     
9 Bielenberg, Cork’s Industrial Revolution 1780-1880, pp 116–126; Dickson, Old World Colony, pp 
498–500. 
10 Cullen, Economy, Trade and Irish merchants at Home and Abroad, 1600-1988, p. 18. 
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The overall shape of Irish trade in this period was a complex series of 
interdependent parts. The restrictions of the seventeenth century, the 
development of Britain’s geo-political relations and the requirements of foreign 
nations informed its evolution. The international nature of Cork’s commerce also 
directed future developments, sometimes at a very fundamental level. For example, 
the growth of pork production in Ireland was related to the changes in Irish dietary 
patterns due to the introduction of the potato. It helped encourage the rearing of 
pigs on small holdings. Cullen suggests that, 
In this sense, the trade across the Atlantic is a complex development: the demand 
for salted meat came from new-world settlements and long-distance navigation, 
and part of the response-the Irish surplus or pork-was based on the root of an 
American origin.11 
However, despite this reciprocity the volume of Cork’s international trade declined 
over the nineteenth century. Eric Richards argues that there is no definitive 
explanation for the decline of some British regions in the face of competition during 
the industrial revolution. He discusses the issue of previously core regions 
peripheralising during this period while other regions developed strong local 
specialisations.12  
Although there can rarely be a definitive reason for economic and industrial 
decline, there are several key factors. Cork was never a core region; its role was 
always on the periphery of the broader trans-Atlantic trade, albeit an important 
periphery. This left the city very vulnerable to fluctuations in the economy and to 
competition from both British trade as well as increased productivity in other 
regions. The narrow specialisation of Cork was in food production and, despite the 
best efforts of the Committee of Merchants, this was a difficult speciality to protect 
from external competition. The most successful of their trade goods, butter, 
depended on several preconditions. It was designed for long transit times, warm 
Caribbean climates, a rapidly growing colonial population and naval demand. A 
change in any of these left the product vulnerable to shrinking market demand. 
                                                     
11 Ibid., pp 112–113. 
12 Eric Richards, ‘Margins of the Industrial Revolution’ in The Industrial Revolution and British Society 
(Cambridge, 1993), p. 210. 
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Decreased transit times, especially to Britain, meant that the heavy salting required 
for long distance preservation became less palatable. A change in the structure of 
Europe’s Caribbean colonies, for example opening access to British West Indian 
Islands to American trade, could negate the need for transporting foodstuffs from 
Europe. Any threat of access to Portuguese salt, a necessity for the preservation 
process, could threaten the quality of the product. Cork’s provisioning trade was 
designed for a particular set of circumstances. The manner by which the Committee 
of Merchants secured Cork’s dominance in this trade, through a strict regulatory 
regime, was one that ultimately left them inflexible to change and vulnerable to 
changing market requirements.  
This thesis examines how well Cork’s mercantile community adapted to a 
rapidly changing international trade environment and whether or not they had any 
real agency in the future development of their commercial endeavours. Previous 
research has provided an excellent insight into how Cork developed trade and 
commerce within the city. This research provides a valuable insight into how Cork’s 
domestic industries developed over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. I propose to expand upon that to assess how well Cork’s merchants 
turned these local successes into a thriving and adaptable international trade and 
build upon this previous research to closely examine the international context for 
Cork’s development in the early nineteenth century. 
The Committee of Merchants 
The Committee of Merchants was founded by twenty-three export 
merchants in Cork in 1769 and would survive into the early decades of the 
twentieth century. The Committee was founded in response to the relatively poor 
performance of Cork produced butter in English markets. In 1759 British markets 
were opened to Irish trade but Cork butter was too heavily salted for the British 
palate. Despite producing Cork accounting for over a third of Irish butter exports 
less than a fifth of this was sent to England. The Committee established a three tier 
pricing system that placed a premium on lightly salted butter in an attempt to 
revitalise exports to Britain. This was a success and by 1774/5 Cork accounted for 
9 
 
34 per cent of Ireland’s butter exports to Britain.13 The structure and grading 
systems established by the Committee of Merchants remained broadly unaltered 
throughout their lifetime. Over the course of the nineteenth century the grades of 
butter were expanded to six and there were some changes to broaden the 
membership of the Committee, but these changes were relatively minor. This slow 
adoption of changes was part of the success of the Committee, they favoured 
careful consideration over rash judgement. It was strict adherence to local 
regulations that helped the Cork butter market to dominate the Irish butter trade.14 
However, this rigidity also led them to a tendency for acute conservatism and an 
inability to react quickly to changing conditions. 
The importance of the butter trade to Cork allowed the Committee of 
Merchants to quickly expand their influence in Cork to cover almost all the major 
trades of the city as well as becoming very influential in the civic and political life of 
the city.15 As butter was the cornerstone of Cork’s commercial development and 
financial well-being the membership of the Committee of Merchant’s included a 
large number of individuals that had economic and political clout. This enabled the 
Committee to carve a particular niche out for Cork’s butter trade and successfully 
secured Cork’s butter trade exemptions from legislative interference up to 1829. 
Such manoeuvring was greatly assisted by the protracted Napoleonic Wars giving 
Cork a unique position of primacy in the Atlantic economy. Cork was the main 
convoying point for ships travelling in protective convoys across the Atlantic, and 
since the American War of Independence had been the centre of British naval 
victualling in Ireland. The Committee regularly entertained a variety of admirals and 
other senior military and political figures, which no doubt helped them in their 
political lobbying. This enabled them to exert an undue amount of influence for a 
city of Cork’s size. 
                                                     
13 Dickson, Old World Colony, pp 375–377. 
14 James S. Donnelly, ‘Cork Market: Its Role in the Nineteenth Century Irish Butter Trade,’ Studia 
Hibernica, no. 11 (1971), pp 133–134. 
15 David Dickson, ‘Butter Comes to the Market: The Origins of Commercial Dairying in County Cork,’ 
in Patrick O’Flanagan and Cornelius G. Buttimer (eds), Cork: History & Society: Interdisciplinary 
Essays on the History of an Irish County, (Irish County History Series v.6, Dublin, 1993), pp 368–385. 
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After the removal of specific protection granted to Cork produced butter in 
1829 the Committee of Merchants, with the support of much of Cork’s political and 
mercantile classes, moved to a system of internal regulation. This involved the 
voluntary agreement of several interested parties in the city as well as a more 
vigorous policy of enforcement abroad in major British ports such as London and 
Liverpool. This maintained both the value and the market for Cork produced butter 
for several decades. The introduction of butter substitutes from the continent, such 
as Butterine, improvements in the packaging of continental butter and the Irish 
agricultural depression of the 1870s had a serious impact on the market for the 
Cork butter merchants. They were slow to adopt more modern packaging methods, 
relying on the traditional firkin, and were slow to adopt refrigeration preferring 
heavy salting for preservation.16 This spelled the beginning of a period of marked 
decline of the influence of the Committee. By 1884 control of the butter market in 
Cork was transferred from the Committee of Merchants to a board of trustees. A 
declining butter trade, the beginning of the creamery system and poor adaptation 
of modern production methods led to the end of the Committee of Merchants as a 
domineering influence on Cork’s external trade.17 New methods of trade, 
production and sale had passed them by and they were too slow to adjust to the 
new realities of the trade. The butter market in Cork was still active by 1919, but 
the massive growth of the commercial creamery system and the co-operative 
movement damaged their dominance of the butter trade in South Munster. 18 The 
high point of the Committee of Merchants influence was from the late eighteenth 
century up to around the mid nineteenth century, which coincides with the high 
point for Cork's international trade in general. This is unsurprising as the market for 
butter and provisions were closely related in this period.  
                                                     
16 Donnelly, “Cork Market,”, pp 146–158. 
17 Liam Kennedy, “The Decline of the Cork Butter Market: A Comment,” Studia Hibernica, no. 16 
(1976), p 175. 
18 Colin Rynne, At the Sign of the Cow: The Cork Butter Market, 1770-1924 (Cork, 1998), pp  92–98. 
11 
 
A Relational Database of Cork’s Trade 
The most important primary sources used for this evaluation were the 
‘Abstracts of Irish Exports and Imports’ in the National Library of Ireland that cover 
the volumes of Irish trade for the period 1764-1823, the ‘Committee of Merchants 
Papers’ held by the Cork City and County Archives and the British Parliamentary 
Papers.19 The latter two were used to examine the political lobbying and debates 
that were fundamental to the evolution of Cork’s trade during this period. The 
Committee of Merchants minute books provide an invaluable insight into the 
political and commercial world of Cork city during the nineteenth century. 
However, the minute book covering the crucial period of 1818-28 is lost. The 1820s 
saw distinct changes in Ireland’s relationship with Britain and in the lobbying efforts 
of the Committee. The two extant volumes on either side of the 1820s show a shift 
in the tone and interests of the committee. From 1829 on they appeared to have 
less of an interest in international affairs and far more concern with the local 
interests of the merchants. This is somewhat understandable as the Napoleonic 
Wars were a major issue for exporters to deal with, but it is interesting that their 
focus moves from actively petitioning those with political influence, to enforcing 
and creating local regulations and ordinances. The merchants had moved from 
trying to improve their commercial opportunities at the highest level of political 
engagement to instead focusing on local issues. This was a result of two issues, the 
decline in Cork’s international trade and an increasing focus on Britain, as well as 
the removal of exemptions that had allowed the Committee of Merchants a large 
amount of freedom to regulate Cork’s butter trade as they saw fit. If the 1820s 
volume was extant such a change in tone might appear more natural. 
The ‘Abstracts of Irish Exports and Imports’ record the volumes of trade for 
each port broken down by destination and item level. The majority of the data used 
in the charts throughout the thesis derived from this source and the data for the 
period 1797-1823 has been compiled into a database (discussed below). Although 
the transcription of all Cork’s trade during this period was laborious it allows for a 
                                                     
19 ‘Abstracts of Irish Exports and Imports, in 24 vols, for the period 1764-1823’, MSS 353-76 ,NLI; 
'Committee of Merchants Papers', U401, CCCA  
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very detailed level of analysis of the trade volumes during the period, from the 
trade in major goods such as butter to the trade in luxury items such as sugar. Using 
a volumetric analysis gives a clear indication of how much demand impacted upon 
the local export economy. In terms of the valuations and price series excellent work 
has been done by Liam Kennedy, Peter Solar and David Dickson in this regard, so 
these price series can be used to show the valuations for the core products.20 A 
problem with this series, and one that transcends both the NLI and the Cust series, 
is that the Act of Union led to a merger of the customs and trade data between 
Ireland and the United Kingdom. The NLI series ends on January 5th 1823 with the 
Kew series going further by 6 years, though the level of detail of the earlier ledgers 
is lost. This is due to the Irish trade being classed as a coasting trade after 1823, 
which ended the recording of separate data for Ireland’s external trade.21 
Creating new digital historical resources provides us with the opportunity to 
create new perspectives and new interpretations of our past. They also have the 
potential to create larger agglomerations of research from data sets that may never 
have been able to interact or be merged whilst in an analogue format. A vast 
amount of data is being made available online at an exponential rate. In some cases 
this material is being digitised by cultural heritage institutions as part of larger 
advocacy and outreach plans that dovetail with contemporary political and public 
objectives regarding historical events. Examples of this would include the historic 
Irish census data online through the National Archives of Ireland, the Bureau of 
Military History Digitisation project and the National Library of Ireland’s collection 
of historic photographs on Flickr. Larger projects such as Europeana aggregate all of 
these collections and merge them online as part of promoting a wider European 
cultural resource. 
These are all admirable projects, especially if they relate to one’s own 
research. Unfortunately the resources that might interest the public or reflect the 
                                                     
20 Liam Kennedy and Peter Solar, Irish Agriculture: A Price History, From the Mid-Eighteenth Century 
to the Eve of the First World War (Dublin, 2007); David Dickson, Old World Colony: Cork and South 
Munster 1630-1830 (Cork, 2005). 
21 Charles Hubert Oldham, ‘Ireland’s External Trade’ in 19th Century Social History Pamphlets 
(London, 1910), p. 10. 
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prevailing cultural atmosphere are not necessarily those that are of utility to the 
historian. Unlike digital humanities projects in some other fields historical data is 
not necessarily readily translatable into a machine readable format. The issues vary 
from the inability of Optical Character Recognition (OCR) to adequately cope with 
handwriting, poor or unreadable typesets, palaeographic issues and many other 
problems inherent with historical sources too extensive to list here. This means that 
for many historians the starting point is at the level of transcription, a very labour 
and time intensive activity, with very uncertain outcomes at the end. The question 
remains: why undertake such work? 
There are several compelling reasons for doing so. Firstly, the data that I 
have transcribed for this project has been used by many social and economic 
historians in the past. The corollary of this is that this is not the first time that an 
individual has had to examine and transcribe this data for their research. By 
transcribing the data into a relational database the data used for my own thesis can 
aid future researchers. If the objective of history is to move our understanding of 
the past forward, should this not also include providing access to as much of our 
data as possible? Rather than sitting on silos of data we should provide broad 
access to our data and see what others can do with our initial work. As previously 
mentioned one of the benefits of creating a database from this type of material is 
that it has the potential to allow future researchers to analyse the reasons for the 
disparities between the ledgers held in Kew and those in the NLI. On a more 
immediate level it will make a portion of an invaluable resource for Irish economic 
history more immediately accessible to a wider audience. The ledgers themselves 
are unremarkable eighteenth and nineteenth century books. As objects they may 
be ordinary, yet the data that they contain gives a valuable insight into Irish 
commercial life at a regional level for one of the most remarkable periods in Irish 
history. They cover a period of unprecedented expansion in the Irish economy, 
major European warfare and the fundamental political changes that occurred 
between Grattan’s Parliament and the full implementation of the Act of Union. 
Creating a more accessible resource from this data has the potential to save future 
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researchers months of painstaking transcription and allow them to focus on further 
developing and analysing the context in which this trade was conducted.  
Database Design 
The design of the database to hold the volumetric data was an iterative 
process.  The first design, based on samples of data taken from a preliminary 
research trip was broadly similar to the final structure. The main difference 
between the initial and final designs was that the former was intended to also 
contain comparative data for Dublin and Belfast when those cities were exporting 
the same product to the same region as Cork, along with the national totals. The 
inclusion of the data for Belfast and Dublin in the preliminary design was to provide 
a comparison with other Irish cities. The sheer volume of data transcription this 
would have entailed was an impractical undertaking so this had to be omitted. The 
abstracts for yearly totals were compiled separately in a spreadsheet as a control 
group to help in the identification of any issues that may have arisen in either the 
data collation or transcription. From my preliminary research I was aware that the 
measurements used, as well as the goods descriptions, varied sufficiently for some 
form of control to be required to refer back to. It was hoped that the combination 
of the database design and the interface would allow for rapid data entry. The 
database structure and the web interface were created in conjunction with each 
other. The objective of this was two-fold: the web interface would ultimately be 
used for access to the database when put online, but until then it was designed to 
operate also as the data entry interface. This proved to be a much faster system 
than either transcribing into a spreadsheet or entering the data directly into the 
database.  
Unfortunately a number of issues arose that required a redesign of the 
system. The web interface, running through a localhost, was not flexible enough for 
quick data entry. Approximately every 50-75 entries the interface would crash. This 
problem was resolved through a redesign of the website. Furthermore, the system 
was not fast enough for data entry straight from the archives. This was partially due 
to an underestimation of the amount of material contained in the records and also 
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to the design of the web interface. Instead of conducting data entry in the archives, 
I took images of the remaining volumes for later transcription. For reasons of time 
and the volume of material I decided to forego the collation of the data for Dublin 
and Belfast. This was unfortunate, but to transcribe all this data would have been 
impractical. To speed up the web interface several ‘placeholders’ were inserted in 
the HTML. These ensure that on each refresh of the page after an entry had been 
submitted the page would have the cursor ready for the next entry in the ‘year’ 
field. This may seem like a minor change, but combined with the more restrictive 
data capture it at least halved the workflow and the time spent on transcription. 
The database itself was revised with these changes in mind to streamline it. This 
helped mitigate against the crashes that I had previously experienced with the web 
interface.  
There are a number of legacies of this previous database that remain in the 
current system due to issues that became apparent while transcribing the data, 
such as the ‘measurement’ field. The concept for this field was that it would link to 
a separate measurements table. The data was captured as it was written, in 
imperial units. This was done to ensure the database was as accurate a reflection of 
the volumes as possible. However, databases and data visualization suites are 
designed for metric measurement systems. The initial concept was that the 
measurements table, through some form of Javascript code, would act as an 
intermediary between the recorded data and a visualization where the data would 
be converted into more usable measurements such as pounds. However, this was 
never implemented due to the sheer variety of measurements employed in the 
data and variances within specific units of measurement, such as a bushel of wheat 
being approximately fifty-six pounds whereas a bushel of oats could be as low as 
thirty-eight pounds.22 
A number of potential uses for the database design should be pointed out. 
First of all, although the data for Dublin and Belfast has been omitted, it is very easy 
for fields for any other county or region to be added to this database. It only 
                                                     
22 Aashish Velkar, Markets and Measurements in Nineteenth Century Britain (Cambridge; New York, 
2012), p. 32  
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requires a small revision of the database code. The data can also be incorporated 
into a larger geographic dataset or to be used to geographically map the movement 
of goods across nations. In terms of this database there is not a huge amount of 
new information to be gleaned from doing so. There is a certain amount that can be 
learned from this, but it terms of a project focused on a single city its value is 
limited. An expanded dataset containing the data for other Irish regions would 
make this an invaluable tool, but as this database only contains the information for 
Cork it is of limited benefit. 
This ties into a wider concept of the utility of such databases for historical 
scholarship. By its very nature this project is focused on a single region in Ireland, 
though national data is included. By making this database freely and openly 
accessible, by creating it in an open programming language as free from proprietary 
tools as possible and by documenting the creation of the database and its 
limitations fully, there is the potential to integrate the data into other resources. As 
has been pointed out it would be relatively straightforward to add in data for other 
Irish counties, allowing this database to function as a readymade resource for 
historians to compare data for Ireland. There is also no reason why this data cannot 
be taken and used with other sources of national import and export figures to 
create trade comparisons. However, there are a few caveats to bear in mind. For 
goods being exported and imported from Cork the national totals for that market 
are recorded. But if Cork did not engage with that market in a certain product the 
data was not captured. This is the result of necessity. It would take far more time 
than was available over the course of a PhD to capture all that data. For similar 
reasons the abstracts for Irish trade only capture the totals for each product. All 
products in the trade abstracts, whether traded in Cork or not, were recorded to 
create contextual information. The abstracts for Irish trade also record the amount 
of each product sent to each port, but this data was not transcribed, again due to 
time restraints. A database of this information alone would be invaluable, but it was 
outside the scope of this project. I expect that future expansion on this database 
will include this information.  
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In many respects it would have been ideal to have the time and resources 
necessary to solve some of these issues, but identifying them is half the battle for a 
project such as this. Aside from generating the data required for this thesis the 
primary goal for creating this database was two-fold; to create a resource for future 
researchers and to serve as a proof of concept for a database for representing Irish 
export and import figures that was as accurate and sympathetic to the original as 
possible. It is important that we make the data we generate over the course of 
research projects as openly available as possible. By making our research as open 
and accessible as possible it creates the potential for our data to be re-used in new 
and unforeseen ways to the benefit of scholarship as a whole. The issues described 
above notwithstanding it has achieved all the primary objectives. To develop a 
more interactive database that contains similar data for other Irish regions would 
be a valuable tool and is deserving of further time and study. 
Transcription Issues 
Despite having undertaken a sampling exercise of the data in this series 
prior to embarking upon the full transcription process a number of issues arose that 
impacted upon the database’s design and outputs. The most apparent issue was 
concerning the wide variance in the units of measurement for the goods traded. An 
obvious example of this is the hundredweight measurement. Over the course of 
transcribing the data the measurement used for hundredweights varied year on 
year from the division hundredweight-quarters-pounds (CQLB) to hundredweight-
stone-pounds (CWT). Although this is not a major issue in itself, it impacted upon 
how the data was exported for visualisation and created an additional barrier to 
generating charts and graphs. However, once identified this was easily rectified. A 
more difficult problem actually surrounds the most stable unit of measurement 
throughout the series, the barrel. Due to a combination of how goods were 
measured and local standards the pound weight of a barrel of produce varied 
depending on a number of factors, including the region in which it was recorded 
and the goods being measured. Aashish Velkar has produced one of the most 
comprehensive accounts of British measurement systems and his work has broad 
18 
 
applications to Ireland’s trade goods.23 What complicates the issue of 
measurement, in terms of the NLI series, is that in some instances the 
measurement unit used were wrong. It appears that, at least in some cases, the 
volumetric data and the goods data was entered independently. It is highly likely 
that the list of goods and measurements was composed from a separate clerk’s 
ledger that contained all goods traded, data was filled under this system and then 
the final tallies were calculated excluding goods that were not handled that year. 
This presumption is supported by the CUST 15 account for 1714 in Kew. Here the 
volume available for that year is actually one of these draft ledgers rather than the 
final version. It has quite a different structure to the finalised ledgers.24 It is highly 
likely that a similar system was in place in the Irish customs for the recording of 
trade data. 
For the data used in this thesis these variances resulted in a number of 
issues that should be made explicit. To allow comparisons for a number of goods 
some items, such as wood products, which were recorded in a wide variety of units, 
were normalised to a standard unit of measurement. In some instances this 
involved converting goods measured in pounds up to a hundredweight measure of 
112 lbs, and in other instances it entailed converting products recorded in mille or 
thou down to hundreds, as was the case with many recordings of wood staves. In 
other instances it was deemed more appropriate to round to the nearest whole 
number, as was the case with multiple recordings of hundredweights of beef or 
pork. This has an insignificant effect on the graphs shown as the volumes of goods 
traded overall negated any discrepancies.  
Such discrepancies are not limited to the measurement units being used. 
Over the timespan transcribed how trade with foreign states was recorded 
changed. This is understandable as the period was one of dramatic upheaval. 
Overall it has a limited impact on the data. In the earlier years British possessions in 
                                                     
23 Aashish Velkar, ‘Measurements, Standards and Transactions: Measurements in Nineteenth-
Century British Economy’ (PhD thesis, London School of Economics, London, 2008); Velkar, Markets 
and Measurements in Nineteenth Century Britain. 
24 ‘Ledgers of Imports and Exports, Ireland 1698-1829’, CUST 15, TNA 
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the Caribbean were simply recorded as the West Indies, but later trade with 
individual islands was recorded. The most noticeable, and tantalising, change in the 
recording of foreign trade occurs post 1819 where distinctions are made between 
foreign and colonial goods imported through England. Some goods are also 
differentiated by the suffix ‘East India’ or ‘not East India’. A reasonable supposition 
is that these were goods imported directly into Ireland and that they were not 
transhipped via England. This assumption is supported by the fact that the East 
India Company charter contained a proviso for a certain number of ships per year to 
land directly into Ireland. These variations give us an intriguing, yet unfortunately 
brief, window into the true extent of Ireland’s colonial trade and global 
connections. These are issues to be addressed in future research. 
Website Design 
The database is accessible online from modernirishvenice.com. In order to 
create a usable web interface and to facilitate visualisation the data required 
conversion. The focus of this conversion was on three main areas. Firstly, the 
measurement units needed to be standardised. The units used for measurement of 
goods in some instances changed over the course of the nineteenth century. In 
most instances this was simply converting pounds into stone. This was done to 
standardise the measurements across time. Secondly, imperial units do not work 
well in modern graphing programmes. In instances where the measurements 
contained three divisions, for example pounds, shillings and pence, the unit was 
converted to a decimal format. It would have also been possible to simply drop the 
final unit, for example the pence measurement, but converting to decimal units 
provides a slightly more accurate representation of the original data. Although 
these conversions could all have been done using SQL quite rapidly the conversion 
process was actually undertaken in spreadsheet software. The required data was 
exported to excel and the conversions were undertaken using excel formulae. 
Although slower this allowed for constant sampling of the data to ensure accuracy 
as well as an ability to roll back any changes that were incorrect, which would have 
been more difficult to do using SQL.  
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The third conversion of the data was far more complex, but was necessary 
to create a usable search interface. Due to a variety of factors such as recording the 
data for similar products with a variety of different units and the subdivision of 
products over the course of the nineteenth century, such as some timber products, 
the primary database contains 1,552 recorded products. For a functional search 
interface these needed to be simplified. If this was not done there would have been 
errors in the returned figures. For example, there were three different entries for 
hams, measured in CWT, CQLB and Barrels. These needed to be rationalised to 
ensure all requested data was being returned. Furthermore, there were 142 
different entries for wood products, and within those goods there were eight 
different types of fir timber recorded. This level of detail was unnecessary for this 
thesis and made the search interface very complex. Such items were normalised to 
reduce the search list to 639 items. In the case of wood the 142 entries were 
reduced to 12. Such normalisation was not undertaken in all instances. The level of 
detail for wood products was unnecessary for the web interface, but the 
subdivision of wine was left broadly unaltered as the distinction made between 
French wine and Portuguese wine was desirable. Although all these changes 
required dramatic intervention in the data as recorded in the nineteenth century 
they were necessary to create a usable search interface. As the primary database is 
available for download from the website such intervention is acceptable as any 
researcher can access the data as recorded in the ledgers. The original list of goods 
along with the normalised list is also available from the website for download. 
This simplification was undertaken to address issues that arose with the 
reconstruction of the Database of Irish Historical Statistics created by Queens 
University Belfast in the 1990’s, and currently available from the History Data 
Service.25 This database was a phenomenal undertaking, recording the Irish 
agricultural production levels in the mid to late nineteenth century. The data was 
recorded from the parliamentary returns and is an incredibly detailed data series. 
However, the data was captured as accurately as possible and this means that 
                                                     
25 Clarkson, L.A., Kennedy, L., Crawford, E.M., Dowling, M.W. (1997). Database of Irish Historical 
Statistics. UK Data Service, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-3578-1. 
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searching the data can be quite complex. A variety of geographical divisions were 
employed over the decades for recording the  data which cannot be readily 
integrated with one another, and the level of detail for specific agricultural livestock 
varies, in some instances the ages of livestock are recorded and in other years they 
are not. This makes querying a specific item over the decades a very complex piece 
of SQL code, so in preparation for my own database this database was normalised. 
This was a partial success. Rationalising the goods produced was relatively 
straightforward, but the geographic locations was very difficult to normalise to an 
acceptable system. This was due to the enumerators recording the returns for 
baronies, poor law unions or electoral divisions. These divisions often crossed 
county boundaries, so standardising them is no simple task. Fortunately in terms of 
the database for Cork’s trade the geographic entities were straightforward, usually 
only divisions of countries which could be readily standardised. As Cork undertook 
the majority of its trade with the coastal countries of Europe the issues regarding 
the more complicated geographical divisions of early nineteenth century Europe, 
such as the Holy Roman Empire and the German Confederation, did not arise. 
The website itself was designed using the Bootstrap framework. The open 
source and modular nature of Bootstrap makes the process of designing a dynamic 
front end interface far more intuitive. It allows allows for a web page to be adapted 
for a variety of browser and hardware configurations quite quickly. The homepage 




Image 1 Home page for modernirishvenice.com 
The ‘Query’ tab contains details on how to use the search interface and provides 
the user with the option to search exports or imports. Whichever option is chosen 
will open the search page. There are four options to create a search, ‘Country’, 
‘Goods’, ‘Chart Type’ and there is the option to include the total volume of trade 
from Cork for the specific product. The ‘Chart Type’ option gives the user the choice 
between a line or a bar chart. Once the desired search terms have been selected 
the results page will appear with a populated chart, as seen in image 2. A title is 
dynamically generated based on the inputted search terms. Below the visualisation 
there is the option to generate an image based on new search terms and towards 
the bottom of the page there is an expandable section where the user can view the 




Image 2 Search Results Page 
The ‘Database’ dropdown provides the user with details regarding the database and 
also allows the user to download both the normalised and un-normalised 
databases. Finally the ‘About’ dropdown gives information on the site and a select 
bibliography on Cork’s trade. The underlying code used to create the search and 
retrieval interface, as well as the relevant vairables for the visualisations, can be 
viewed from the ‘About this Site’ section of the website. 
 To generate the visualisations the Google Chart API was chosen. Initially 
Highcharts was to be used, but Google Charts was simpler to implement and 
provides more functionality, such as the ability to show the data for any point on 
the chart by hovering over it with the cursor. Google Charts is optimised for use 
with Google Sheets, Google’s spreadsheet software, and some options are not 
available unless the data is contained in Google Sheets. The data used for this 
website is generated dynamically from an SQL database so many of the more 
advanced functions were not available. If there was only a sporadic trade in an item 
it is recommended that the user select the option for a bar chart. This is due to 
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Google Charts automatically joining values in a line chart. For example, if there was 
a trade in a product in 1800 and then no trade in that item until 1820, Google 
Charts will automatically connect these two data points. Selecting the bar chart 
option negates this issue if it arises. 
The focus in this thesis is on the most important countries that Cork traded 
with during the early nineteenth century. This is reflected in the structure of the 
thesis. Cork’s part in the transatlantic trade was the defining trade for eighteenth 
century Cork. The expertise they developed in preserving foodstuffs for the 
Caribbean was the cornerstone of all their international trade. In order to ensure 
quality produce they needed access to Portuguese salt. The monetary value of 
trade with Portugal was small in comparison to that with the Caribbean or Britain, 
but access to Portuguese salt for preservation was fundamental to ensure the 
quality of their provisions. Finally Britain was the defining influence for their 
commerce. Sixteenth century restrictions had led to the development of Cork’s 
transatlantic trade, and political change in Britain was one of the fundamental 
problems for Cork’s provisioning merchants. However, the Committee of Merchants 
in Cork also bears responsibility for many of the issues that arose for Cork’s 
international trade in the nineteenth century. Cork undertook trade with many 
different countries at many different points in the nineteenth century, but trade 
with Britain, Portugal and the West Indies was critical to their success. Any changes 
in the nature of their commerce with any of these three countries had the potential 




Chapter 1  
Trans-Atlantic Trade 
Ireland’s, and specifically Cork’s, trade and industrial development was 
intrinsically linked to the modern world that was taking shape around them. Close 
ties with Britain integrated Ireland into the world’s largest economy, one that 
would shortly have the power to enforce the Pax Britannica. In many respects the 
loss of Grattan’s Parliament and the introduction of the Union with Britain 
improved Ireland’s potential for economic growth. Before the Act of Union 
protectionist legislation (such as the Navigation, Wool, and Cotton Acts) restricted 
Ireland’s access to imperial markets. However, the implementation of the Act of 
Union would potentially put much of Ireland’s trade on an equal footing with that 
of Britain. Terms under Article VI limited Ireland’s integration for a period, but 
these limitations were only to apply for a prescribed length of time. Of course this 
was not the only important legislation passed at this time; it was just one of the few 
that Cork merchants could influence. Two other major pieces of legislation would 
come to pass that had the potential to impact Cork’s trans-Atlantic trade; the 
abolition of slavery and the prospective renewal of certain provisions of the Jay 
Treaty. The abolition of slavery had little noticeable impact on the volumes of trade 
Cork conducted with the Americas, but the Jay Treaty and it’s renewal was a long 
running issue that posed a serious threat to Cork’s transatlantic commerce.This 
chapter will assess the impact that legislative and treaty changes had on the Cork 
merchants’ trans-Atlantic trade with the West Indies and America. It will also assess 
their attempts to preserve and increase their access to these markets. 
Historians of British industrial development have long debated the 
importance of the Caribbean trade to the British Industrial Revolution. Mokyr 
disputes the claim that foreign markets were vital for the rapid expansion in British 
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industrial growth.1 By the 1780s the opinion that foreign trade was ‘trivial and 
dispensable’ was moving towards a perception that it provided a variety of benefits 
not captured statistically and comprising a significant component of British 
industrialisation.2 These benefits comprised of the trades ancillary to the main 
provisioning industries in Cork, as well as the associated benefits of engaging in 
international trade such as the profits made in transporting goods across the 
Atlantic. More recently Mokyr has argued that the importance of foreign trade was 
twofold: it spurred on economic growth and was a useful tool in British colonial 
domination through the exclusion of rival European powers. However, he suggests 
that these factors had lost much of their primacy by 1780.3  
This debate does not apply directly to Cork, but it is relevant because Cork’s 
industrial development throughout the eighteenth century was driven by the 
merchant class. The main business of these merchants was in supplying provisions 
for both the colonies across the Atlantic and the vessels making the voyage.4 They 
developed techniques to ensure that produce lasted for the duration of these trips. 
The focus on the production of provisions led to specialisation in many trades that 
were directly related to the provisioning industries, such as coopering, tallow 
making, and leather work. The only major industry in the region that had a large 
stake in the trans-Atlantic trade outside of food production was in linen goods. The 
Cattle Acts had forced Cork merchants to broaden their horizons at the same time 
that the American economies’ pace of growth increased. Cork merchants had a 
vested interest in developments across the Atlantic.  
                                                     
1 Darity, William, ‘British Industry and West Indies Plantations’ in Stanley L. Engerman and J. E. 
Inikori (eds), The Atlantic Slave Trade: Effects on Economies, Societies, and Peoples in Africa, the 
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Cork’s Trade with the Americas 
The trans-Atlantic trade from Cork, to all locations, was primarily in 
provisions and semi-finished or finished produce, such as linen and shoes. There 
were small amounts of other desiderata sent to the colonies, such as glassware, but 
the trade in these items was minute. Restrictions placed on Ireland during the 
eighteenth century influenced the structure of this trade, moving the focus away 
from live exports and towards provisioning and limiting the production of wool 
while favouring linen. Eighteenth century legislation was intended to limit Irish 
competition on the British market. Richard Pares and Mark McCarthy have argued 
that the British government had forced South Munster into livestock raising due to 
these restrictive eighteenth century policies.5 Although much of the restrictive 
legislation had been lifted by the turn of the century and the Act of Union promised 
to grant greater access to the United Kingdom home market, a large proportion of 
the structure and focus of Cork’s trade had already been consolidated. O’Hearn 
argues that during this period British policy moved from formal colonialism to free 
trade imperialism and that this was further enhanced in Ireland as the ‘Union 
helped Britain control Ireland politically and subjugate it economically, 
institutionalising regional unequal development between regions’.6 
The restrictions of the sixteenth century forced Irish merchants to source 
economic opportunities elsewhere through the development of alternative 
industries. As the trans-Atlantic trading environment gained momentum, a new 
opportunity was presented to South Munster; supplying the colonies. Munster, 
with fertile agricultural land, a strong tradition of livestock production, one of the 
largest natural harbours in the world, and positioned on the South Western tip of 
the European Atlantic, was ideally suited to establish itself in trade with the 
American colonies. It was also strategically placed for shipping to supply and gather 
what it needed before making the crossing. It was in the provisioning trade and 
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burgeoning trade in American cash crops that Cork developed its enviable, though 
tenuous, position in the Atlantic economy. In 1853 John Maguire commented on 
the city’s access to American markets while discussing the decline in Irish 
provisioning at that time. He noted both the ‘immense’ size of Cork’s provisioning 
industries and their ‘peculiar privileges over the…important markets of 
Newfoundland and the West Indies.’7 
The following sections focus on direct trade between Cork and the American 
continent and assess the reasons for its decline after very strong growth during the 
eighteenth century. This is not to take away from the importance of the 
transhipment trade. It was indeed a key component of Cork’s trans-Atlantic 
economy that dwarfed the direct trade, but this will be dealt with in following 
chapters on trade with the Continent and with Britain. The main potential benefit 
from trade with the Americas was through direct links. This provided the mercantile 
community in Cork with access to some of the most rapidly developing world 
economies and to regions of the world whose cash crops were becoming 
increasingly valuable consumables in Europe. Furthermore, the transhipment trade 
should be considered under the auspices of Cork’s trade with the intermediary 
nation; the market to which they were gaining access. In many respects it is 
irrelevant if the majority of the butter being shipped to Liverpool was intended for 
the American market. Cork derived very little benefit from the ultimate destination 
of transhipped produce, beyond the fact that there was demand for its particular 
brand.8  Cork’s merchants did not gain direct access this way to cash crops such as 
sugar or tobacco. One of the most serious threats to Cork’s transatlantic trade came 
from the newly emergent United States and its proximity to the West Indies 
markets.  
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The ‘Jay Treaty’ (1794) and Cork Merchants 
The economic development of the United States had a negative impact on 
Cork’s Atlantic trade from 1790 to 1830. During the eighteenth century the main 
products being imported from the United States were flaxseed and timber. During 
the mid-1780s Reuben Harvey, a successful Cork merchant, corresponded regularly 
with suppliers in North America providing market conditions for these goods in 
Ireland. He noted in 1786 that ‘…staves here are declining owing to great quantities 
lately landed from Philadelphia’.9 In this correspondence he also takes care to 
mention legislative acts that could have an impact upon their business:  
An act of Parliament has lately pass’d allowing your vessels and cargoes to be 
enter’d at our custom houses and discharged… your ships can be sold without any 
duty, but they are not permitted in the West Indies to land Irish produce of 
manufactures, tho’ they may load such articles in Ireland.10 
It is important to note the specific exclusion of the West Indies. These islands were 
too valuable to Britain to allow access to the United States, which had until very 
recently been at war with Britain.  
This protectionism, so crucial for Cork’s provisioning merchants, would not 
last. Cork’s main exports to the Caribbean were in processed foodstuffs, 
commodities that America had the potential, but not yet the ability, to supply. Fear 
of American competition on these markets led the Freeman’s Journal to complain 
that ‘The States of America are stirring earth and hell to be permitted our West 
India islands with provisions and lumber’.11 This apprehension about the potential 
for American interference in colonial markets extended to the highest levels of the 
British establishment, with a report to William Pitt noting the damage that could be 
caused:  
When America shall be quickly settled, shall have established salt works, and can 
draw cattle from the back settlements, she may supply the West Indies with 
provisions, and the injury to Ireland will then extend not only to depriving her of 
the beef and pork trade, but of those commodities which cattle furnish, such as 
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butter, candles, cheese, tanned hides, soap, tallow, shoes, and all other 
manufactures of leather… This may therefore be the proper time for settling the 
trade with the West Indies, so that no article of manufacture in which America may 
at a future day contend with Great Britain or Ireland be suffered now to be 
imported into the islands from America.12 
This statement echoes the main points of letters John Foster sent to Thomas Orde 
around the same time querying the state of the United States relationship with the 
West Indies and the potential threat of this to Ireland’s trade. He maintained that 
allowing a free trade between North America and the West Indies would benefit ‘all 
those who wish to separate us [Ireland] from Britain.’13 
The decades between the end of the Revolutionary War and the opening of 
the nineteenth century were tumultuous times for trade with North America. 
Leaving aside the changes in Ireland’s status after its absorbtion into the United 
Kingdom, the Napoleonic Wars’ impact on Continental trade and the increasing 
pressures on Irish domestic industry due to improving production methods in 
Britain, America was emerging as a real threat to Ireland’s trade with the 
Caribbean. In an examination of the commercial state of the West Indies in 1807 
many residents and merchants of the various islands expressed doubts concerning 
their ability to source goods from Britain during times of conflict. Furthermore they 
expressed reservations regarding the cost involved in transporting supplies over 
such a distance.14 The Jefferson Embargo of 1807 and ensuing economic and 
military conflicts with Britain stemmed the flow of American goods into the West 
Indies somewhat, but this merely served to postpone the inevitable. These issues 
became more pronounced as the years moved on and conflicts increased. 
By 1805 this threat had become so apparent that the merchant community 
of Cork felt the need to petition William Pitt, then first Lord of the Treasury and 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, regarding the pressures they were under. In their 
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petition they noted that the provision trade was declining and under serious threat 
of being extinguished. Their main contention was that it had become impossible for 
Cork provisioning merchants to compete with the capabilities of the United States 
to provision the British colonies and the conquered settlements. Presumably this 
refered to captured islands during the Napoleonic Wars, as well as Trinidad, which 
was ceded to Britain under the Treaty of Amiens.15 As with most petitions or 
correspondence the Cork merchants attempted to frame the issues as an Imperial 
matter,  pointing out how valuable this trade was to the British American Colonies, 
‘as we was [sic] to the United Kingdom.’16 They argued that the loss of their 
provisions trade with the West Indies would also be a serious loss to the remaining 
British colonies in the region. To put it succinctly, they thought that the treaties 
made with the United States since the conclusion of the Revolutionary Wars were 
too generous to the Americans. They pointed to the extra costs for Cork merchants, 
such as salt duties, as examples of how the trade increasingly favoured American 
merchants. Indeed they argued that these duties were 
so high that the duty upon the quantity necessary to manufacture a barrel of 
provisions amount [sic] to nearly as much as the freight of the same to Jamaica and 
act at once as a bounty to the American provisions trade.17 
Combined with the expense inherent in convoy shipments, Cork merchants 
were failing to compete against the United States on the Caribbean markets. As was 
their wont, they argued that the difficulties for Cork would have wider imperial 
implications, before framing their arguments at a national and then local level. They 
were quite politically astute and asserted that the Act of Union placed certain 
obligations on Westminster with regards to protecting their industry. Furthermore, 
they argued that the loss of the provisions trade for Ireland could lead to a point 
where British military forces could become dependent on foreign countries for their 
supplies and that this would be a serious issue if political relations deteriorated 
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with said country.18  This was quite a forceful argument to be sent from the 
merchants of a port which was a major victualler for the British military. 
The subject of this petition was the re-negotiation of the 1794 Jay Treaty.19 
It had been signed in light of certain disagreements and omissions from the Treaty 
of Paris, which ended the Revolutionary War, regarding trade and the treatment of 
merchant sailors. A long-running point of contention between Great Britain and the 
United States was the impressment of United States sailors and one of the 
objectives of the renewal of this treaty was to rectify the problem. A letter from 
Rufus King (American Minister to the Court of St. James 1796-1826) to Lord 
Hawkesbury (Robert Jenkinson 2nd Earl of Liverpool and at this time the Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs) from 1801 outlined American grievances during the Anglo-
Spanish War. He alleged that American vessels travelling to the Spanish colonies 
were seized on the basis that they were carrying the produce of a nation at war 
with Britain. Furthermore, he stated that such seizures ‘continue to be the unjust 
and ruinous interruption of the American commerce in the West India seas… [and] 
are wasting the lawful commerce of a peaceful and friendly nation’.20  
British newspapers did not show much sympathy for these allegations. The 
Hampshire Chronicle noted the discontent in the United States due to these alleged 
practices and the introduction of a bill for the protection and indemnification of 
American seamen. This newspaper’s nitpicking of the bill is quite amusing, its main 
point of contention being that the government 
Seem[s] to make no allowance for the difficulty of distinguishing between real 
Americans, and the various British seamen who assume that name. The operation 
of the clause must, therefore, have the effect of protecting every fugitive and 
deserter, from England, Ireland, or Scotland, who could find shelter on board an 
American trader. We find, in fact, that the impressing out of an American vessel 
some person from the North of Ireland, notoriously subjects of his Majesty, has 
been enumerated in the list of excesses committed by British cruisers. Upon the 
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principle of this clause then, we cannot see what is to prevent the American 
Masters from giving protection to all the English seamen who are base enough to 
desert their colours.21 
This rather ridiculous argument conceals the seriousness of the situation. The 
tension between the United States and Great Britain over this issue was enough 
that it could potentially lead to an escalation of economic sanctions or even to war.  
The provisions of the Jay Treaty were up for renegotiation after a period of 
ten years. Several of the articles contained within it concerned those involved in the 
provisions trade in Cork, namely Articles III, XII, and XV. Article III stated: 
All goods and merchandise whose importation into his Majesty’s said territories in 
America, shall not be entirely prohibited, may freely, for the purposes of 
commerce, be carried into the same in the manner aforesaid, by the citizens of the 
United States, and such goods and merchandize shall be subject to no higher or 
other duties, than would be payable by the citizens of the United States on the 
importation of the same in American vessels into the Atlantic ports of the said 
states. 22 
This recipicrocity of duties was a major boost for any exportation from the United 
States into British possessions in the Americas, and when combined with the much 
shorter distances goods had to travel was a threat to Cork’s provisioning trade with 
the West Indies. Article XII directly allowed for the exportation of American produce 
to the West Indies in vessels less than 70 tons. The only restrictions were on sugar, 
coffee, molasses, cocoa or cotton and Article XV agreed to place no tariffs or duties 
above those of other nations.23 In 1800 the average time it took to travel from Cork 
to Barbados was approximately forty-two days, whereas the sailing time from the 
United States would have been a fraction of this.24 This combined with the 
requirement for convoys during the Napoleonic Wars and transportation and 
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preservation costs would have acted as an effective bounty in the favour of 
American producers, as the Committee of Merchants argued.25  
However, for a time at least, there was a mutual benefit in the more relaxed 
trading environment. The Jay Treaty gave the United States important concessions, 
but during the period between the Treaty of Paris and this treaty Ireland imported 
substantial quantities of lumber and flaxseed from the United States which was 
important for the domestic Irish market.26 There was a degree of double standards 
at play in Cork’s outrage. Ireland desired to obtain free trade with Britain and to 
gain greater access to colonial markets, but was not so keen a proponent of free 
trade to support a more open market with a country that had the potential to 
interfere with her own interests. This hypocrisy was not unique to Cork’s 
merchants. Many of their arguments exhibit striking similarities to those British 
producers had made several years earlier when Ireland was on the verge of 
achieving free trade. They too argued that granting free trade to Ireland would 
devastate British industry and merchants.27  
A series of parliamentary debates ensued, focusing on allowing neutral ships 
to import and export named goods from the West Indies and North American 
colonies. In essence the issue was whether or not Parliament should allow the 
United States shipping freedom of access to British possessions and extend the 
expiring concessions under the Jay Treaty. The intention of this bill, as stated by the 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Charles Fox was  
To permit the inhabitants of those islands to be supplied with provisions, and 
certain other articles of indispensable necessity, with which it was impossible, 
under a variety of impediments, for British ships to supply them.28 
This would address some of the concerns expressed by West Indian planters 
regarding security of supplies. George Rose (who served on the Committee of 
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Trade, not his son who was an MP at the same time) argued strongly against the 
Bill, both on the basis that beef and pork was already being supplied cheaper by the 
Americans than the Irish and that any relaxation of the Navigation Acts at this time 
risked further American encroachments beyond those necessary to supply British 
colonies with provisions.29 Sir John Newport (MP for Waterford and Chancellor of 
the Irish Exchequer) believed that this bill would benefit all. His voice carried some 
weight on this topic as he had recently been in the region, from where he wrote 
frequently to the Committee of Merchants regarding the need for provisions in the 
Caribbean region.30 Arguments were posited by those in favour of the bill that this 
would not threaten Irish trade and that in fact Irish trade was insufficient to 
provision these regions. At one point Newport even attempted to argue that this 
bill was in fact supported by those in the Irish provisions trade on the basis that it 
would give them more confidence in the trade by setting down a fixed rule. There is 
no evidence of this in the Committee of Merchants records.31  
The arguments over this legislation continued, with opponents suggesting 
that not only would this bill harm the Irish provisions trade, but that it would also 
place British colonies in a position of dependency on a country with which they had 
recently been in conflict. They believed this would weaken the entire British 
colonial system and also threaten the East India Company. Supporters claimed that 
the lack of such a bill in the previous conflict with the French had led to the death of 
15,000 slaves due to starvation because it had been impossible to transport 
sufficient amounts of produce due to the war.32 The debate centred on the 
necessity of American supplies to the West Indies, with Rose suggesting that the 
initial treaty in 1794 had the effect of collapsing British shipping to the region. This 
was a pressing issue since the West Indies, devoted as they were to the production 
of a single cash crop, were unable to supply themselves and a great amount of 
wealth flowed from these islands into British coffers. In this period British military 
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expenditure was skyrocketing in order to fund the various conflicts with the French. 
Any threat to colonial trade would be detrimental to British finances.  
During the course of these debates Lord Sheffield put forward an interesting 
argument: he suggested that by taking away the Irish parliament merchants there 
had nowhere to voice their concerns and that they should have a place of redress.33 
The Union had moved Ireland to the margins of imperial policy. This had begun to 
manifest itself in the declining influence of the Committee of Merchants in political 
spheres and the dearth of representation they could muster despite regular wining 
and dining of senior political and military officials. An Order of Council in 1807 
effectively shelved the debate by allowing for the continuation of the Jay Treaty 
until further notice. Though overtaken by a variety of embargoes due to renewed 
hostilities with the French, it served to highlight that the Irish provisions trade, 
centred on Cork, was a concern in London due to its importance to the West Indies. 
This argument would resurface after 1815, when the exigencies of war were not as 
pressing.34 
Upon the conclusion of the War of 1812, negotiations opened between 
Britain and the United States. The general view of the Morning Post was that flaws 
in the initial treaty establishing the United States, the Treaty of Paris, had provided 
them with a nursery for seamen and that past decades of European war had gifted 
them the potential for the boundless expansion of their commerce.35 The treaties 
being negotiated could potentially open new markets for British manufacturers as 
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well as sources of raw materials for the Empire. This typifies the objectives in 1814 
for future agreements with the United States. It was to be a market for the British 
Empire, a market where they could find new outlets for their growing industrial 
production. Increasing access to America was of paramount importance for British 
commercial interests, not the trivial concerns of minor merchants hoping for 
protection against American encroachment in their West Indies trade. 
This was not an isolated case of doubt expressed by the Committee of 
Merchants regarding the potential impact of further developments in the United 
States. In 1815 after the cessation of hostilities the Prince Regent made a seemingly 
innocuous statement in his speech on the dissolution of parliament: 
The restoration of Peace between this Country and the United States of America 
has been followed by a negotiation for a Commercial Treaty, which I have every 
reason to hope will be terminated upon conditions calculated to cement the good 
understanding subsisting between the two countries, and equally beneficial to the 
interests of both.36 
At once the Committee wrote a petition to the then Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Lord 
Viscount Whitworth. They re-iterated the same concerns that they had expressed 
ten years previously when the provisions of the Jay Treaty were up for re-
negotiation. They argued that no condition should be agreed to that would permit 
the importation, from the United States in any vessel whatsoever, in any of the 
British colonies or settlements in the West Indies or North America, of any flour, 
fish, salt provisions, butter, lard, soap or candles, ‘in any contingency or under any 
circumstances whatsoever.’37 They emphasised that Britain (within which they 
included Ireland) and her colonies could supply all in abundance, while maintaining 
that previous treaties providing equal access to the produce of the United States 
had led to ‘the law itself [becoming] the cause of the evil that it intended to 
correct’.38   
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At this time it is likely that the merchants of Cork foresaw the potential loss 
of revenue that the conclusion of a long period of hostilities would create. They 
went so far as to state that it was Britain’s obligation 
to afford that protection [from the United States] in, and engagement of the 
markets of our different colonies which as a member of the parent empire she has 
eminently earned, by returning to that fundamental principles of colonial 
connexion [sic], mutual monopoly of market, and material preference of supply.39 
Cork merchants knew well the loss of revenue caused by peace. With the potential 
renewal of hostilities with the French in 1803 they had written to express their 
support for the war and for the reintroduction of various bounties for sailors.40 
Peace — with the loss of high military demands for provisions and weakening 
interests in the Caribbean — could be bad for business. 
The West Indies provisioning trade may have shrunk for the Cork merchants, 
but perhaps it was never as bountiful as they thought. A private letter detailed 
some issues American merchants faced at this time. Peace in Europe had led to a 
stagnation of American commerce and they sustained losses on all exports. 
Furthermore, the writer alleged that the cost of American flour was so low that any 
exported to the West Indies was at a massive loss, so great that some American 
merchants had taken to purchasing American flour on the West Indies market for 
sale back in the United States.41 The author perhaps overstated the issues American 
exporters faced, but no more so than the Committee of Merchants did in Cork. The 
loss of the West Indies trade was far more complex than simply American 
merchants taking advantage of the chaos of wartime and a lack of support from 
parliament to protect Cork’s trade. Whereas the Committee of Merchants in Cork 
bemoaned the opening of the Navigation Laws to allow increased access of 
American merchants to colonial markets, the Americans complained that Britain 
had not sufficiently relaxed these laws or opened her colonial system to them. They 
desired further access, which Britain would not allow.42 In a contest between the 
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desires of merchants in Ireland and merchants in America, it is unlikely that the Irish 
merchants would prevail for long. Concessions to the United States, it had long 
been recognised, brought raw materials and an exponentially expanding market for 
manufactured goods. Ireland had very little to offer in competition except for her 
claims to protection under the articles of the Act of Union. 
The fears that Committee of Merchants expressed may have been well 
founded. By 1831 they petitioned the Board of Trade yet again petitioning with 
respect to their ‘decaying’ Caribbean trade, pleading that American provisioning be 
subject to the same duties in the colonies as they were on importation to Britain. 
They dismissed the protective legislation that was in place as an ‘illusion’.43 This was 
one of the last mentions of the West Indies trade in the Committee’s minutes up to 
the 1840s. What had once been a vibrant trade with the West Indies had, to all 
intents and purposes, been lost. Patrick Nash argues that after the American 
Revolution Britain was quite successful in protecting the rights of its subjects in 
terms of merchant shipping, plantations, mineral resources and colonies.44 If this 
was truly the case then some of the grievances the Cork merchants felt are 
understandable as they believed their interests were being excluded. Parliamentary 
debates from the mid- to late-1810s show increasing frustration expressed by 
Members of Parliament over the self-interest of Irish merchants. Mr. Hudson 
Gurney in a speech before the House of Commons noted that ‘it seemed to have 
passed as a matter universally understood, that the people of England were to pay 
everything, and the people of Ireland nothing’.45  
The Committee of Merchants used carefully constructed terms and 
arguments in their dealings with the government. Throughout this period they 
rarely or solely applied their complaints to the impact upon Cork’s trade alone. 
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Instead, they tended to place their interests in an Imperial context, whether or not 
it should be afforded such a place. Their complaints almost always mention the 
potential damage to ‘our Imperial Enterprise’, ‘British Wealth’, or ‘the Kingdom’. In 
some instances, such as the 1815 petition to Lord Viscount Whitworth, they refer 
to, ‘the separate interest of Ireland (if any part of the United Kingdom can have a 
separate interest)’.46 This is the language, tone and style of a body of men 
completely au fait with the exigencies of dealing with distant London- or Dublin-
based bureaucrats and politicians. Their urgency is always clear, but they were 
aware that using such a tone ensured their complaints would not be treated as 
simply the bitterness of a distant backwater town. Their arguments regularly 
progress from placing their opinion at a level with Imperial concerns, before slowly 
moving to the local specifics of the issue at hand. By 1815 the Committee of 
Merchants had accumulated several decades of experience dealing with various 
high level officials, from Admirals to Lord-Lieutenants. This experience was 
reflected in how they positioned their arguments to the upper echelons of society 
and it was effective in many, but not all, instances. 
However, despite protestations to the contrary, the belief that Ireland 
deserved a protected trade was not the case. There may have been some argument 
that by implementing the Act of Union Ireland did deserve certain market 
protections, but conversely the Union also tied Ireland to Westminster. As early as 
1784 Richard Atkinson, the Director of the East India Company, discussed the topic 
of Ireland’s trade with the colonies. In a letter to Pitt, ‘Observations on Irish Trade’, 
he noted, 
They already enjoy it upon an equal footing with Britain… But it should never be 
forgot [sic] that they hold this privilege by the favour of Britain; and when 
therefore their pretensions are advanced to limit the trade of those very colonies 
to which they themselves only have by favour… The sacrifice made by the sugar 
colonies in giving the Irish a monopoly of the great staple produce of their country-
salted provisions-merits a different return, and it must not be forgot [sic] that the 
                                                     




commercial importance of the sugar colonies to Britain, is vastly beyond that of 
Ireland itself.47 
Given the rapid growth of the American market in the decades between the 1780s 
and the 1820s such considerations could equally be applied to the United States. 
The potential benefit of access to such a vast and lucrative market far outweighed 
the benefits of kowtowing to provincial merchants in Ireland. 
The letter from Atkinson is indicative of how the mercantile system in 
Britain viewed Irish trade. His views (in 1784) can be surmised thusly: firstly, 
Ireland’s trade with the sugar plantations was a gift from Britain and the sugar 
islands were more valuable than Irish exports to them. Matters of political 
expediency were not relevant. Secondly, without harmonisation of taxes and duties 
between Britain and Ireland freedom of commerce between them threatened 
British interests, either due to price differentials or smuggling. Finally, no benefits 
should be accrued to Ireland that could threaten any aspect of British trade or 
manufacture. These considerations pervade the whole letter, but especially with 
reference to access to the East India trade and taxes on wrought iron. The petitions 
of the various British manufacturers of the time echo similar views, with complaints 
focused on the perceived advantages of the Irish manufacturers as well as the 
potential threat to indigenous British industries. Although all seem to be of the 
mind that Ireland and the Irish were ‘British’, they nevertheless feared the lower 
duties, taxes and cost base of the Irish market.  
The pervasiveness of this mercantilist attitude accounts for Cork merchants’ 
grievances at the perceived injustices regarding the lack of protection of their 
interests in the West Indies after the Napoleonic Wars. The opposition surrounding 
the relaxation of the Navigation Acts centred on duty differentials and the need to 
protect the interests of those that benefitted from operating free from external 
competition. Thirty years later, after tax harmonisation and concession to many of 
the mercantilists’ demands, they found themselves at a loss. The burgeoning 
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laissez-faire system had little time for the protectionism and racketeering of 
mercantilism.  
Caribbean Trade 
Ireland might carry on a considerable trade with the West Indies, for which its 
situation is exceedingly favourable, as there is demand in those islands for almost 
every production and manufacture of that country.48 
The West Indies trade was the cornerstone of Cork’s export business in the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. An estimated 80 per cent of Ireland’s 
trans-Atlantic trade was with the West Indies and, due to its advantageous location, 
Cork dominated this trade.49 Figures for direct exports do not fully capture the 
extent to which Cork produce was used in the region due to transhipment via 
Britain and the Continent. However, contemporary demand for supplies of ‘Rose’ 
butter, one of Cork’s quality marks, can demonstrate its extent.50  This ‘Rose’ butter 
was often directly specified in provisioning contracts, with bills of lading for the 
Beamish and Crawford Merchant business including this designation for their 
butter, along with the ‘mess’ beef used in the Caribbean.51 It also facilitated the 
creation of a number of interrelated ancillary trades. The direct exportation of 
produce brought Cork merchants into the centre of one of Britain’s most lucrative 
colonial regimes: the Caribbean sugar trade. The provisions Cork supplied were tied 
to its position as a major victualling centre for the British navy and thus colonial 
residents were acclimatised to the produce that British naval forces and merchants 
carried. 52 Of course it was not just Britain that had a hand in the sugar plantations 
in these regions; France, Portugal, the Netherlands and other major European 
colonial powers were likewise invested in the development and exploitation of the 
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Americas. The French in particular recognised the importance of Cork’s produce, 
specifically beef, for the maintenance of their plantations. During the eighteenth 
century various acts, correspondence and manuals regarding the French sugar 
colonies all listed salt beef from Ireland and ‘negres’ from the Guinea coast as 
necessary exports to the islands in almost the same breath. During the various 
embargoes of the eighteenth century a variety of methods were used to circumvent 
trade restrictions such as shipping via intermediary islands in the West Indies.53 The 
major flaw in the trans-Atlantic sugar trade was its unsustainable nature.  Turning 
the entire economic structure to produce a single cash crop, which utilised the 
majority of the arable land and required a slave labour force devoted to its 
production, meant that the islands required vast quantities of imported goods to 
sustain themselves. Very little production capacity was left to supply the basic 
produce required to sustain an artificially increasing slave population. This 
unsustainable structure created a high demand for the produce of Cork. 
As previously mentioned, numerous debates surround the question of the 
colonies’ importance to British economic development.54 It has variously been 
considered an unrelated economic development, or that it was a result of the 
growing British demand for produce from these regions and that this demand, in 
turn, helped create the massive growth in British industrialisation. Eric Williams 
proposed that the slave trade and related trades in plantation supplies had a 
substantial role in British industrialisation.55 In essence Williams argued that the 
slave trade funded British industrialization, but to support the increased 
consumption it necessitated the development of improved production methods 
that eventually superseded the need for slavery.56 The debate surrounding the 
relevance of the slave trade and related trades to overall industrial growth in Britain 
will not be resolved here. However, its influence on the regional development of a 
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city supplying the essential goods and provisions that sustained the population will 
be examined. This trade had a small but key role in supporting the growth in 
demand of consumer desirables such as sugar, coffee and cocoa.   
Imports 
As the most important product of the West Indies, Cork benefitted from the 
production of West Indies’ sugar. Figure 1-1 below demonstrates that no other 
region came close to exporting the same level of sugar to Cork. Cork did possess its 
own small-scale sugar refineries and Etienne Coquebert, the French consul to 
Ireland, noted in the late eighteenth century that the sugar refineries he observed 
in Cork appeared to run on the same principles as those in France.57 The indication 
is that this was yet another industry, along with linen manufacture, that Hugenot 
families had introduced to Cork.  
 
Figure 1-1 Cork’s sugar imports from all parts of the American Continent58 
From an Irish perspective the levels of sugar imports into Cork were quite 
small. Although Coquebert noted that there were French style refineries in Cork, 
these would not have been anywhere near the same scale or standard as those of 
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Britain or France. Even if they were, the prices fetched on the Irish market were not 
as competitive as those in a larger urban environment. Jacob Price notes that  
Since almost all the sugar produced in the British islands was consumed in Britain 
and Ireland, it can be logically argued that home demand for sugar indeed kept 
prices above world market levels and produced the earnings that bought the 
needed slaves as well as imports from Britain, Ireland, and North America.59  
The value of sugar production was not in its direct importation, though investment 
in the large scale refining of raw sugar would have been lucrative. The real benefit 
lay in the demand the growth of the sugar trade in the British Empire created for 
Cork’s exports. This presented opportunities for the exportation for the principal 
agricultural produce of the Munster region through Cork. In the context of 
Wallersteins’ World systems theory, Cork (or Ireland) was a semi-peripheral region, 
Britain was the core and the West Indies the periphery.60 The West Indies supplied 
the raw materials and consumed goods produced in the core nation, namely 
Britain. Ireland supplied semi-finished or agricultural goods for the benefit of both.  
The case of rum importation into Cork is interesting (See Figure 1-2). Rum 
was a valuable consumable, with a significant time devoted to sourcing the most 
saleable produce.61 It even impeded the establishment of an indigenous distilling 
industry in the area, because the Cork palate was more inclined to rum or brandy 
than whiskey. This led to a large business in the rectification of Irish spirits to try to 
appeal to the tastes of South Munster.62 By the early nineteenth century the 
indigenous distilling industry had made inroads in changing Irish tastes. This could 
partially explain the peaks and troughs in the importation of West Indian rum. 
These fluctuations also correspond with the renewal of war with France and the 
war of 1812 with America respectively, with dramatic falls in 1804 and 1812. Such 
massive drops in the amount of rum available on the import market provided the 
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breathing space necessary for the Irish distillers to acclimatise the market to their 
own produce. 
The transhipment of produce through Britain explains the differential 
between total imports of rum into Cork and the importation of rum from America. 
Discussing eighteenth century rum imports to Ireland, Truxes attributes low levels 
of growth to issues with the schedules regarding importation duties. These 
guaranteed lower tariffs if the product was shipped to Britain first. He maintains 
that Ireland absorbed 90 per cent of Antiguan produced rum and 58 per cent of 
that from Barbados and St. Christopher in this manner during the 1770s.63 This 
demonstrates two problems in assessing the importance of the trans-Atlantic trade: 
First, a large proportion of both exports and imports were shipped via third parties. 
If Truxes’ estimates are correct this vastly alters the picture and it would mean that 
the consumption of West Indian imported rum was far higher than can be 
demonstrated from direct importation figures. Second, it demonstrates the 
distorting influence of having such a large economy as Britain’s on Ireland’s 
doorstep, irrespective of the almost dangerous levels of economic reliance on 
Britain that prevailed.  
                                                     




Figure 1-2 Cork’s rum imports64 
The final cash crop import from the West Indies that Cork was potentially in 
a strong position to dominate was coffee. In the period before the French 
Revolution the French colonies dominated coffee production, providing nearly two-
thirds of the world’s consumption.65 Considering the importance of Irish beef 
production for the French colonies, as well as several well placed family 
connections in the major French ports, it is no surprise that Cork secured quite a 
substantial amount of the direct coffee imports from the West Indies.66 
Unfortunately, as was to be the case in many of Cork’s international trade dealings, 
international and domestic affairs overtook the ability of the mercantile community 
to take full advantage of this gift. Coffee imports into Cork declined from the 1790s 
onwards (Figure 1-3). A series of uprisings in the French colonial holdings disrupted 
production and from that point on the decline was further interrupted by the 
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various outbreaks of conflict between Britain and France. Brief resurgences 
occurred during times of peace. These were not as a result of direct importation, 
but of transhipment via Britain and the ability of larger markets, such as Dublin, to 
capture what had been an imported good that had the potential to be of major 
consequence to Cork. As the consumption of coffee grew, Cork was left on the 
sidelines with regards to its importation. While Cork dominated national 
importation of coffee at an early stage when total Irish imports were low, by a 
decade later when Irish imports had increased six fold none of this increase led to a 
growth in Cork’s imports.The disruption to the trade by several decades of conflict 
meant that the initiative was lost. It is possible that had the city’s merchants had 
their own commercial ships they may have been able to take advantage of the 
massive upswing in Irish coffee imports. However, for a variety of reasons that will 
be discussed in the following chapters, they did not have that option available to 
them.  
 
Figure 1-3 Cork’s coffee imports compared to Irish total67 
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Exports and Provisioning 
The structure of the slave trade played a significant role in the development 
of Cork’s provisioning business. The rapidly growing slave population, used to 
cultivate cash crops, required large amounts of food and other necessities that 
could not be produced locally due to the preponderance of cash crop production. 
The abolition of the slave trade in 1807 led to a dramatic collapse in the shipment 
of slaves on British ships to the region.68 Up to 1807 Britain was the main exporter 
of slaves to the West Indies region (Figure 1-4). The French shipped small numbers 
to the region, but after a peak of approximately 50,000 slaves shipped in 1790 the 
trade collapsed rapidly. The French Revolution saw the Jacobins prohibit slavery 
and, although it was briefly reintroduced in the early nineteenth century in French 
colonies, the European slave trade was in general decline.69  It would be reasonable 
to assume that this had an impact upon Cork’s trade with the Caribbean. However, 
an examination of the slave population levels for the region shows that, although 
there was a steady decline in numbers, the population was still around 670,000 
twenty-seven years after the trade’s abolition. This is a drop of only one seventh 
from levels on the abolition of the trade in 1807 (see Figure 1-5). 
 
 
                                                     
68 A Bill, Intituled, An Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade, H.C. 1806-07 (68), i, 41 




Figure 1-4 Slaves transported to Caribbean by European powers70 
 
Figure 1-5 Population of slaves in Caribbean, 1807-183471 
What impact did the demographic changes in the West Indies and the 
abolition of slavery have on Cork’s trade with the region? In 1839 a Mr. Connell 
corresponded with the Committee of Merchants regarding the impact of abolition 
on West Indian production. He wanted the merchants of Cork to support him in his 
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endeavour to secure free emigration of ‘Collies and free Africans’ to provide extra 
labour for the production of sugar, rum, and molasses. He promised that this would 
increase demands for the butter and provisions, but warned that if they did not 
support his endeavour, ‘Rest assured that the trade of your port will be seriously 
injured.’72 This suggested that Cork’s success depended on production in the slave 
colonies. Implicit in this was the need for some new form of enforced servitude for 
both Mr. Connell’s endeavour as well as the city’s export merchants. Membership 
of a proposed sub-committee to discuss the topic was rejected by John Hardy and 
Daniel O’Callaghan, with Hardy rejecting on the basis of, 
The inhumanity of such a proceeding which would entice adult labourers from their 
native land & the bosom of their families to be doomed to a life of labour [is] just 
short of absolute slavery .73 
Although the future economic development of the West Indies was of some 
importance to Cork, at least two of the members of the Committee did not believe 
it outweighed moral considerations. It is worth bearing in mind though that the 
Cork West Indies commerce was no longer a hale trade. This is not to question the 
moral objections of these men, but rather to highlight the dramatic changes that 
had occurred since 1807. It further indicates that the contemporaneous health of 
the West Indies would no longer have commanded the same level of importance as 
it might have even ten years prior to Connell’s request. It is likely that most 
merchants of note in Cork had long since moved their main area of interest to 
European markets closer to home. 
The importance of the long-term development of these colonies, whether 
through direct or indirect trade, pushed Ireland into a key position in the rapidly 
expanding Atlantic economy during the eighteenth century. A significant proportion 
of this trade was conducted via British and French ports for re-export and as such is 
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not reflected in the accounts of direct trade. Mandelblatt argues that over the 
course of the eighteenth century the domestic markets in Britain and France 
gradually shrank and there was a reciprocal relationship between Ireland and the 
Atlantic economies.74 This goes against the views of Cullen and Dickson where they 
state that there was a move away from the Atlantic economies.75 However, if such a 
reciprocal relationship existed between Ireland and the Atlantic economies, it 
stands to reason that the abolition of the slave trade would have a direct impact on 
Cork as the main provisioning centre.  
As Figure 1-6 shows, from 1808 beef exports to the West Indies experienced 
a steady decline. This tallies with the Dickson’s assertion that a long term decline in 
the trade between Ireland and the Caribbean and the restructuring of Irish trade 
towards Europe began around 1760. This decline is indicative of falling provisions 
requirements from Cork, and considering that the decline began to take hold in 
1808 it relates to the impact the abolition of the slave trade. As there was a 
preference for using ‘small’ beef for the provisioning of slaves in the region that 
likely accounted for the dramatic fall.76 Unfortunately the import and export 
ledgers do not record the different types of beef product being exported to the 
region. Three major types were exported: first quality best beef, second quality 
mess beef for sailors and third quality beef of poorer cuts, sometimes referred to as 
French beef. The abolition of slavery was not the reason for this decline. It is more 
related to the trade orientating towards Europe and the implications of a rapidly 
emerging food industry in America, one that benefitted from the limitations on 
European states exporting to the Caribbean during the Napoleonic Wars.  
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Figure 1-6 Exports of beef to West Indies from Cork compared to total Cork beef exports with linear 
progression77 
Although the abolition of the slave trade may have hastened the depression 
in the beef trade, it was part of a longer term decline. This decline was precipitated 
by the changes in the nature of the trans-Atlantic trade, as well as decreases in 
British naval shipping after the American War of Independence.  The significance of 
any fluctuations in the importance of the West Indies beef trade could dramatically 
impact the total beef trade of Cork, as it represented between 20-50 per cent of the 
total trade in the product during the opening decades of the nineteenth century 
(see Figure 1-6). What is surprising is that, although there was a massive drop of the 
total Irish beef exports after the abolition of the slave trade, this was not reflected 
in the exports from Cork. The more significant drops in the exportation of beef from 
Cork coincide with periods of increased hostilities, in 1802, 1804, and the embargo 
of 1807. Although there is a recovery evident after each of these drops, it gradually 
decreased over time.  
The beef trade indicates that, rather than the abolition of slavery being the 
significant factor in the development of Cork’s export market, the more pertinent 
issue was the requirement that conflicts and embargoes placed on West Indies 
planters to source their provisions elsewhere, for example from the United States. 
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If slavery had the potential to disrupt the Irish provisioning trade it is highly unlikely 
that the Committee of Merchants in Cork would have overlooked it in the minutes 
of their meetings. Instead their major concern was the potential of the United 
States to annex their position of primacy in provisioning the Caribbean.78 As was 
shown, the slave population, although in decline, did not drop dramatically due to 
abolition, as the effective abolition and freeing of slaves did not completely occur 
until 1838.79 This population still needed to be fed. Furthermore, although Cullen 
argues that the main source for beef demand in the West Indies plantations were 
the slave populations and ship victualling, an eighteenth century English 
commentator wrote that the main consumers of salt beef in the British colonies 
were the planters and the settlers, not their slaves.80 Although by the nineteenth 
century many of the larger planters were absentee, there was still a significant 
planter and settler population that had grown accustomed to Irish beef provisions. 
Unfortunately, the exports abstracts do not break down the beef production by the 
various categories, as this is the simplest manner to ascertain what was being 
exported. Nonetheless the bottom category, French (or small) beef (which was used 
for the provisioning of slaves), was in decline by the nineteenth century. Therefore 
it can be reasonably assumed that much of the salt beef being exported was of a 
quality intended for the white population or to supply ships on the voyage across 
the Atlantic.81 
As the exports of beef to the West Indies declined, pork overtook beef as 
one of the main foodstuffs for export (see Figure 1-7). Coquebert noted this trend 
during the 1790s, when he commented that ships were beginning to reject salted 
beef as they found salted pork more digestible and less prone to harden in the salt. 
Furthermore a combination of rising beef prices and falling pork prices led to pork 
being an increasingly attractive alternative to salted beef.82 About the same time 
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that beef exports from Ireland fell dramatically in 1808, pork exports finally 
overtook beef as the major provisioning output. If the fall in beef exports to the 
West Indies was softened by the main market being the planters, rather than the 
slave population, and naval tastes were moving to pork as an acceptable and more 
durable alternative, then it is reasonable to assume that this increase in pork 
consumption resulted from planters and settlers in the West Indies adopting what 
was becoming the preferred naval diet.83 
 
Figure 1-7 Comparison of Beef and Pork exports to West Indies from Cork84 
As with butter and beef, the pork trade focused almost entirely on the sugar 
producing islands, with insignificant level of exports to other American regions (see 
Figure 1-8). This region took approximately 20 to 30 per cent of the exports from 
Cork and consistently around 10 per cent of the national average. Although Beckett 
has argued that the provisioning industry expanded rapidly from the 1790s, this 
does not appear to be the case with regard to Cork’s supply of produce to the West 
Indies.85 Any dramatic increase in the supply of provisions was apparently destined 
for the markets in Britain. This was a result of the slow, but inexorable restructuring 
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of Ireland’s trade towards Britain hastened by the Act of Union, the difficulties of 
sustaining a trans-Atlantic trade during periods of intense conflict, the growing 
urban British population’s increasing demands for foodstuffs and increasing 
competition from the United States. Furthermore, favourable prices and improving 
transit times induced the export of livestock across the Irish Sea. This had the effect 
of reducing the amount of livestock available for processing for the declining, trans-
Atlantic trade.86 The ultimate result of this decline was that by the 1840s exports of 
beef and pork outside of the United Kingdom were only 1/35th of what they had 
been in the 1780s.87 
 
Figure 1-8 Pork exports from Cork to Americas by region88 
This decline severely impacted Cork as much of the economic output of the 
region focused on West Indian provisioning. The deterioration of the West Indies 
trade and the over-reliance on supplying British urban markets was a dangerous 
situation to develop. Limiting the foreign markets that merchants engaged with had 
the potential to turn Ireland’s export trade into one entirely focused on serving the 
needs of Britain’s growing population. In many respects this also pushed Cork down 
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a route where the city would become the, ‘Pork and butter salting provincial’.89 This 
is not to say that this trade was lost without any comment. The mercantile 
community in Cork at times became quite exercised about the potential 
degradation of their trade in the Caribbean, but their political clout was not what it 
had been.90  By the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, Britain and Ireland 
were about to enter a prolonged period of economic depression.91 The constant 
requirements for military victualling had ended, at least to the extent that they had 
been in the past twenty-five years of conflict. The West Indies markets were no 
longer looking east across the Atlantic for their supplies as they now had a vibrant 
and rapidly growing market in the United States on their doorstop. 
The exception to the fall in provisioning supplies to the West Indian markets 
was butter. The figures remain remarkably stable over the period, staying between 
15-20,000 hundredweight per annum, except for some fluctuations during periods 
of conflict or embargo (see Figure 1-9). The same is true of Cork’s total exports, 
with no major variations. This is a testament to the success of the Committee of 
Merchants in regulating the regional butter trade and ensuring consistency and 
quality throughout. Cork butter had a reputation for quality and one that the 
Committee worked tirelessly to maintain. No other Irish producer was able to 
compete with the brand awareness of the quality and consistency of Cork butter. A 
rather embittered Dublin merchant commented that 
I think that Cork butter bore a better price, in consequence of being in better casks 
capable of holding pickle; we have exported to the West Indies, but could not get 
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so good a price for Dublin butter there as Cork butter…Cork Merchants have a 
distinct trade of their own; it is principally for South America and the West Indies92 
Much time and effort was spent locating fraud and false brands that could 
potentially harm the reputation of their output.93 This diligence secured Cork butter 
its prominent and respected place on the market. Other suppliers might surpass the 
quality, but the ability of the Committee of Merchants and Cork’s butter market to 
consistently produce a high quality product was unparalleled.  
 
Figure 1-9 Cork’s butter exports to the West Indies compared to national total94 
Although total butter exports were rising, this was not reflected in the 
volumes crossing the Atlantic. Instead the rise was attributable to growth in the 
British market. General tonnage shipped from Ireland to Liverpool nearly doubled 
from the enactment of the Act of Union to the end of the Napoleonic Wars (see 
Figure 1-10). However, Cork butter was a valuable transhipment commodity, so 
direct figures hide the real amounts being consumed in the Caribbean. In 1826 a 
parliamentary committee on Irish trade heard evidence from Thomas Fitzgibbon 
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that, although the majority of butter consumed in Brazil and the West Indies was 
from Cork, this was not reflected in the trade figures: 
A great deal of our export of butter to Liverpool includes two descriptions of 
butter; one part for use in England, the other part for trans-shipment to the West 
Indies and Brazils [sic]. We have an account of the export to Liverpool, which this 
year has been about 50,000 firkins. Now about 40,000 firkins of those, I think, have 
been pickled for warm climates95 
Other Cork butter merchants supported this view. In a Report from the Select 
Committee on the Butter Trade in Ireland they disputed that there had been a 
decline in the trade with the Americas and argued that considerably more than half 
of their butter was ultimately destined for foreign markets with a large proportion 
of the trade being in transhipments through ports such as Liverpool.96 The 
Committee of Merchants minutes could provide more detail, but there is a gap in 
records for this period. The statements provided in this report may have been 
biased in case parliament attempted to further regulate the butter trade in Ireland. 
Simply put, there was a decline in the direct trade, but the real growth was through 
ports such as Liverpool which re-exported the butter. The committee maintained 
‘brand enforcers’ in these ports for precisely this reason. 
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Figure 1-10 Irish tonnage to and from Liverpool97 
Conclusion 
The importance of Cork’s provisioning trade was not solely confined to the 
values of direct exports to the West Indies. A wide array of allied industries thrived 
around the creation of the core provisioning items. Textiles, hides, butter, tallow, 
and other materials were all a direct result of the development of the provisioning 
industry. Furthermore, Cork developed an expertise in coopering that served the 
city well, not only in ensuring that high quality provisions were exported, but also in 
the burgeoning brewing industries. Coquebert, on his visit to Cork, noted, 
One branch of commerce attracts another and the colonies send a multitude of 
orders to Cork for small articles, many of which are not produced in the city itself.98 
Of crucial importance were the structures that developed to protect these trades, 
namely the Committee of Merchants. These men maintained stringent standards 
and controls over the city’s produce, while also doing their best to ensure that the 
mercantile community’s concerns were brought up at the highest levels of 
government. Provisioning was key, as its by-products and developed expertise had 
a profound impact on the city’s development, fostering smaller producers and 
ancillary industrial endeavours. 
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These trades peaked in the eighteenth century. By the time the Act of Union 
passed, Cork and Ireland’s trade with the West Indies was nearing its end after half 
a century of re-focusing itself on markets closer to home. Other developments 
arose outside the Cork mercantile community’s sphere of influence: the United 
States began to develop its economic prowess and powerful liberal and moral 
forces in Britain stirred to abolish the trade in human capital. Another fifteen years 
of international warfare was still to come and shifting power balances were about 
to negate the virtual monopoly Cork had on West Indies provisioning. Cork 
merchants made great strides in bringing their interests and those of their city to 
the forefront of one of the most rapidly developing and prosperous trade 
environments in the world; the Atlantic economy. They also created a niche market 
for themselves in British global trade. Ultimately these were regional merchants 
with local interests and they had no force of voice, especially once one of their 
strongest advocates, Pitt, was no longer in power. This mirrors a wider 
marginalisation of Ireland over the course of the nineteenth century. There was a 
price to pay for greater connectivity and access to Britain. That price was the loss of 
the status of being the ‘second kingdom’, diminished political representation, and a 
subsuming of Irish economic interests to those of the greater empire. 
America 
Trade with the United States 
The export market to the United States from Cork was in many respects 
inconsequential during the opening decades of the nineteenth century. Simply put, 
there was very little produce that Cork could supply that could not be sourced 
locally. There was some exportation of linen and textiles and miniscule amounts of 
provisions and other assorted goods. The real importance of the United States for 
Cork’s trans-Atlantic trade was in its impact on the Caribbean trade and in the 
importation of a select number of products for the home market. The potential 
threat that the United States could pose to Irish trade was something that had been 
debated for many years. In 1782 it was noted:  
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America is yet so little advanced in manufactures that it is difficult to say in what 
particulars she will interfere with the trade of Ireland to the West Indies, except in 
the trade of provisions, which being of the natural growth of the country she may 
in some time be able to supply the islands… and the injury to Ireland will then 
extend not only to depriving her of the beef and pork trade, but of those 
commodities which cattle furnish99 
It was further noted that America should be prohibited from such from trade with 
the West Indies unless a scarcity of supply gave no other option. This was precisely 
what led to the introduction of the United States to the West Indies trade. 
The most obvious, high value, high demand product imported from the 
United States was tobacco. Cork’s tobacco imports from the United States were 
substantial, varying from 10 to 30 per cent of total Irish tobacco imports. This was a 
respectable figure, especially when taking into account the large proportion of 
importation from the United Kingdom. However, the tobacco imported, even when 
processed, was unable to compete with the larger manufactures outside Ireland. 
This assertion is supported by the distinct lack of any tobacco exports from Ireland 
during this period. The small scale manufacturing and processing of tobacco that 
did occur was strictly for domestic consumption and was not produced for 
exportation. Although the figures for those employed in tobacco production in Cork 
were only first returned in the 1841 census, they indicate the small scale of such 
production in the region, with only twenty-six people employed in tobacco 
manufacture at this time.100 Tobacco imports were more than likely used to fill 
space on outgoing or returning vessels. This was a common occurrence, with 
produce being used to fill empty space on return journeys, especially as the 
decades wore on. Nash has noted that it was becoming more and more difficult to 
fill the holds of returning vessels.101 It is probable that imports of tobacco served a 
similar purpose as imports of items such as flaxseed or sugar as a high value, low 
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bulk product that could be packed around bulkier goods such as timber. The 
premium on utilising space can be demonstrated through the refinements made in 
the condensing and packing of grain for trans-Atlantic shipping at this time.102 
Imports of tobacco from the United States completely fell away during the 
War of 1812 and despite seeing a modest reversal in the total Irish tobacco imports, 
Cork’s imports never recovered fully (see Figure 1-11). Tobacco exporters in the 
United States more than likely went in search of more mature markets, such as 
London, that paid better prices. The issue of tobacco smuggling should also be 
taken into account when considering these fluctuations in the market. Cullen 
attributes the decline seen in 1815 to an increase in smuggling activities.103 
Unfortunately most smuggling enterprises do not leave behind quantifiable data 
with which to assess the impact of the illegal economy! 
 
Figure 1-11 Cork’s tobacco imports from the U.S. as percentage of national total104 
Tobacco was a valuable import, but the two main imports of importance to 
Cork from the United States were wood staves and flaxseed. Cork’s mercantile 
strength derived from its ability to consistently supply good quality provisions to 
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both the colonies and military victuallers. The ability of Cork’s merchants to 
undertake such an enterprise rested on quality packing materials, namely 
Portuguese salt and appropriate packing casks. The timber for packing casks was 
predominantly sourced from the Baltic and North America. Correspondence 
between North American and Cork merchants regularly contained details regarding 
prices and availability of wood staves and flaxseed.105 Due to changing importation 
routes the importation of North American staves superseded those from the Baltic 
in importance. According to Truxes, by the time of the American Revolution barrel 
staves from the United States had become indispensable for Irish provisioning, 
which was essentially Cork provisioning. To support this he quotes Waterford 
merchants stating that if they were ‘deprived of staves to make casks, their export 
provision trade must be destroyed’.106 A similar situation existed in Cork, with 
Beamish and Crawford forced to issue a circular in December 1808 requesting that 
their agents expedite the return of casks in the possession of their customers. This 
was due to the ‘very great advance that has taken place in the price of Staves, in 
consequence of the continuance of the American Embargo’.107 
Overall Cork’s imports of staves from the United States were consistently 
circulating around 30 per cent of the Irish total and half to two thirds of Cork’s total 
consumption was sourced from the United States (see Figure 1-12). The value of 
such goods was quite small in fiscal terms, but its importance in terms of Cork 
provisioning was enormous. Without a regular supply of quality timber, coopers 
could not produce sufficient packaging materials for the exportation of provisions. 
Families such as the Harveys and the Deaves maintained large storage areas to 
supply this timber to coopers around the city, as well as further afield such as 
Waterford. 
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Figure 1-12 Cork’s imports of wood staves from the U.S., compared to Cork’s total imports108 
Flaxseed was the other major import from the United States. High quality 
flaxseed was a pre-requisite for the Irish linen trade and there was a preference in 
Ireland for North American flaxseed as it was commonly believed to be of the best 
quality.109 The main source of flaxseed in Cork was the United States, specifically 
Philadelphia. Flaxseed was also sourced from other British colonies in North 
America, but not in significant quantities. Cork’s direct flaxseed imports from the 
United States were quite a small proportion of the total Irish flaxseed imports (see 
Figure 1-13). By the early nineteenth century Cork’s linen industry was in decline, 
with the North-East of the country being the major producer. The collapse of linen 
manufacturing in Cork during the 1820s led to a commensurate drop in demand for 
flaxseed imports. 
The importation of flaxseed from North America, as a part of the triangular 
trade movement across the Atlantic, fits into the broad trend of financing the trans-
Atlantic trade. The distances involved and the requirements of using London 
intermediary houses to finance the trade or shipping meant that wealthy linen 
merchants were more likely to ship provisions to the Caribbean on their own 
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account.110 Truxes focuses on the northern counties of Ireland with their more 
refined and developed linen trade. This accounts for the low levels of direct 
flaxseed imports to Cork. The point here is to demonstrate that the benefits of 
direct trade with the American continent extended beyond the provisioning 
industry. Other industries had a vested interest in maintaining a regular trans-
Atlantic trade to secure their own industrial concerns. However, these industries 
were also in quite a precarious position at the turn of the nineteenth century. 
 
Figure 1-13 Cork’s flaxseed imports from the U.S. compared to national total111 
South America 
In the opening decades of the nineteenth century Latin America was one of 
the most promising emerging markets to absorb the increase in British production 
during the Industrial Revolution. By 1828 Brazil was the third largest foreign market 
for British produce after the United States and Germany. It also provided a 
substantial number of imports for British markets. Platt quotes Gallagher and 
Robinson as stating that the objective was to create ‘complementary satellite 
economies’ supplying raw materials, food and opening markets in return for 
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manufactured goods.112 In essence, this resulted in the creation of the type of 
economic environment Wallerstein discusses in his world system’s theory. Latin 
America was an important emerging market for the United Kingdom. Considering 
that Cork was in an ideal position to take advantage of any British moves into this 
region during the opening decades of the nineteenth century and already had 
nearby trading partners, the question arises as to whether or not its trade was of 
any significance to Cork.  
Direct trade with South America was of almost no consequence to Cork 
during the early decades of the nineteenth century. Small amounts of linen, beef, 
butter and pork were exported. The period from 1809 to 1812 saw the largest 
volume of exports, but still in inconsequential amounts. These variations are 
possibly attributable to the British invasions of Buenos Aires and increased 
militarisation leading up to the Argentinean War of Independence. The brief period 
of British rule would have seen increased supplies of Irish provisions. There also 
may be some connection to the move of the Portuguese Royal Court from Lisbon to 
Brazil during this time. 1809 saw the peak of Cork’s trade with Latin America: 
46,682 yards of linen were exported from Cork, approximately 55 per cent of the 
year’s Irish linen exports to South America and 22 per cent of total Cork linen 
exports in the trans-Atlantic trade for the year. However, this was a dramatic blip in 
trade, as Cork’s linen exports to the region were generally quite low. The reason for 
this massive increase in this particular year was that Brazil took 32,800 yards of 
linen, four times what it had purchased the previous year.The exception to the 
general trend is explained by negotiations between the Committee of Merchants 
and Merchants in London in 1808 to conduct convoys from Cork to Brazil.113 
The reasons that South America did not play a large part in Cork’s trans-
Atlantic trade are multifarious. First, and most importantly, the major export 
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locations for Cork produce across the Atlantic tended to cluster around areas that 
had been under British rule. Linguistic connections and settlement patterns of Irish 
merchants facilitated this focus.114 Trade that filtered out from these English 
speaking regions generally favoured French colonies, again areas in close proximity 
to English settlements. The language and practices of the French islands would be 
familiar to Cork-based merchants as there was a long history of migration between 
the two. Second, a large proportion of Cork shipping was sent on London tickets, 
which were more inclined to travel to British regions.115 Cork goods found their way 
to French possessions from British holdings in the Caribbean.116 At the same time, 
conflict in Europe limited the free transport of goods across the Atlantic and 
necessitated the use of convoys, further limiting direct commerce. Finally, there 
was a reasonably strong direct trade between Cork and the Iberian Peninsula. In the 
early nineteenth century one of the best markets for Cork-produced butter was 
Lisbon. This was mostly for re-export to Brazil, with exports increasing from 50,000 
firkins in the 1820s to nearly 80,000 twenty years later.117 During this period Brazil 
became a more important trading partner for Britain after the 1810s Strangford 
Treaty. Cork’s produce found its way to South America via Spain, Portugal and 
Britain. Cork needed high quality Portuguese salt and also had a good wine trade 
with the Iberian Peninsula.118 These products were of more benefit to Cork at this 
time than any produce that could have been extracted from South America.  
Yet there were high value imports from the region. The prime import was 
sugar, a highly valuable, highly desirable commodity. Although large in terms of 
overall trade with South America, in terms of total sugar imports from the Americas 
it was miniscule. The dominant point of origin for sugar imports were the West 
Indies; but that was not the main source of Irish sugar imports. As Irish sugar 
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refining industries were not as well-developed as their counterparts in Britain or on 
the Continent in general, Irish sugar imports came from other markets; mainly 
Britain.  
Although the Latin American markets had the potential to be lucrative for 
Cork merchants, they lacked the ability to take advantages of the opportunities. 
There was no great demand there for Cork’s main trans-Atlantic exports. Those that 
were required could be sourced via Spain, Portugal, or London. While coffee and 
sugar were consumed in Ireland, there was a dearth of refining plants and other 
expertise necessary to take advantage of this potential, as well as ready access to 
the specie that would make this trade viable. Finally, Cork merchants operated 
mainly through London. They did not operate their own shipping and the limited 
tonnage of shipping that had an investment from Cork-based merchants mostly 
operated out of the North American Colonies or Britain.119 It was unlikely that a 
merchant community with a demonstrable reticence in investing in risky ventures 
(which shipping definitely was) would speculate on the potential for development 
in South America. Cork’s merchants were more interested in sourcing high quality 
salt from the Iberian countries for their lucrative provisioning industries. As a result, 
most of Ireland’s South American trade was conducted via Portugal and Liverpool.  
Cork’s Trade and the Atlantic System 
The distribution of Cork’s trade with the American continent shows clear 
trends. Direct trade destinations cluster around two major areas, the West Indian 
islands and the northern American states. Map 1-1 illustrates the destinations (with 
no weighting given for quantities of goods or value). It is clear that the main 
American trading partners for Cork merchants focused on very specific areas. When 
the quantities and type of goods are taken into account the focal regions are the 
larger West Indian islands, Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad and the more established 
North American regions of New York, Pennsylvania and New Jersey. The focus of 
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the trade was on the recently independent United States and the established sugar 
colonies in the Caribbean. However, relatively large amounts of trade were 
conducted with Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and a small amount with the Latin 
American countries. Cork merchants followed their own triangular Atlantic trade 
along established shipping lines: departing from Ireland towards the West Indies, 
then moving up the eastern seaboard of America to procure materials from the 
United States, before making the voyage home. This follows the evidence that a 
large proportion of the shipping that departed from Cork for the West Indies did 
not return directly to Ireland and that in fact continued onwards to American ports 
before returning (see Figure 1-14). However, this should not be overstated as many 
of the ships that departed from Cork were on London tickets. During the 
Napoleonic Wars convoys from many of the major ports in the United Kingdom, 
such as Bristol, Liverpool and London used Cork as their assembly area and they 
returned to their own home ports with produce.120 In the post-war period the 
tonnage departing from Ireland declined slightly, but rebounded within a few years. 
However, the tonnage of goods entering the country plummeted. The implication 
of this is that overall exports stayed reasonably stable overall while imports 
collapsed. It is hard to pinpoint a precise cause for such a dramatic decline, but the 
most likely reason is that the end of the Napoleonic Wars saw a marked decrease in 
ships clearing from Ireland returning with cargo to Cork.  
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Map 1-1 Caribbean and North America trade121 
 
Figure 1-14 Shipping tonnage from Ireland inwards and outwards from the West Indies122 
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This triangular movement was similar to the Atlantic system in place for the 
slave trade (see Map 1-2). More than likely it developed as Cork merchants 
followed the demands of the slave route with their wares. The Atlantic system 
developed in the early part of the seventeenth century following the movement 
and supply of the slave colonies as well as the prevailing trade winds. 
Simultaneously, a network of supply for British colonies developed between 
Ireland, England, and North America.123 The West Indies requirements for 
provisions and other desiderata created a demand for Irish produce – such as 
textiles and foodstuffs – whose export to Britain had been restricted. On the return 
journey from these regions ships would often return in ballast with produce from 
the North American colonies. Timber and flaxseed, as well as sugar, a high value, 
low bulk product, were sourced in the Northern Colonies for consumption and sale 
at home.124 Large quantities of timber staves were required to supply the demand 
from Cork’s coopers to create barrels for the provisions exported across the 
Atlantic.  
 
Map 1-2 Cork’s Trade Route with the Americas125 
What the Cork provisioning merchants successfully achieved, for a time, was 
to carve a niche in this Atlantic system. Price, when outlining the overall structure 
of the Atlantic slave trade, comments on the impressive nature of the 
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interdependence of the parts in this trade between Africa, Britain, and the 
Americas.126 Provisioning constituted a small, but vital component of this trade 
triangle, one that was considered of great importance, especially by the French with 
regard to their own sugar colonies.127 Legislative changes in Britain had a dramatic 
impact on the changing nature of Cork’s trade. War, treaty arrangements with the 
United States and a growing population in Britain all contributed to the inexorable 
decline of Cork’s trans-Atlantic trade.  
It is important not to overstate the control Irish merchants had over this 
trade. Much of the West Indies leg of the journey was conducted on English 
account or via English shipping stopping on their way to load provisions. This meant 
that although Cork merchants exported large volumes of goods to the West Indies, 
they did not reap the benefits of valuable return cargoes. Instead, the ships that did 
return across the Atlantic loaded up in the British North American Colonies and the 
United States with timber and flaxseed. These were important goods to be sure, but 
they lacked the high value of sugar, tobacco or cotton. There was a distinct 
triangular trade for Cork, similar to that hypothesised by James and considered by 
Truxes.128 The fact that much of this trade was conducted on English account meant 
that the value to be derived from these regions was not to Cork’s benefit beyond 
the money to be made from provisioning the West Indies. The major capital was 
derived from the importation of high demand luxury produce such as sugar, which 
found far more favourable markets in Britain. The difference between the number 
of ships departing from Cork to the West Indies and those returning in 1804 was 
quite substantial. This demonstrates that although ships departed Cork to provision 
the West Indies, they did not return with valuable Caribbean cash crops. 
The shipping returns for 1804, illustrated in Figure 1-15, show that three 
times the number of ships departed from Ireland for the West Indies as those that 
made the return journey. Shipping figures for Cork account for almost the entirety 
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of this difference: the one hundred and twenty vessels that set sail from Cork were 
only met by eighteen returning vessels. This leads to a number of conclusions: first, 
the majority of the ships sailing from Cork were British ships provisioning for the 
journey or contracted by Cork merchants for transportation. Ninety-five of the one 
hundred and twenty ships that left in 1804 were British. Second, these ships did not 
return to Cork, at least not directly. Of the eighteen retuning ships only eight were 
from Britain. The implication of this is that while Cork was deemed suitable for 
sourcing provisions it was not deemed suitable for the sale of the high value 
produce sourced from the sugar plantations. Finally, as a large proportion of these 
ships were engaged in a circular trade, on offloading provisions to the West Indies 
islands they then moved onwards to North America to source materials, such as 
timber for preservation casks, for the return journey. This can be seen in letters 
from Deaves’ timber merchants to merchants in Rhode Island regarding increasing 
imports from Pennsylvania in the late eighteenth century.129 
 
Figure 1-15 Incoming and Outgoing ships from the West Indies, 1804130 
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The decline in the Caribbean trade in the early nineteenth century would in 
all probability have occurred anyway. As Dickson notes in his seminal work, Old 
World Colony, Cork’s trade with this region had declined since the 1760s, the 
beginning of a long process of refocusing trade from the Americas and Europe to 
Britain. According to Dickson’s sources the fear in the mercantile community at this 
time was of losing the valuable French West Indies markets to Dutch, Spanish, 
Portuguese or French traders. The British West Indies were essentially a protected 
market for Irish merchants due to legislation such as the Navigation Acts. This adds 
credence to Mokyr’s argument that part of the importance of the trans-Atlantic 
trade to the British Empire was as a foreign policy tool.131 By 1815 the British West 
Indies were no longer protected to the same extent as they had been during the 
eighteenth century due to the removal of the Navigation Acts and various trade 
deals with the United States. The eighteenth century mercantilism and market 
protections were a thing of the past. 
Although this decline may have been a long time coming, eighteenth 
century commentators failed to foresee the eventual collapse. The final 
disintegration of the Caribbean markets in the 1820s was a result of events during 
the Napoleonic Wars. Various French West Indies islands had been ceded to Britain 
during the war, which would potentially secure these markets against their loss to 
foreign powers. Unfortunately, the Napoleonic Wars saw the requirement for 
vessels to sail under convoy to protect themselves from privateers and foreign 
powers. These convoys predominantly departed from Cork, but were limited in 
their number per year to the chagrin of Cork’s mercantile community.132 To 
maintain the supplies necessary for their existence, the West Indies planters looked 
to the former British colonies of North America, which received quite favourable 
terms from the 1794 Jay Treaty. Improved production methods, ease of access and 
necessity improved the trading links with the United States in an effort to secure 
                                                     
131 Mokyr, The enlightened economy. 
132 Letter  to John Newport Regarding need for Convoy and Reply Stating Impossibility to Increase 
Convoys, 3 June 1806, Committee of Merchants Papers, U401/0668, 0665, CCCA. 
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sufficient provisions. This would prove a continuing source of frustration for the 
mercantile community in Cork and Ireland.  
At the same time, the Act of Union favoured an increase in Ireland’s trade 
with the United Kingdom, speeding the process of re-focusing attention from the 
Caribbean. The abolition of slavery lessened the need for Irish provisions, yet there 
does not appear to be a direct corollary between the termination of the British 
slave trade and the collapse of trade with the West Indies. The abolition of the slave 
trade was focused initially on the movement of slaves via Britain, rather than those 
sent directly to the region. There was still a need for provisions to the area to 
support the existing population. The acquisition of the French West Indies boosted 
the number of regions supplied, adding to an increased demand. Most importantly, 
a large proportion of the goods being shipped were for the planters, rather than the 
slaves, thus helping to sustain a certain level of demand.  
The loss of the Caribbean markets was not due to the Union with Britain or 
to the declining slave population in the sugar colonies after the abolition of the 
slave trade. It was due, in no small part, to the inability of small, regional producers 
to compete with an economically and geographically expanding country in close 
proximity to the region. With the pervasiveness of the mercantilist attitude in the 
1780s, as expressed by Atkinson, it is understandable that Cork merchants would 
feel aggrieved at their perceived injustices regarding the lack of protection of their 
interests in the West Indies after the Napoleonic Wars. The opposition surrounding 
the relaxation of the Navigation Acts centred on duty differentials and the need to 
protect the interests of those within the ‘club’. Now, thirty years later, after tax 
harmonisation and in many respects having acceded to the demands of the 
mercantilists, they found themselves at a loss. Furthermore, by this time the Cork 
merchants faced a more integrated world market. Even before the mass 
introduction of steam, transit times had shrunk. The United States was no longer a 
former colony, but a fully-fledged state, while Napoleon’s Continental System was 
instrumental in creating a more unified European continent. Mercantilism could not 
survive in this new world order. 
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Despite innovations in trade and communications this was still a world in 
flux. Since the 1780s innovations in the factory system and production methods had 
surpassed any potential for Irish manufacturers to threaten British trade. It created 
a problem unforeseen by those old adherents of mercantilism. Industrial 
techniques had improved at a rate far faster than consumer spending. The origins 
of the British Empire, and in fact most imperial systems, did not solely rely on the 
need for the exploitative extraction of resources. They needed markets to sell 
produce. This required large-scale borrowing and investment in industry. When war 
ends, the problems are twofold. Industry is geared to supplying demand that no 
longer exists, and government is left with debts it must service. Cork was geared 
towards supplying a number of major military goods, textiles and foodstuffs. A large 
proportion of the region’s textile industry at this point was lower quality 
manufactures for military consumption. This suited the Cork and Irish market, as 
the putting-out system fed into it. At the same time burgeoning British industrial 
machinery was improving in a far more competitive manner. Irish manufacturers 
relied on low wages while British manufacturers invested in industrialisation.  
In the post-Napoleonic War period there was a large economic contraction. 
The open markets that Irish merchants had so dearly desired nearly destroyed 
them. Textiles was one of the earliest industries to industrialise in Britain and 
therefore was a highly refined industrial enterprise by this time. This had a major 
impact on the lower scale textile manufaturers in the Cork region. British merchants 
took advantage of the equalised duties and began to dump goods at reduced prices 
on the Irish market in a large-scale manner during the 1820s. This crushed large 
numbers of Cork’s textile manufacturers for much of the nineteenth century as 
their antiquated putting out system could not reduce costs enough to compete with 
the better quality and cheaper industrial manufactures.  
Even worse, the long-term refocusing of Cork’s provisioning on the military 
and British market had degraded their domination of the plantation market. 
Necessity and the restrictions of the convoy system had led to an increasing move 
towards the United States of America by the West Indies for supplies. No amount of 
complaints calling for the protection of the Union would change this. Cork was 
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poorly placed in terms of proximity and poorly equipped due to its reliance on 
transhipment and British shipping to compete. Mercantilism was dying. Where did 
that leave the merchant princes? Their business was overly focused on provisioning 
and textiles. For nearly a century this had sufficed, but they now had to compete in 
a changed world. The old order would never be the same again. The loss of the 





Chapter 2  
Trade with Continental Europe 
Over the course of the eighteenth century Cork’s trade with continental 
Europe gradually diminished. Its cornerstone was the ability to provide high quality 
provisions and foodstuffs that could survive extended journeys. Casking and 
preservation methods formed the key to the longevity of the produce. Large 
volumes of salt were required for the butter and salted meat production as well as 
for the repackaging of imported fish from Nordic states. Cork merchants preferred 
St. Ubes or Setubal salt from Portugal and it was the most important product 
imported from the continent into the city. There were alternative sources for bay 
salt, but Cork producers believed St. Ubes salt was a high quality product ideally 
suited to their needs. A number of commentators at home and abroad noted this 
preference. In his 1801 Account of Ireland Wakefield wrote that Cork’s mercantile 
community feared the loss of access to Portugese salt during the Peninsular Wars.1 
In the 1840s a parliamentary account of Anglo-Portuguese relations referred to 
Portugal’s salt exports to Cork and was one of the few examples of a product linked 
to a location.2 
The pre-eminence of Cork’s provisioning trade saw the accreditation of 
numerous European consulates in Cork. Not only did Spain, Portugal and France 
maintain a consular presence in Cork, throughout the early decades of the 
nineteenth century so did Brazil, Denmark, Holland and Norway.3 Cork’s expertise 
in provisioning gave it a small but important place in Europe’s economy, 
predominantly in relation to supplying provisions for colonial powers to re-export 
                                                     
1 Edward Wakefield, An Account of Ireland, Statistical and Political Vol 1 (London, 1812), p. 750 
2 Commercial Tariffs and Regulations of the Several States of Europe and America, Together with the 
Commercial Treaties between England and Foreign Countries. Part the Fourteenth. Portugal. p.37 [c. 
547] H.C. 1844 xlvii, 325. 
3 Colin. Rynne and Royal Irish Academy., The Industrial Archaeology of Cork City and its Environs, 
1750-1930 (Dublin :, 1991), pp 11–12; Archives du Commerce, ou Guide des Commerçans, Recueil de 
tous les Documens Officiels, Renseignemens, faits et avis, Pouvant Intéresser les Négocians, 1837, p. 
161; Aldwell, Alexander, Aldwell’s General Post Office Directory of Cork for the year 1845: List of 
Traders, Public Officials and Prominent Citizens (Cork, 1845); J. Pigot & Co, Pigot and Co.’s City of 
Dublin and Hibernian Provincial Directory: Containing a Classification of the Nobility, Gentry, Clergy, 
Professional Gentlemen, Merchants, and Manufacturers of Dublin and Upwards of Two Hundred & 
Twenty of the Principal Cities, Seaports and Towns of Ireland. (London, 1824). 
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to their trans-Atlantic possessions. For eighteenth century France and Portugal this 
was mainly their West Indian and Brazilian colonies respectively. Cork’s trading 
relationship with these countries skewed towards whichever country had a 
preferential relationship with Great Britain and for most of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries Portugal held pride of place. However, despite the strong 
relationship between Britain and Portugal since the Methuen Treaty in 1703 there 
were times when the stability of Irish and Portuguese trade came under intense 
pressure. The most notable instance was the period from the formation of 
Grattan’s Parliament up to the Commercial Propositions of the mid-1780s. The 
importance of Portugese trade did not impede Cork’s trade with other countries, all 
of which contributed to its own unique character. Despite numerous instances of 
Cork harbour being placed under embargo to prevent French vessels provisioning 
there during times of conflict, the city’s merchants did trade with France through a 
number of duplicitous methods, including trading through neutral shipping.4 
Another trading partner of note was Norway, with imports of timber coming in to 
supply Cork’s coopering industry. Although the customs’ ledgers record this trade 
as coming from ‘Denmark-Norway’ until Norwegian independence in 1814, it is 
almost certain that the majority of this trade derived from Norway. Once Norway 
began to be enumerated separately trade with Denmark disappears.  
As demonstrated in Figure 2.1 below the total tonnage entering Ireland 
from the Iberian Peninsula completely overshadowed the tonnage arriving from 
France. High tonnages also came from Prussia and Belgium, though Cork’s trade 
with these regions was quite limited. Similarly high returns came for Norway and 
Denmark and later from Norway as an independent entity. By far the largest 
European trade in terms of both numbers of ships entering Ireland and tonnage, 
was Norwegian; usually about twice the rate of their nearest rivals.5 Despite a large 
share in terms of the volume of goods being imported, the value of these goods 
from the Nordic regions never surpassed that of Portugal. Norweigian imports were 
                                                     
4 David Dickson, Old World Colony: Cork and South Munster 1630-1830 (Cork, 2005), p. 368. 
5 Kingdoms and States to which the Foreign vessels in the passing amount belong, Board of Customs: 
Statistics: Trade and Shipping, Cust 36, TNA. 
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high volume but low value transactions that, for Cork at least, were almost entirely 
comprised of timber and wood products. Timber requirements for casks were high 
in Cork, but timber imports from the Nordic states could always be replaced by 
imports from other countries, whereas Portuguese salt was a precious and, in the 
opinion of Cork’s provisioning merchants, an irreplaceable product. Without high 




Figure 2-1 Tonnage entering Ireland 1818-266 
Dublin, Cork and Belfast comprised two-thirds of national trade with the 
continent (see Appendix 1). After Dublin, Cork was the preferred destination for 
continental shipping, maintaining a slim lead over Belfast. Between 1811 and 1823 
Cork maintained around 20 per cent of Ireland’s total tonnage, with Dublin 
increasing from 30 to 34 per cent. What these figures conceal is Cork’s success in 
maintaining its share when compared with the figures for Munster as a whole 
during this period. Munster’s share of Irish tonnage plummeted by 15 per cent, 
down to 26 per cent of the national total, with Cork handling over 70 per cent of 
                                                     
6 Comparative statement of the British and Foreign Tonnage which have entered the several ports of 
Great Britain, distinguishing the several countries for the last ten years. A similar return for Ireland, 
Board of Customs: Statistics: Trade and Shipping, Cust 36, TNA. 
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Munster’s trade. The majority of this collapse for the province was in the tonnage 
arriving on British ships, with arrivals into Limerick and Waterford being devastated. 
Although tonnage arriving on British ships into Cork also declined, it was nowhere 
near as precipitous.7 There are several reasons for this decline. As the fall mostly 
centred on goods carried on British shipping it is likely that at least part of the 
decline was related to a decline in overall tonnages shipped after the Napoleonic 
Wars. Usage of more isolated regional ports also dimished, a process that can be 
traced back to the relocation of military victualling to Cork in the 1770s. It is 
probable that this was due to the economic depression that began to set in during 
the 1820s and better profits to be made in the larger urban environments. 
Furthermore, during the Napoleonic Wars Cork had consolidated its position as a 
pre-eminent port for naval victualling; building on the earlier successes during the 
American Revolution.8 In the early nineteenth century Cork maintained its share of 
the Irish total and cemented its position as the primary transit route for goods out 
of Munster, as well as being the main market for agricultural goods produced in the 
region.  
Portugal 
The broad structure through which Cork would trade with Portugal for the 
first four decades of the nineteenth century was firmly established by 1787, but its 
roots go back much further. Ireland had a long standing history of trade with 
Portugal, but during the period from 1780 to 1787 the foundations of this trade 
were under serious threat and a question hung over the future connections 
between the two nations. Ireland had, at least in part, used the opportunity the 
American War of Independence presented to gain a degree of free trade from 
Britain. In turn Portugal was going to attempt to use both the relaxation of trade 
                                                     
7 An Account of the Number of Vessels, with their Tonnage, that Entered the Ports of Ireland, in the 
year 1811 and 1823, from the Several Countries on the Continent of Europe, from Norway to the 
streights of Gibraltar, including the Baltic and the Mediterranean seas, and also Including the Islands 
of Guernsey, Jersey, Aldenay and Sark, The Countries and Islands from which, and the Ports at which 
they had with the Number of Vessels, and Amount of Tonnage from each such ..Island to each Port 
Respectively, the each year, and Further Distinguishing British from Foreign Vessels, Board of 
Customs: Statistics: Trade and Shipping, Cust 36, TNA. 




restrictions on Ireland and the American War of Independence to leverage more 
favourable treaty concessions from Britain. Ireland was to be the fulcrum for this 
attempt.  
Since the mid-eighteenth century Portugal was Cork’s most important 
European trading partner and this relationship was maintained up to the 1830s. In 
his assessment of trade between Cork and Portugal Horta notes that it resulted 
from ‘the unlikely connection between Cork butter and Portuguese salt’.9 Cork did 
have a certain level of trade with other European countries, but due to Britain’s 
conflicts with numerous European states the Portuguese trade was one of the most 
enduring. The imported salt was considered virtually irreplaceable for Cork’s 
provisioning industry, whereas the materials imported from other European could 
be easily sourced from elsewhere. Imports of wine and exports of butter were 
meaningful to a degree, but it was salt that made the Portuguese trade so vital, 
specifically what was known as ‘bay’ salt from St. Ubes or Setubal. ‘Bay’ salt was sea 
salt dried out in large beds, as opposed to the rock salt mined in England, and this 
process led to larger salt crystals forming, which enhanced its preservative qualities. 
The preference for bay salt was not specific to Cork’s provisioning merchants and 
was shared by the British fishing industry. The matter came up repeatedly during a 
parliamentary enquiry on the state of the latter.10 Both the reputation and nature 
of Cork’s international trade was inseparably tied to provisioning, which required 
high quality preservation salt. 
Sourcing the type and quantity of salt required for the provisioning industry 
was not easy. In 1781 Lucius O’Brien observed:   
tho’ we might import it on nearly as good terms from some of the salt islands in the 
West Indies, from the nearer ports of Spain or from the Mediterranean where the 
salt of Ivica is said to be near 30 per cent better than that of Portugal, tho’ we 
might manufacture it on our coasts at home.11 
                                                     
9 José António Gonçalves Horta, ‘Images and Representations of Ireland in Portugal (1830-1925): 
Geographical knowledge and Geographical Imagination’, PhD Thesis UCC 2009, p. 97. 





However, despite stating claims of alternative and superior sources, they were 
never availed of even in times of severe difficulty for this trade such as during the 
Peninsular War. While salt could be gotten elsewhere, such as in the West Indies or 
Ivica (Ibiza), it was not what Ireland needed or wanted. Despite making statements 
to the contrary, O’Brien would have been aware of that fact.  
O’Brien listed the main commodities that Ireland traded with Portugal, as 
well as potential alternative sources for these goods. In terms of exports the major 
goods were: 
1. Wheat, flour and biscuit, but only when Portugal was short in supply and 
Irish prices could stand British competition. 
2. ‘Beef and butter of which Ireland… has a monopoly in Europe, which neither 
Portugal nor any other commercial country can do without, which her own 
country cannot produce, and which Ireland sends from her own 
manufactures without duty.’ 
3. Some linen, which was otherwise purchased from Germany. 
4. Some woollen goods, for which Ireland competed with France. 
In return, he stated that Ireland imported wine, St. Ubes’ salt and oil. According to 
O’Brien Portugese wine got preferential treatment despite the fact that ‘the wines 
of France have been more admired here, every hogshead of which have been paid 
for with Irish commodities imported into Bordeaux’.12 This preferential treatment 
was due to the provisions of the 1703 Methuen Treaty between Britain and 
Portugal.  
Ralph Davis has suggested that three-quarters of the growth in the 
eighteenth century English export trade depended equally on the Iberian Peninsula 
and Britain’s imperial possessions in America.13 Fisher countered that this 
overstated local demand as it depended on Spanish and Portuguese colonial 
                                                     
12 Letter from Lucius O’Brien, 8th April 1781 William Pitt, The Papers of William Pitt the Younger, 
PRO 30/8/342 ff 12–14, BL. 




possessions and a large proportion of goods imported from the United Kingdom 
were ultimately destined for re-exportation.14 While there was a great deal of re-
exportation going on, Cork’s trade was heavily reliant on both Portugal and 
America, though perhaps not in as equal a manner. Lucius O’Brien noted that no 
matter the state of Anglo-Portuguese trade, in terms of Ireland’s trade with 
Portugal, ‘not only the balance, but the whole course of the trade, and the 
comparative value of the commodities exchanged is in favour of the latter’ (see 
Figure 2-2 below).15 The balance of trade was so strongly in Ireland’s favour by the 
nineteenth century that Irish goods accounted for approximately ninety per cent of 
the monetary exchange between the two countries. Horta notes that this was 
predominantly due to the price differential between salt and butter. He estimates 
that for 1834-36 Portugal would need to sell at least two tons of salt in order to 
purchase one barrel of butter.16 For Cork’s merchant trade with the European 
continent was nowhere near as lucrative as that with North America and its direct 
value was only a fraction of that of the trans-Atlantic trade, but without strong 
connections with Portugal and access to Portuguese salt it is unlikely that Cork’s 
trans-Atlantic trade would have been able to maintain its size or longevity. 
Furthermore, regular and long-standing trade with the Iberian Peninsula had 
implications for domestic consumption patterns, with Portuguese wine becoming a 
preferred drink for the merchant classes, as it also had become in Britain. This can 
be seen in figure 2-3 below, which compares Cork’s importation of port to French 
wines. 
                                                     
14 H. E. S. Fisher, ‘Anglo-Portuguese Trade, 1700-1770’ in The Economic History Review, xvi, no. 2 
(1963), p. 219; 226. 
15 Letter from Lucius O’Brien, 8th April 1781, The Papers of William Pitt the Younger, PRO 30/8/342 
ff 11, BL. 




Figure 2-2 Irish balance of trade17 
 
Figure 2-3 Imports of Portuguese and French wine into Cork18 
                                                     
17 (Ireland.) Imports and Exports. --(1.)-- A Return to an Order of the Honourable House of Commons, 
Dated the 8th of March 1822;--for, An Account of the Imports and Exports of Ireland, in the Years 
1792, 1800, 1810, 1815, 1820, and 1821; Distinguishing the Countries from which Imported, and to 
which Exported, with the Official and Declared or Real Value thereof; Stated in Irish Currency. --(2.)-- 
An Account of the Shipping Entered Inwards and Cleared Outwards in Ireland, from or to all Parts of 
the World, in the Years 1792, 1800, 1810, 1815, 1820, and 1821; Distinguishing such as Entered 
Inwards or Cleared Outwards, from or to Great Britain. H.C. 1822 (234), xviii, 473 
18 ‘Abstracts of Irish Exports and Imports, in 24 vols, for the period 1764-1823’, MSS 353-76, NLI. 
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 However, before discussing the impact of Portugal’s trade with Cork it 
should be noted that by the late eighteenth century Britain accounted for 74 per 
cent of Irish imports and 79 per cent of exports.19 Dependence on Britain means a 
number of caveats should be taken into account in examining the broader 
environment for Cork’s trade. No market either in Europe or worldwide was as 
important as the British market, but although its size of dwarfed all others, there 
were still certain crucial goods that were sourced from abroad and upon which 
specific sectors of the economy relied. For Cork’s provisioning merchants, 
Portuguese salt was indispensable and neither the size nor stated value of imports 
of salt to Cork’s market is proportional to its actual worth. Furthermore, 
contemporary commentators noted that certain continental goods found their way 
to the Irish market through Britain with it being estimated that in 1789 half of all 
trade with the British Isles from Bordeaux was imported via Ireland.20 A converse 
trend can be seen for exports to Portugal, especially once the Strangford Treaty of 
1810 opened the Brazilian market to direct trade from Britain. As a result a 
proportion of goods that had been previously transhipped via Portugal were instead 
routed through Britain. 
Treaties 
Key to the development of British trade with Portugal was the longstanding 
history of commercial cooperation between them, with treaties and trade 
agreements stretching back to the fourteenth century. Although these earlier 
agreements were of some significance, the most enduring treaty, and the most 
important for Ireland, was the 1703 Methuen Treaty. Lucius O’Brien argued that the 
Methuen Treaty was regulated by those that came before it and therefore all these 
treaties should ‘be taken together as parts only of one system’.21 Building upon 
earlier seventeenth century agreements, the Methuen Treaty created a foundation 
for the successive one hundred and fifty years of Anglo-Portuguese commercial 
                                                     
19 Cormac Ó Gráda, Ireland: A New Economic History 1780-1939 (s.l.), 1992), p. 43. 
20 James Livesey, ‘Free Trade and Empire in the Anglo-Irish Commercial Propositions of 1785’ in 
Journal of British Studies, lii, no. 01 (2013), p. 108. 
21 The Parliamentary Register: Or, History of the Proceedings and Debates of the House of Commons 
of Ireland (1784), p. 24; Letter from Lucius O’Brien, 8th April 1781, The Papers of William Pitt the 
Younger, PRO 30/8/342 ff 9, BL. 
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arrangements. It established a system of preferential treatments for the signatory 
nations and created a stable environment within which trade occurred. 
Furthermore, the Methuen Treaty was later used as a blueprint for nineteenth 
century agreements with Brazil. Large proportions of this treaty focused on the 
sensitive issues of English Protestant merchants trading with Catholic Spain.22 These 
religious issues were not of much relevance to Cork’s trade with Portugal, but the 
creation of a stable and well thought out commercial arrangement was, especially 
because it gave certain freedoms of trade and movement to the British merchant 
population resident in Portugal.  
Initially the Methuen Treaty was not considered a significant agreement, but 
over time it became an important factor in the development of Anglo-Portuguese 
and Anglo-Franco relationships. It endured in one form or another (with several 
renewals and re-negotiations) until the mid-nineteenth century. This not only 
reflects the importance of trading connections between Britain and Portugal (and in 
many cases this trade was more important for Portuguese interests than British) 
but also the need for a dependable ally on the continent during the repeated 
conflicts between France and Britain, as well as during the American War of 
Independence.23 Portuguese diplomats repeatedly referred to their support during 
the latter in their attempts to force Britain to renegotiate the provisions of the 
Methuen Treaty. Duguid points out that this treaty was not always destined to 
succeed. He argues that in the negotiations for the Treaty of Utrecht the British 
government was willing to abandon the Portuguese treaty to achieve freedom of 
trade with France; a far more valuable proposition. Ultimately this never occurred 
as some MPs feared it would lead to the prohibition of English textiles in Portugal. 
However, it does highlight the uncertainty surrounding the longevity of the 
Methuen Treaty.24 In exchange for the admission of English woollens into Portugal, 
this treaty allowed for the importation of Portuguese wines into Britain at two 
                                                     
22 Fisher, ‘Anglo-Portuguese Trade, 1700-1770’, p. 227. 
23 Commercial Tariffs and Regulations of the Several States of Europe and America, Together with the 
Commercial Treaties between England and Foreign Countries. Part the Fourteenth. Portugal. p. 4. 
24 Paul Duguid, ‘The Making of Methuen: The Commercial Treaty in the English Imagination’ in 
História, Revista da Faculdade de Letras, iii, no. 4 (2003), pp 10–11. 
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thirds of the French duties ‘forever after’. An 1844 report on the commercial tariffs 
and regulations into Portuguese trade saw this treaty as ‘most unwise’ for two 
reasons: first, that Portugal had a small, poor population and second, that it 
brought them into commercial conflict with France.25 
This is not to say that the application of this treaty to Irish trade with 
Portugal was guaranteed. In the 1780s problems arose in the commercial 
arrangements between Ireland and Portugal as to the application of the Methuen 
Treaty. The Portuguese claimed that as Ireland had recently secured free trade 
from Britain it was now a distinct trading entity. Therefore they maintained that 
previous agreements with Britain no longer applied to Ireland.26 The source of the 
disagreement came from an increase in the exportation of Irish woollen products to 
Portugal in 1780-81, which were stopped by Portuguese customs officials. After a 
strenuous period of negotiations in the words of Dickson, ‘it was discovered, 
perhaps to no one’s surprise, that “Irish camblet” was a long established category 
of import’ in Portugal.27 This demonstrated that Ireland had always been subject to 
the same trade agreements as Britain. During a debate on the topic of Irish-
Portuguese trade on October 29th, 1781, Sir Lucius O’Brien stated that it was a 
mistake to believe Ireland’s trade with Portugal was founded upon the Methuen 
Treaty. He attributed Ireland’s recently achieved free trade as the trigger for 
commercial disagreements with Portugal. Some members of the House questioned 
whether the actions of the Portuguese were out of gratitude to Britain for giving 
concessions to Portuguese goods on the British market. During the discussion as to 
whether this suspension of Irish trade with Portugal was due to actions of British 
merchants, Grattan stated that, ‘the King of England has no right to rob the King of 
Ireland of the brightest Jewel of his Crown, to embellish that of England’ and that 
British ministers were ‘neglecting the interests of the merchants of Ireland’.28 This 
                                                     
25 Commercial Tariffs and Regulations of the Several States of Europe and America, Together with the 
Commercial Treaties between England and Foreign Countries. Part the Fourteenth. Portugal., p. 4. 
26 David Lammey, ‘The Irish-Portuguese Trade Dispute, 1770-90’ in Irish Historical Studies, xxv, no. 97 
(1986), p. 31. 
27 Dickson, Old World Colony, p. 130. 
28 The Parliamentary Register, pp 17, 24–30; For an in depth account of these treaties and their 
relationship to Ireland see: Letter from Lucius O’Brien, 8th April 1781 Pitt, The Papers of William Pitt 
the Younger, pt. 30/8/342 ff5–9, BL. 
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event serves to highlight the longstanding, yet uncertain, relationship between 
Ireland and Portugal. Nevertheless their commerce had operated under the 
provisions of the Methuen Treaty, whether by custom or explicit agreement, for 
some time. 
In 1780 Portugal began to refuse to accept certain Irish goods in her ports, 
namely textiles.29 Both Kelly and Lammey suggest that the underlining motive for 
these tensions between Portugal and Ireland was the desire to force Britain to 
renegotiate the Methuen Treaty.30 The justification for refusing Irish produced 
goods was relatively flimsy, but the intention was clear. In a pamphlet circulated in 
Ireland in 1783, A Defence of the Conduct of the Court of Portugal, the author 
repeatedly takes issue with the Methuen Treaty and attempts to attribute the 
problems between Ireland and Portugal to it. The author claimed that John 
Methuen (who negotiated the treaty and was simultaneously Lord Chancellor of 
Ireland and the English ambassador to Portugal) had explicitly stated that Ireland 
was not to be included in the treaty and that the current British government was 
refusing to countenance any of the re-negotiations necessary for a renewal of 
commerce between Ireland and Portugal.31 The author is quite exercised at the 
perceived imbalance between Portuguese and British trade, referring to problems 
with the wine trade and shipping and asserting that the Methuen Treaty was 
nothing ‘but a gilded meteor that glittered for a moment in their commercial 
horizon, and then totally disappeared’.32 According to the author, the origins of 
problems between Ireland and Portugal were twofold. First, London wanted to 
keep Ireland commercially subjugated to prevent Irish competition in the 
Portuguese wool market. Second, the Methuen treaty itself contained unfair 
                                                     
29 Murray, ‘A History of the Commercial and Financial Relations between England and Ireland, from 
the Period of the Restoration’, 220,227; For more on this dispute see Lammey, ‘The Irish-Portuguese 
Trade Dispute, 1770-90’; Kelly, ‘The Irish Trade Dispute with Portugal 1780-87’. 
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wording. The author suggested that Ireland was implicitly excluded in the treaty’s 
text and, although apparently sympathetic to Irish complaints, stated that ‘it is not 
the business of the court to enter into metaphysical distinctions, respecting the 
indivisibility of the British crown’.33 It is no coincidence that this pamphlet was 
circulated in 1783, at the same time that the Portuguese Foreign Minister, Chevalier 
de Pinto, was attempting to convince the Irish government to support a 
renegotiated treaty.34 The Portugese were running a divide and conquer operation, 
if not officially then at least unofficially. Hugh Shey, a Portuguese merchant that 
dealt in Irish goods, made similar arguments in the Irish House of Commons, 
asserting that ‘the exclusion of the Irish merchant from sending manufactured 
goods to Portugal would secure to the English merchant the monopoly he has 
enjoyed’.35 This played on both the aspirations of some Irish merchants that 
Portugal could be a market to extend their woollen trade as well as the inherent 
distrust of British intentions for Irish commercial development under the new free 
trade regime. 
Marx also assigned responsibility on this issue to British ulterior motives. 
This was a common sentiment in contemporary Irish opinion with Marx recounting 
some inflammatory rhetoric from Lucius O’Brien calling upon the King to defend 
Ireland’s trade ‘by hostility with Portugal’.36 Such calls to action were not 
representative. John Curran took a far more pragmatic view of the matter, 
expressing the opinion that  
If the trade of Portugal is to be abandoned… we [should] find out another market 
for the exportation of our butter and our woollens, and not continue… [to] be the 
ridicule of Europe.37 
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He goes on to state that Ireland’s response, namely prohibitory duties on 
Portuguese wine, ‘is a tax upon yourselves; you make us pay double for a glass of 
wine, to revenge yourselves on the Portuguese’.38 However, Pitt’s own papers seem 
to show that the British government was attempting to rectify this issue, though 
perhaps not at the pace the Irish desired. A Memorandum on Several Points of 
Commerce with Ireland noted that Irish linens had higher levies imposed on them in 
Portugal than those on French linen and most Irish woollens were excluded from 
Portuguese markets. In the observations on this report the commentary noted that 
the matter was ‘under full discussion with the Court of Portugal.’39 The Portuguese 
argued that as Britain had prohibited the export of Irish woollens several years 
before the signing of the Methuen Treaty they felt that they had the liberty to 
refuse the admission of Irish textiles.40  
In a letter to Lord Northington, Lord North outlined the main issues for the 
British government in handling the issue. The Portuguese government had provided 
four preliminaries that had to be agreed upon: Great Britain had to admit that 
Ireland had a right to be included in the Methuen Treaty; the treaty was not to be 
used as a baseline for a future negotiation; Irish duties on Portuguese wine had to 
be fixed; and Portuguese merchants and ships should be allowed access on the 
same footing as Ireland’s.41 Lord North took issue with the fact that Portugal 
required these conditions while offering no concession of his own and that as 
‘Portugal… excluded Irish woollens from the benefit of the treaty of 1703 [she] has 
no right to claim it for her own wines.’42 This issue was resolved by 1787, but it 
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highlights the uncertain environment in which Cork’s merchants operated. Their 
successes and failures were built upon precarious grounds.  
The truth behind these problems is less clearcut than contemporary 
commentators suggested. Portugal had been attempting to make a separate 
commercial agreement with Ireland, along the same lines as the Methuen Treaty, 
but one they believed was more equal to both parties.43 This interested John 
Foster, who was the Irish Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1784, as based on reports 
from William Conyngham’s travels in the Iberian Peninsula at this time, there 
existed the possibility for a mutually beneficial trade with Portugal. At issue was the 
lack of proper commercial representation for Ireland in Portugal.44 Lammey 
alternately concludes that the dispute centred on Ireland’s recent freedom to 
export woollens.45 Although the Woollen Acts and the exportation of Irish wool to 
Portugal may have been the excuse used to start this commercial tiff the real 
motivations were twofold. The balance of trade between Ireland and Portugal was 
repeatedly referred to as problematic (see Figure 2-2). This was due to the volume 
of butter exported from Ireland being sufficient to cover the entirety of Ireland’s 
imports from Portugal. Any increased exportation from Ireland would have further 
heightened this imbalance. However, the crux of the issue was not Irish trade, it 
was the nature of Portugal’s relationship with Great Britain. Lisbon was attempting 
to force a re-negotiation of the Methuen Treaty and very nearly achieved this aim in 
1785. The issue of Ireland’s trade with Portugal was a sideline, an important one to 
be sure, but the real issue was with Britain and Ireland served as the proxy through 
which this disagreement played out. Foster recognised as much, writing,  
The idea of Portugal’s wish to separate our interest from Britain’s or to suppose us 
not included in every treaty ought to be crushed, and I would humbly advise that 
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whatever step Great Britain means to take with Portugal may have the conciliatory 
appearance of being taken for our sake.46  
For Irish politicians and Cork’s merchants this issue was a pressing one. Not only 
was Portugal an important commercial partner, there was a very real concern that 
so shortly after attaining free trade these actions ‘must form a general precedent 
for our trade with all other states’.47 If Portugal would so readily forfeit her Irish 
trade and Britain was so lacklustre in support for Irish commercial rights, what hope 
was there to cultivate a strong and meaningful international trade? 
The source of the animosity towards Portugal and heavy-handed attitude 
that pervaded the period can be attributed to the mistaken belief that Ireland’s 
trade was indispensable for Portugal. There was a belief amongst some Irish 
politicians that Ireland provided Portugal with goods that ‘except from us she 
cannot get at all, while on the other hand we do not get a single article from 
Portugal which we may not be supplied with from elsewhere’.48 Hugh Shey 
contradicted this notion two years later when he suggested that Portugal could 
source butter from Holland, beef from Denmark and pork from America. He was 
convinced that Ireland would suffer more if the disagreement between Ireland and 
Portugal continued, ‘because that the salt of St. Ubes is absolutely necessary to the 
provision trade of this country, and because no one article exported from Ireland is 
absolutely necessary in Portugal’.49 Despite this, in 1785 the Irish parliament laid 
retaliatory duties of £30 per ton on Portuguese wine. The matter was effectively 
resolved by December 1786, when the Portuguese prohibitions were lifted. This 
was more than likely due to renewed negotiations with Britain, though it is possible 
that a non-consumption agreement of Portuguese goods by the Irish Volunteers 
had some small affect.50 The prohibitive duties did cause a severe decline in trade 
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for both Ireland and Portugal, though Ireland was able to partially offset the 
difference with increased exports to Spain.51  
The true reasons for the relaxing of restrictions on Ireland’s trade with 
Portugal are still unclear. Although he was probably far more interested in 
furthering Portuguese interests than those of Irish merchants, Mr. Shey proposed 
two actions to benefit Ireland that provide insights into Ireland’s commercial 
problems: first, that Ireland needed their own agent resident in Portugal to forward 
its interests and second, that the Portuguese perceived Methuen as 
disadvantageous to themselves. He argued that the best course of action for Irish 
interests would be to make trade with the British Empire as a whole advantageous 
to Portugal.52 Essentially to appease Lisbon and have the prohibition on Irish 
textiles lifted, Ireland merely had to rescind the duties on Portuguese goods. 
Despite some hand wringing and negotiations between the various representatives, 
trade between the two countries was cleared within the opening months of 1787. 
The summer of that year imports of port and exports of Irish textiles resumed.53 
The provisions of the Methuen Treaty were renewed at Rio de Janeiro in 
1810 with the Strangford Treaty, which also extended the commercial 
arrangements Britain had with Portugal to Brazil. This was important in terms of 
Cork’s trading relationship with Portugal, as much of its trade was in provisions 
destined for colonial markets and direct access for British merchants provided an 
alternative trade route. The provisions in these two treaties were re-negotiated in 
1825 after the Rio de Janeiro Treaty and Brazilian independence and again in 1842. 
Articles XXXII and XXXIII of the Strangford Treaty, along with its subsequent 
revisions, stipulated that the treaty was unlimited in duration, but provided for the 
re-examination and revision of its provisions after fifteen years.54 The Strangford 
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Treaty had also set the rates on British imports at 15 per cent, as compared with 
the 30 per cent for other countries.55 In 1835 correspondence was circulated 
regarding the Portugese government’s proposed suspension of the treaty. It 
highlighted weaknesses and disagreements surrounding the arrangements made in 
the Strangford Treaty and the re-negotiated treaty of 1825. This was in response to 
the British government withdrawing the preferential duties that had long existed on 
Portuguese wines. Tensions from 1830 onwards, combined with internal instability 
in Portugal, saw a decline in Anglo-Portuguese trade. The impact of this uncertainty 
on Ireland’s trade with Portugal can be inferred from the abrupt and precipitous 
decline in Ireland and Britain’s combined butter and cheese trade with Portugal 
from the mid-1830s (Figure 2-4). As the major butter producing and exporting 
region in Ireland and Britain, much of this decline related to Cork’s produce, either 
in direct or indirect exports. However, due to the abolition of separate customs 
accounts in the mid-1820s it is difficult to fully detail just how much this decline 
impacted Cork itself.  
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Figure 2-4 British and Irish exports of butter and cheese to Portugal Proper56 
The Methuen Treaty had a noticeable impact on the wine trade, with Britain 
importing larger quantities of port wine at the expense of French wines. By 1830 
Hyde Villieres argued that this had led to the British substituting ‘for a wine which 
was good and cheap, a wine which was dear and bad'.57 Villieres went on to 
highlight some of the discrepancies the Methuen and Strangford Treaties had 
caused: average imports from Portugal were £34,233,000 per year and exports just 
shy of £52,938,689, whereas for France imports were just £1,883,844 and export of 
only £1,227,887. He was astounded that trade with the United States even 
surpassed that of France by many multiples. He also suggested that Britain should 
look at trading iron for French wines as there was a demand for British iron in 
France and French wines were superior to their Portuguese counterparts.58 Cork 
could not supply iron, but butter was one product which it exported to Portugal in 
notable volumes. This trade had been maintained throughout all of the difficulties 
of the 1780s and the tumultuous period during the Napoleonic Wars.  
Villieres comments may have been pertinent in the time he was writing, but 
they do not hold true for much of the commercial agreement’s lifetime. At the 
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same time issues surrounding the Oporto Wine Company arose in the early 1810s, 
European markets were isolated from Britain as Napoleon’s influence spread and 
trade with the continent was restricted. Due to the Napoleonic Wars Ireland’s trade 
with France declined, though there was the exchange of some produce through the 
Netherlands as an intermediary. Despite some limited attempts to liberalise the 
European trading environment from the 1780s, the period from 1793 to 1815 saw a 
return to the old protectionist commercialism.59 Tensions between British 
merchants resident in Portugal and the Portuguese authorities compounded 
problems resulting from the changing nature of continental trade. One of the most 
egregious disagreements was a series of complaints levelled by British merchants in 
1813. They referred to the seizure of accounts and false imprisonment, but the core 
issue was the nature of the Oporto Wine Company, which had been established to 
regulate the Portuguese wine trade. British traders resident in Portugal contended 
that it worked as an effective monopoly under the auspices of being a regulatory 
body with the aim of improving the region’s wine. British traders argued that these 
rights subjected them  
to the examination of mean yet arbitrary judges, appointed by the Company, who 
are competitors in that trade, and of consequence interested in the depreciation of 
that particular commodity.60 
If the quality of the wine was judged insufficient they had nowhere to sell their 
wine as its exportation and sale was then prohibited, bar to the Oporto Wine 
Company itself, their business rival. These laws were ‘complained of by the 
merchants, not only as being directly contrary to the express stipulation of treaty, 
but as destructive of their commerce and discouraging to navigation’.61 These kinds 
of commercial disagreements were not favourable to a conducive trading 
environment. This was not a minor dispute either; the essential product of over a 
century of commercial agreements between Britain and Portugal was the purchase 
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and sale of Portuguese wines at the expense of French produce. To have such 
accusations levelled against one of the major Portuguese commercial wine interests 
threatened the stability of these agreements.  
It is unclear if similar disputes surrounding the Oporto Wine Company 
concerned Irish merchants, but the existence of these disputes would have 
introduced an unwelcome uncertainty in their trade. As the economic environment 
began to return to some form of normality after the Napoleonic Wars, trade with 
Portugal began to decline and, despite the renewal of treaties in 1825, tensions 
continued to build between Britain and Portugal. By the 1830s relations between 
Britain and Portugal had become strained and had been for some time. Britain had 
a long running dispute over the treatment of British merchants resident in Portugal, 
in addition to the perceived monopoly of the Oporto Wine Company. By 1831 these 
tensions had reached a point where serious consideration was given to rescinding 
the favourable duties on Portuguese wines.62 
The 1842 treaty between Great Britain and Portugal specifically moved to 
address some of the grievances that British merchants had previously expressed. 
The first articles provided for the right to be free from arbitrary searches and 
confiscations and Article XV promised that trade would not be inhibited by any 
monopolies. What is far more interesting about Article XV is the concluding 
statement:   
But it is distinctly to be understood, that the present article shall not be interpreted 
as affecting the special regulations now in force, or which may hereafter be 
enacted, with a view solely to the encouragement and amelioration of the Douro 
wine trade… or with regard to the exportation of the salt of St. Ubes’.63 
The wine and salt trades were of special importance, both in terms of this treaty as 
an international agreement and for Irish merchants in terms of the key items they 
desired from Portugal. It is indicative of Portugal’s position in Europe’s trade 
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network that its wine and salt trade were specifically exempted and that these 
were also the goods Irish importers valued most.  
However, the Cork Committee of Merchants did not greet this new treaty 
with much cheer. In an article in the Freeman’s Journal they complained that they 
had not been consulted regarding the new arrangements despite their extensive 
trade with Portugal. To them it appeared that the treaty was ‘intended to be 
favourable alone to England’.64 In the same article they stated that they had 
‘directed themselves with an energy which Cork men well know how to exercise’, 
but it was ‘utterly in vain’.65 The problem they had with this new arrangement was 
that duties on their beef and pork provisions were to remain at 90 per cent and 61 
per cent respectively while that on British goods was reduced. They questioned 
whether ‘Irish interests… [were] to be always sacrificed, and sacrificed to those of 
England?’66 The Committee of Merchants may have had a point, because in signing 
this treaty Portugal had given Britain free access to Portuguese colonial ports and 
diminished the importance of Lisbon in the re-export of butter to the colonies.67  
The normalisation of duties and the dismantling of the Methuen Treaty had 
a number of effects. It was a destructive occurrence for Cork’s exports of butter to 
Portugal, but it also led to a reduction in wine imports. When the last vestiges of 
the treaty unravelled in 1860, a journalist referred to this moment as the ultimate 
‘disestablishment’ of port wine.68 The lower rates paid on Portuguese wines had led 
to its domination of British and Irish markets, but the equalisation of duties led to a 
move towards ‘better’ French wines. It was solely due to the Methuen Treaty that 
merchants 
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consented to drink scarcely other than the heavy, black, and spirituous wines of 
Oporto, instead of the clear and wholesome wines of Bordeaux, Burgundy, and 
Champagne.69 
At this stage in the nineteenth century the impact of the loss of Portuguese salt was 
probably less acute than it would have been earlier. In an increasingly connected 
world market Cork had lost importance as a trans-Atlantic provisioning centre. A 
preponderance of Cork’s trade had moved towards the English market, processed 
food exports fell in favour of fresher meat or live animal exportation and English 
preferences moved towards lighter salted butter. Changing tastes, demands, and 
transportation methods lessened the need for such quantities of provisioning salt, 
as did the increasing emphasis on supplying the much closer British market.  
Imports 
The Methuen Treaty opened up trade with the entire Iberian Peninsula. Its 
major impact was slashing the duties on wine from the region to a third less than 
those on French wines in exchange for Portuguese preferential treatment of British 
woollens. This led to dramatically increased volumes of port being imported into 
Britain.70 However, in Ireland imports of French wines still surpassed those from 
Portugal in terms of both revenue and volume. Not until 1787 did imports of port 
begin to overtake French wines as trade between Ireland and Portugal became 
officially regulated by the Methuen Treaty’s provisions. By the 1790s the growth 
rate of Irish imports was substantial, as seen in Figure 2-5.71 Some of this trade was 
due to importation via Britain, reflecting the growing preference of British 
merchants for Portuguese wines. Notably, imports of Spanish wines also began to 
overtake their French counterparts, though this growth was much smaller and 
never reached the heights of the Portuguese trade. It was no coincidence that the 
growth in Spanish wine imports occurred at the point where tensions between 
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Britain and France escalated and much of the growth can be attributed to the fall in 
French imports. Furthermore, in 1785 when duties on Portuguese wines were 
increased Spanish wine imports briefly overtook those of port.  Despite lowering 
the duties on French wine in 1786 under the Eden-Rayneval agreement, the 
following year William Pitt reduced Portuguese wine duties commensurately so the 
duty on French wines dropped from £96 4 s. 1 d. per tun to £29 8 s. 0 d. while 
Portuguese duties dropped from £45 19 s. 1 d. to £19 12 s. The changed duties 
achieved little in halting the growth in Portuguese wine imports into Britain.72 They 
had a more noticeable impact upon the volume of wine imported into Ireland from 
France, Spain, and Portugal. There was a dramatic reduction in imports of French 
and Portuguese wines and a halving of Spanish imports. Surprisingly these changes 
led to an increase in the importation of Madeira wines, despite similar levels of 
duty. 
 
Figure 2-5 Irish wine imports73 
The agreements and disagreements between the British and Portuguese 
governments had a direct impact upon Irish trade with Portugal. For much of the 
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1820s and 1830s trade with Portugal declined in both terms of volume and value. 
This is attributable to Anglo-Portuguese disagreements over wine duties and 
attempts to levy duties of 30 per cent on goods imported in foreign ships. Although 
nothing in the treaty extended the 15 per cent rate to goods imported into Portugal 
in foreign ships, this had always been the rate paid.74 
Disagreements in Britain regarding the monopoly of the Oporto Wine 
Company also impacted Irish wine imports, with a decline in total volumes being 
imported from around 1810. Lord Strangford wrote to the Conde Das Galveas  
that unless immediate satisfaction shall be given upon this point, and that British 
subjects shall be permitted henceforward…to buy and sell, when, where, and how 
they may think proper, and to re-sell, transport, and export wines, vinegar and 
brandies…without any impediment, interference, or control on the part of the 
company or others, according to the plain intent and meaning of the Treaty, His 
Majesty’s Government is fully resolved to propose measures to Parliament for 
encouraging the importation into  the British Dominions of wines from other 
foreign countries.75 
The Oporto Wine Company denied accusations that their activities breached the 
spirit of the trade agreements, though it is not the place here to make a case for or 
against such recriminations. The impact that the dispute had on the wine trade into 
Ireland is of greater importance. It is difficult to separate the impact of the activities 
of the Oporto Wine Company from the European-wide disruptions, but a 
comparison of Spanish and Portuguese wine imports can provide an indication of 
the impact of Portuguese actions. Although there was also a decline in Spanish wine 
imports, which is attributable to the Iberian Wars, by 1815 the volume of Spanish 
wine imports briefly overtook those from Portugal. This is indicative of the tensions 
between British wine merchants in Portugal and the activities of the Oporto Wine 
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Company. In denying such accusations the Conde das Galveas had a rather strong 
rebuke for Lord Strangford:  
Nor could the parliament have taken any other resolutions concerning these 
articles, resolved as it was to continue the East India Company in its privileges, 
(though most unquestionably a perfect monopoly) not to mention many others 
that continue to exist in Great Britain, which could not be the case if the abolition 
of the Porto Wine Company had been stipulated, as it would be contrary to the 
principle of reciprocity76  
As Figure 2-6 shows, Irish imports of port wine declined overall during the opening 
years of the nineteenth century. The period around the signing of the Strangford 
Treaty and the disagreements over the Oporto Wine Company mark the point 
where imports suffered a precipitous decline. It would have been somewhat 
arrested by indirect importation, as well as the availability of alternative wines, 
such as those of France. The decline marks the end of one of the pillars of leverage 
in Irish commercial dealings with Portugal. It may have been grandstanding for the 
Portugese to dismiss the Irish wine trade as ‘of not much consideration’ in 1781, 
but now this truly was the case.77 1810 proved a decisive year for trade with 
Portugal, with almost all the major trade goods declining except that perennial Cork 
product, butter.  
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Figure 2-6 Irish imports of port78 
As previously addressed, the most significant and valuable import from 
Portugal was salt. Until the extraction of rock salt in Carrickfergus in the 1850s 
nearly all the salt consumed in Ireland was imported, with a fivefold increase in its 
importation towards the end of the eighteenth century corresponding with the 
expansion of Cork’s provisioning trade. Portuguese salt imports and Cork’s 
provisioning industry had a symbiotic relationship. Colin Rynne attributes the 1825 
abolition of the salt duties, which had previously favoured the Irish industry, as 
causing the provisioning industry to go into decline.79 The 1825 act to which he 
refers came about as part of the full implementation of the Act of Union and it 
repealed all protective duties, drawbacks and bounties on salt and salt products 
throughout the United Kingdom. Not only did this remove the duties on salt, it also 
removed certain drawbacks that had been permissable on salted meat products.80 
However, some of the provisioning trade’s decline is also attributable to 
                                                     
78 Ledgers of Imports and Exports, Ireland 1698-1829, CUST 15, TNA. 
79 Colin Rynne, At the Sign of the Cow: The Cork Butter Market, 1770-1924 (Cork, 1998), pp 39–40. 
80 5 Geo. IV.--Sess. 1824. A Bill to Repeal the Duties and Laws, in Respect of Salt and Rock Salt., H.C. 
1824 (376) iii,1; 3 Geo. IV.--Sess. 1822. (Ireland.) A Bill [As Amended by the Committee] to Continue 
the Duties of Customs Payable on British Salt Imported into Ireland; to Repeal the Duties on Foreign 
Salt Imported into Ireland; and to grant other duties in lieu thereof., H.C. 1822 (510) iii,1951 
106 
 
competition in the trans-Atlantic trade and increasing moves in the Irish economy 
towards increased livestock exports to Britain.  
With the equalisation of all duties, tariffs and bounties the Irish market was 
opened to the full weight of British competition. Increasingly, questions were asked 
in Britain as to why foreign salt imports were utilised rather than British-produced 
rock salt. Still, the use of Portuguese salt was considered essential for the 
provisioning industry, because rock salt was not of sufficient quality. This 
preference for foreign salt was not confined to Ireland and a select committee 
report on British fisheries also noted its benefits. Philip Ball, who was involved in 
the pilchard fisheries in England in 1817, stated that he and others involved in the 
pilchard trade found French salt superior. It should be noted that the term ‘French 
salt’ encapsulates salt from Spain and Portugal as well. He noted that the price for 
foreign produced salt was higher, so the only inducement for its use was its 
superiority; it better preserved the fish and was more suited for use in export to 
warmer climates. This type of preservation salt also led to the produce maintaining 
its appearance, quality and appeal for consumers far better than the British 
produced equivalent.81 These qualities also made it the preferred preservative for 
Cork merchants, as either directly or indirectly their provisions were ultimately 
destined for equatorial locations. 
The favoured source of Portuguese salt was that from St. Ubes, or Setubal. 
In the nineteenth century ninety-six per cent of all Portuguese salt exported to 
Ireland was from there and the majority of it was sent to Cork.82 Compared with 
British-produced rock salt, St. Ubes salt was sea salt, often referred to by 
contemporaries as ‘bay salt’. The long time spent extracting the salt produced large, 
coarse crystals which were slower to dissolve and in consequence preserved meat 
at the top of a barrel for longer.83 In 1780 the 361,563 bushels of imported St. Ubes 
                                                     
81 Report from the Select Committee on the Use of Rock Salt in the Fisheries; &c., pp. 33-35 H.C. 1807 
(247) iii, 121 
82 Horta, ‘Images and Representations of Ireland in Portugal (1830-1925)’, pp 112–113. 
83 Wakefield, An Account of Ireland, Statistical and Political Vol 1, p. 750; John O’Donovan, The 
Economic History of Live Stock in Ireland (Cork, 1940), p. 143. 
107 
 
salt accounted for approximately 96 per cent of the total Irish salt imports.84 
Writing shortly after the French attempts to invade Portugal, Wakefield noted that 
there had been a fear that the salt from St. Ubes would be lost due to the French 
invasion and alternative sources were considered from the Cape de Verde islands.85 
It is interesting that they were looking towards the Cape de Verde islands rather 
than the alternatives locations such as Ivica and the West Indies that had been 
espoused in the 1780s. Obviously much of Europe was inaccessible, but what of 
England or the West Indies? Although this invasion never took place the fact that 
alternative plans were envisaged to replace St. Ubes salt specifically, rather than 
bay salt or Portuguese salt generally, is indicative of the high esteem in which this 
product was held. Of all the the imports from Portugal, this specific type of 
preservation salt was the one that could not be supplied sufficiently from 
elsewhere and in some cases it was absolutely required to satisfy the terms of 
Ireland’s provisioning contracts.86   
This reliance on foreign-produced salt for the Irish provisioning trade was a 
recurring theme in nineteenth century parliamentary debates. In an 1804 debate 
on foreign salt duties Colonel Hutchinson, MP for Cork, objected to any changes in 
the rates charged, believing that it would exacerbate an already declining 
provisions trade and create a sense of worry amongst traders. Some support was 
received from the Louth MP, Mr. Foster, who stated that he would not support any 
thing that could have an impact on the provisioning trade. To encourage that trade 
he would introduce a provision to allow the warehousing of salt. This move to put 
additional duty on foreign salt was soon dropped.87 However, this was only a 
temporary respite as once the full implementation of the Act of Union took place 
regulations on salt duties were changed and by 1825 all duties within the United 
Kingdom were repealed. Part of the argument posited for increasing the salt duties 
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was that the duty on salt in Britain was far too high. This led to fraudulent re-
exportation from Ireland to Britain, which would be exacerbated when the full 
union was implemented.88 If, as Davies ascertains, in the 1850s the cost of a ton of 
salt for Irish merchants was double what it cost for their English competitors after 
duties between the two islands were normalised there is some argument for both 
sides; that lower Irish salt duties had led to re-exportation to Britain and Irish duties 
were too low. During the Napoleonic Wars a duty of £40 per ton of foreign salt 
imported into England was applied, whereas the duty on the same amount in 
Ireland was £4. At the conclusion of the war the British duty was removed and with 
it one of the advantages of the Irish manufacturers.89 There was a 
contemporaneous hope that the discovery of a new industrial salt supply at 
Carrickfergus would revitalise the flagging Cork provisions trade as the extra 
expense for salt in Ireland had partially hastened the transition towards live exports 
and the loss of foreign markets. It also created an excessive reliance on the British 
market for food exports. According to John Maguire’s account for the country as a 
whole it would be ‘a vast gainer by the facility which that most fortunate chance 
has afforded it of procuring an indispensable article free from the heavy charges of 
sea transport.’90  
The changes wrought on Cork’s access to Portuguese salt and the lack of 
alternative sources of salt of a sufficient quality were blamed for the decline of the 
region’s most lucrative trade. This could be interpreted as proving Hutchinson’s 
point made several decades earlier when he alleged that changes in the duties on 
Portuguese salt would accelerate the decline in Cork’s provisions trade, but this is a 
rather simplistic view. The changes in the fortunes of Cork’s provisioning trade 
depended on a multitude of factors. Access to salt was of course an important 
consideration, but so too was the changing nature of Ireland’s relationship with 
Britain, improving transportation networks and the changes in the nature of 
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colonial relationships. One pertinent example is how Britain had gained direct 
access to the Brazilian market with the Rio de Janeiro Treaty, bypassing the need to 
tranship material through Portugal. British merchants were quick to adapt to new 
opportunities. In the years prior to the negotiation of the Strangford Treaty they 
had moved some of their trade with Portugal to Brazil in response to the relocation 
of the Portuguese royal family there.91 While salt was a very important commodity 
for Cork’s merchants, there were wider issues that also impacted upon Cork’s 
provisioning trade.  
The push for the equalisation of salt duties between Britain and Ireland ran 
well into the nineteenth century. A General Gascoyne alleged that the inequality of 
these duties discouraged British salt manufacturers as they gave an advantage to 
foreign produce. He maintained that the lower duties in Ireland should be equalised 
to encourage the use of British salt instead of bay salt. Mr. Foster strongly argued 
against this as there was no comparison between the two goods, with British salt 
being unsuitable for packing provisions for trans-Atlantic shipment, which ‘had 
made Irish beef so famous in different quarters of the world for keeping so well in 
any climate, was the virtue of the Bay salt with which it had been cured’.92 The 
importation of salt was a constant concern for those involved in the provisioning 
trades. Even the period from the resolution of the Portugal trade dispute in the 
1780s up to the Act of Union saw many difficulties; the Committee of Merchants 
repeatedly petitioned parliament and their representatives regarding restrictions 
on their Portuguese salt trade and unfavourable duties.93 
The tone in this debate followed a distinct pattern of tensions between 
British and Irish manufacturers. In some respects it had less to do with the issue at 
hand than with jealousies regarding duty differentials and potential smuggling. A 
General Tarleton’s opinion epitomises some of this: 
England had been on all occasions bounteous and indulgent towards Ireland, in 
giving her every fair advantage in her trade; and that if it was made out that British 
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salt was as effectual in curing provisions as the foreign salt… Ireland should not 
object to the equalisation of the duties. The bay salt was the cargo under which 
brandy in general was smuggled: and perhaps it might be owing to this method of 
disguising smuggling that the gentlemen in Ireland were able to drink such good 
wines. He had often been indebted to them for a very hospitable portion of their 
excellent wines; and he knew them to be very select in their wines in general, 
indeed they drank it much cheaper and better than gentlemen in this country were 
able to do; and that they did so, might be owing to the Irish market being pretty 
abundantly supplied in this way.94 
These arguments did not solely relate to the lack of Irish support for British 
manufacturers. They went deeper. The debates were indicative of the underlying 
tensions of the Act of Union and the requirements to create an equal trading 
environment within the United Kingdom. However, an 1836 report noted that the 
greatest quantity of salt used for butter in Ireland was sent from England and that 
approximately 50-60,000 tons was exported from there.95 This was after the duty 
differentials were no longer an issue, but it still calls into question some of the 
views General Tarleton expressed. He may have had, at least partially, a point with 
regards smuggling, though perhaps not in wine. In the 1780s disagreement with 
Portugal the Irish parliament complained of a reduction in the sale of various Irish-
made textiles to Portugal, ‘which the Portuguese were fond of smuggling as English 
goods’.96  
As with many of the parliamentary debates it can be hard to separate 
personal bias from the truth of the situation. Was it possible that the salt trade was 
being used to smuggle wine? It would have been an effective method to smuggle 
wines. However, the question remains, would smuggled wine and brandy from 
Portugal have been of more value to provisioning merchants than the salt they 
displaced? That is highly unlikely. Even though the main market in Britain for French 
wines was in high quality clarets, the value of this wine could not have displaced 
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either the inherent value of or the requirement for provisioning salt.97 A more 
reasonable interpretation is that the individuals the general referred to had 
excellent connections in the continental wine trade. These familial connections 
throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth century had been important in 
cementing Ireland’s and Cork’s access to continental produce.98 
At the turn of the nineteenth century Portuguese salt dominated all foreign 
salt imports into Ireland (see Table 2-1 and Figure 2-7). Even when British white salt 
imports are included it still comprised well over a third of all imports and this 
proportion increased into the first decades of the nineteenth century. In the three 
years from 1799 to 1801 Cork imported 45,080 bushels of foreign salt.99 Cork’s 
share of Portuguese salt imports dominated; direct imports from Portugal alone 
generally comprised around half of Ireland’s total imports of Portuguese salt. This is 
not surprising considering Cork’s large provisioning trade. However, this salt was 
not solely for home use. A certain amount of it was re-exported to Newfoundland, 
presumably for the fishing industry there. In 1804 Mr. Foster proposed that salt 
imported into Ireland should be allowed for re-shipment without landing from the 
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1798 97420 100818 257670 
1799 256602 262351 710428 
1800 217458 225040 559837 
1815 306378 306378 564668 
1816 212920 223728 374873 
1817 266334 266574 514318 
Table 2-1 Irish salt imports101 
 
Figure 2-7 Salt imports into Cork102 
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Figures 2-8 and 2-9 show the relative value of wine and salt in Cork, in terms 
of requirements for the local economy. Although both goods experienced sharp 
declines at the turn of the 1830s, the decline in salt was rapidly turned around into 
growth, whereas wine imports continued to decline. These are the total figures for 
all imports, so it is impossible to ascertain how they break down for Portugal alone. 
However, working from the trend that Portugal dominated all of Cork’s salt imports, 
and a large proportion of its wine consumption, the fluctuations seen here are 
representative of changes in Cork’s trading relationship with Portugal more than 











Figure 2-8 Salt and wine imports from Portugal103 
 
Figure 2-9 Cork’s trade and shipping 1831104 
The Pitt papers contain expressions of concern that Portugal appeared to 
treat Ireland as a nation separate from Britain. The ultimate intention of this 
treatment by Portugal was to secure a portion of the export of sugar to Ireland, for 
which Ireland mostly relied upon Britain. While presenting evidence on the state of 
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Ireland’s trade with Portugal, Hugh Shey, a Portuguese merchant, suggested that a 
sugar trade could develop between Ireland and Portugal and that ‘by Ireland 
confining herself to purchase sugars only from British colonies in the West Indies 
she is greatly injured’.105 This individual treatment of Ireland by Portugal was not 
entirely beneficial, as Irish-Portuguese trade suffered serious difficulties during the 
mid-1780s. Exports to Ireland were obviously significant enough for it to be 
considered a potential major trading partner. The probability of usurping Irish 
dependence on imported sugar from Britain would have made sense as the trade 
that then existed between Ireland and Portugal revolved around provisioning 
Portugal’s American colonies, both in terms of Cork’s butter exports to Portugal and 
imports of Portuguese salt. Portugal’s attempt at developing a sugar trade with 
Ireland were unsuccessful, but it would have made for a sensible policy. Portugal’s 
imports from Ireland were mainly southern provisions. Providing more direct access 
to the required supplies from Ireland in exchange for valuable colonial merchandise 
would have given Portugal a favourable balance of trade with Ireland as well as 
guaranteeing more secure sources for the required provisions. It can only be 
speculated as to how serious this threat was to British interests in Ireland and how 
interested Irish merchants were. But considering the effort expended to secure free 
trade for Ireland with Britain’s West Indies colonies it could have made a tempting 
proposition for the mercantile community. 
Exports 
From the 1780s exports of Irish butter to all continental destinations fell, but 
Cullen demonstrates the West Indies and Portugal remained the two major trading 
partners for Ireland and Britain.106 Ireland’s chief export to Portugal was butter, 
predominantly from Cork. As previously noted much of the trade from the British 
Isles to Portugal was ultimately destined for the colonial market and butter was one 
of the key provisions. For this reason, Cork butter was almost synonymous with the 
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major moments of importance for the Methuen Treaty. During the treaty 
negotiations Cork butter was used to alleviate a local famine in Portugal and foster 
good will towards the British negotiating team. On the 5th of January 1703 John 
Methuen requested a convoy of ships to carry provisions from Cork to alleviate the 
famine. He wrote, 
Nothing has served to show the people here, who are all on our side, the 
advantages of our friendship more than the great quantity of butter, which hath 
come from Ireland and fish from Newfoundland at a time when their oyle [sic] has 
failed.107 
There was a long standing history of the consumption of Irish butter in Portugal. It 
was used both locally and for re-export. The export of Irish butter to Portugal was 
of a sufficient volume by 1783 that it paid for all imports from that country. In fact 
the balance of the whole trade was £60,000 in Ireland’s favour. Shey noted in the 
same year that he was not aware of any other country that sent butter to 
Portugal.108 After Cork’s trans-Atlantic trade in butter, Portugal was the next 
favoured international market, with Lammey pointing out that the Cork butter 
trade had, ‘made the New World and Portugal her own particular monopoly.’109 
Portugal could not get butter and provisions of such quality elsewhere, but 
this is more a testament to the quality of the Irish provisioning industry than a 
criticism of Portugal’s commercial connections.110 However, during the trade 
dispute between Ireland and Portugal in the 1780s Shey argued that better quality 
butter could be sourced from Holland, but at a higher price.111 This had always been 
the case. The success of Cork’s butter market lay in consistency rather than quality. 
Other butter producers could provide a better quality product, but the consistency 
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could vary widely; Cork’s did not. Furthermore, Shey made this comment during a 
period of intense negotiations between Britain and Portugal regarding their future 
commercial arrangements. It would be a poor negotiating tactic for a Portuguese 
merchant to suggest in any way that they depended on Irish produce. Shey’s 
argument underestimated the importance of trade with Cork to Portugal. Horta 
notes,  
Portuguese consuls in Ireland and particularly in Cork were considered 
fundamental to Portugal’s colonial enterprise…The importance of the south of 
Ireland and particularly Cork became so overwhelming to Portugal that in the early 
nineteenth century Cork became the main Portuguese consulate, while Limerick, 
Derry, Belfast, Waterford and Dublin were the location of vice-consulates 
dependent on Cork.112   
The sheer volume of consuls appointed to Ireland supports this argument. For 
almost the whole first half of the nineteenth century Ireland had more consuls than 
similarly sized countries such as Holland, Belgium, Prussia and Austria.113 The 
balance of trade in favour of Ireland was maintained consistently throughout the 
early nineteenth century, excepting a minor deficit in the first decade (see Figure 2-
10). Cork’s provisioning capabilities were unrivalled at this time. Its produce was 
renowned for its ability to survive both the long journeys across the Atlantic and 
the hot and humid climate prevalent in many of Portugal’s colonial possessions. 
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Figure 2-10 Irish balance of trade with Portugal114 
The Peninsular War from 1807 to 1814 had a dramatic impact on Cork’s 
butter exports to Portugal with exports of butter plummeting from around 50,000 
CWT in 1807 to a low of just over 5,000 CWT in 1809, which accounted for almost 
the entirety of Cork’s continental trade (Figure 2-11). However, the recovery of its 
trade was substantial. Although the total volumes declined over the following 
decade the direct continental trade in butter remained focused on Portugal. An 
increasing focus on British trade, the opening of direct trade from Brazil to Great 
Britain and the changing nature of the West Indies all contributed to this decline. 
Donnelly estimates that in 1825 the majority of the 77,000 firkins of butter 
exported from Cork to Portugal were destined for Brazil, making Lisbon by far the 
most important continental destination for Cork produced butter. By the 1840s the 
exports to Lisbon alone had almost doubled from 50,000 firkins a year in the early 
1820s to some 80,000 by the early 1840s.115 These comparisons are based on 
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having a firkin as approximately half a hundredweight (though there were local 
variations in the exact weight).  
In 1839 of the 1,362,680 francs worth of butter imported into Lisbon, 
427,300 francs were supplied by England, followed closely by Hamburg. A large 
proportion of this butter originated in Cork.116 The equalisation of wine duties in 
1842 had a calamitous effect on these exports, with the trade collapsing from 
80,000 firkins in the early 1840s to 16,000 by 1852. The treaty negotiations of the 
mid-1840s between Portugal and Great Britain left the state of Cork’s provisioning 
exports to the region in a disastrous position. The 1844 commercial report noted 
that Lisbon’s importation of butter was almost solely from Cork, sending salt in 
return. Unfortunately the report does not distinguish between Irish and British 
shipping, using British synonymously. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that 
the four British ships that arrived in Portugal in 1842 laden with butter and some of 
the seven departing British ships laden with salt were actually from Cork. Of course 
not all of the shipping involved in this route was of British origin. Ships leaving the 
Port of Cork for Portugal were often matched by Portuguese vessels heading in the 
other direction.117  
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Figure 2-11 Cork's butter exports to Europe118 
By the 1840s, with the Methuen Treaty in its final stages, Cork butter again 
featured in the debates. In an article in the Freeman’s Journal titled ‘English and 
Irish Interests’ the Committee of Merchants launched a vociferous attack on British 
negotiations with Portugal. They argued that their trade was in serious decline, 
‘strangled by some measure of protection, or some provision for the extension of 
the commerce of “the empire”’ and that Britain sacrificed Irish interests ‘to suit 
their own purposes or to tempt the cupidity of strangers’.119 There is a certain 
pleasing symmetry to the grievances expressed at this time. During the previous 
disagreement in the 1780s Portugal had argued that England expressly excluded 
Ireland in the 1703 negotiations. The Irish Parliament and others had argued at that 
Britain was not acting in Ireland’s interests to secure trade with Portugal. After the 
full passage of the Act of Union once more we come across the old argument that 
Irish interests were secondary to those of Britain. In the words of a Mr. Sheil in 
1826 the question at the forefront of minds was: ‘Shall Portugal be free, and shall 
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Ireland be still a slave? Shall treaties be sacred for Portugal, and be nullities for us? 
Shall treaties be chains of adamant for Portugal and be ropes of sand for us?’120 
Although the reliability of the data becomes problematic after the mid-
1820s, data for British and Irish exports to Portugal can be used to draw some 
conclusions. Figure 2-11 shows that Cork’s butter exports rarely fell below 20,000 
firkins per year, averaging at around 33,500 firkins per annum. From 1810 onwards 
while a steady decline is evident, there is still a substantial trade going on. Data for 
the volume of the total exports of butter and cheese combined from Ireland and 
Britain a decade later shows a trade in a serious long-term decline (Figure 2-12 
below). This was not unique to dairy products. Both the total declared value of 
butter and cheese exports and the total declared value for all exports of Irish and 
British manufacture to Portugal declined dramatically in the mid-1830s. The total 
value of exports plummeted from £1,654,320 in 1835 to £1,085,934 in 1836, a loss 
of over a third of its value from the previous year.  
 
Figure 2-12 British and Irish butter and cheese exports to Portugal121 
There are several potential causes for such a dramatic decline. The abolition 
of the trans-Atlantic slave trade helped to precipitate this collapse along with the 
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Portuguese Civil War. However, it is far more likely that the decline resulted from 
the British government’s withdrawal of the preferential treatment of Portuguese 
wines and the application of new rates of duty on Cork’s Portuguese butter 
exports.122 The Duke of Palmella noted that this had resulted in ‘depriving 
Portuguese commerce of the most important advantage which it enjoyed in the 
British dominions’ and he furthermore noted, ‘Treaties of Commerce ought always 
to be temporary since the commercial interests of nations are in their nature 
variable’.123 Maguire observed that a large proportion of the falloff in the butter 
trade with Portugal was due the imposition of duties of nearly 40 per cent on Irish 
butter in response to the disagreements of wine duties with Britain. By the time he 
was writing, in 1853, he suggested that a large proportion of the trade that 
formerly went through Portugal now was sent directly to Brazil. William Fagan, the 
Committee of Merchants representative in London, had made a similar assessment 
a decade earlier when he estimated that a reversion to the old rates of the 1830s 
would increase exports by 40,000 firkins; a more than fourfold increase at the time 
he was writing!124 The gradual shift of butter exports from Portugal to Brazil is 
consistent with a decline beginning around 1810. The trade collapsed quite 
dramatically in the mid-1830s and, although a slight improvement is evident by 
1840, it is minor. Figure 2-12 shows combined butter and cheese exports for both 
Britain and Ireland.  
The actual decline in Cork’s butter exports alone was even more dramatic. 
The Freeman’s Journal commented in 1840 that it had almost entirely ceased.125 
The application of prohibitory duties against the United Kingdom due to 
disagreements over wine duties had its precedence in the 1780s. These events add 
credence to the arguments made by the Portuguese Foreign Minister, Chevalier de 
Pinto, that butter was a luxury good for the Portuguese that they could readily 
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replace it with oil.126 Cork’s butter merchants faced the uncomfortable truth that 
their produce was both quantifiably replaceable and consistency readily 
sacrificeable, at least by Portugal, their only European market of note. 
Conclusion 
Economic progress in Portugal was tied to supplying the Brazilian market. 
However, the liberalisation of the Brazilian trade and granting of access to British 
merchants meant that in 1808 much of this progress was lost. Up to a third of 
Portuguese industrial establishments were described as in a state of decay by 
1811.127 This decay was not arrested and in 1844 it was noted that, 
The separation of Brazil nearly completed the ruin of the Portuguese trade, which 
in regard to exports, is now chiefly limited to wine, fruits, wood, cork, and salt.128 
In the eighteenth century Cork had a substantial trade with Portugal (and Spain). 
This sharply declined following the opening of direct trade between Britain and 
Brazil after 1810. However, very little of this direct trade applied to Cork. There was 
a spike in linen exports to Brazil around the time that the Portuguese monarchy left 
during the French assault on the Iberian Peninsula, but this was a temporary 
outcome. After 1810 Cork’s provisioning trade, which had supplied colonial 
provisions via Portugal, was moved to British traders shipping directly to South 
America. Britain’s overseas trade with South America rapidly expanded in the early 
decades of the nineteenth century, increasing in value from £479,000 in 1800 to 
£5,970,000 by 1810.129 However, these figures are for British trade with the Foreign 
West Indies and South America in their entirety, so do not fully reflect the realities 
of British trade with Brazil alone. They are indicative of an increasing British 
                                                     
126 Belfast Newsletter, 29 April 1785. 
127 François Crouzet, ‘Wars, Blockade, and Economic Change in Europe, 1792-1815’ in The Journal of 
Economic History, xxiv, no. 4 (1964), p. 574. 
128 Commercial Tariffs and Regulations of the Several States of Europe and America, Together with 
the Commercial Treaties between England and Foreign Countries. Part the Fourteenth. Portugal., p. 
2. 
129 B. R. Mitchell, British Historical Statistics (Cambridge, 1988), p. 311. 
124 
 
commercial presence in the region. Irish trade did track that of Britain, with a 
similar surplus of trade in Irish-Portuguese trade as with Anglo-Portuguese trade.130 
France 
Migration from France contributed to the development of many of Cork’s 
regional enterprises, including linen and sugar-refining.131 During the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries a strong cross migration of French and Cork people was 
reflected in the city’s trading relationship with France. On a visit to Cork in the 
1790s Coquebert de Montbret noted that there was a high demand for Cork butter 
in France to supply the colonies and that Cork’s merchants, contrary to custom, 
paid higher prices to small vessels exporting salted beef to Le Harve as this allowed 
them to load and offload cargo directly from their stores.132 However, Coquebert’s 
analysis of Cork’s trading relationship with France was composed on the eve of 
nearly a quarter of a century of intra-European conflict. As with all Irish trade, 
Cork’s trade with France was vulnerable to the state of Anglo-Franco relations. This 
was an important factor for much of the early nineteenth century.  
In previous conflicts between Britain and France a variety of means were 
used to circumvent trade restrictions.133 While it is probable that similar 
mechanisms were employed during the French Wars, due to their clandestine 
nature, customs officials would not have captured them. Nash points to this issue in 
his examination of seventeenth and eighteenth century Irish trade, stating that the 
official statistics on Irish trade with France exclude direct trades with the Caribbean 
colonies as well as indirect trade via intermediaries such as using Dutch trading 
houses to supply the French West Indies during the Seven Years War.134 Smuggling 
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remained an issue into the nineteenth century, as demonstrated by the differences 
in the quantities of brandy entered in the French custom books as exported to 
Britain and the quantities listed as imported by the English custom accounts. For 
example, in 1827 France recorded 2,254,529 gallons of wine as exported to the 
United Kingdom, whereas the United Kingdom listed 1,697,310 gallons as imported 
the same year.135 This analysis should therefore be counterbalanced by a tacit 
acknowledgement that smuggling and other unofficial trading arrangements are 
not captured in the existing data. 
The exportation of Cork’s salted produce to France has a long history. 
Eighteenth-century French colonial and commercial texts noted the necessity of 
Irish salt beef for the success of French colonies in the Caribbean. Mandelblatt 
specifically notes that it was the French colonial ports like Nantes, La Rochelle, and 
Bordeaux that had the strongest connections to the Irish beef trade.136 Ireland’s 
trade with France was informed by the requirements of the colonial powers to 
supply their colonies with high quality foodstuffs that could survive a trans-Atlantic 
journey. As with most of Cork’s international trade it was very heavily influenced by 
the exertion of Imperial power across the Atlantic. Due to war with Britain, France 
lost many of her Caribbean possessions, as well as holdings on the continental 
United States, in the opening years of the nineteenth century. This impacted upon 
France’s requirements for provisioning meat. The type of salt beef that Cork 
exported to France was only destined for slaves in these regions as it was poor 
quality mess beef. A nineteenth century Bordeaux historian suggested that Irish 
beef was the ‘Food of sailors, and in our colonies, most importantly that of 
slaves’.137 Cullen points out that the high duties within France excluded Irish beef 
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from the internal French markets. This further supports the evidence that most Irish 
beef exports were destined for colonial use.138 
Cork’s beef trade with France in the eighteenth century was one of its most 
important exports to continental markets. However, poor relations between Britain 
and France repeatedly restricted this commerce. The expatriate Irish community in 
France controlled much of the development of this continental trade. Beef was sent 
out, wine, brandy and prunes were returned. Nantes was the major landing port for 
Irish produce and beef prices steadily increased over the course of the eighteenth 
century.139 Cullen attributes the increase in Irish beef prices to the growth of the 
French colony of St. Domingue and argues that the loss of this colony to revolt in 
1804 precipitated the decline of the Irish beef trade with France.140 The eighteenth 
century growth in beef and butter exports to France would not last into the 
nineteenth century.  
A combination of factors influenced the character of the trade from the 
1780s. These included social and political upheavals in France, growing Anglo-
Franco tensions, an improving wine trade with Portugal and uprisings in France’s 
colonial possessions. Unlike Britain however, Irish trade with France was less 
affected by the Methuen Treaty. One notable impact it did have was that the 
disagreements with Portugal led Irish politicians to push Irish interests in the Eden 
Treaty with France of 1783. To satisfy their concerns Articles fourteen and fifteen 
explicitly referred to both how the treaty was to apply to the Kingdom of Ireland 
and the freedom of movement for Irish shipping.141 Despite the fact that this treaty 
was short-lived, it is an important indication of how the implications of Portuguese 
issues such as the conflict over the application of the Methuen Treaty impacted 
Ireland’s broader commercial environment. By 1793 the early stages of the 
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Napoleonic War had nullified much of this arrangement, as was to be the case for 
some time. Edward Forbes noted in a letter to Christopher Champlin,  
The unparalleled failures throughout G. Britain with some in this Country, together 
with the War with France hath had a very bad effect on our trade, which caus’d a 
great scarcity of money and much diffidence amongst traders and 
manufacturers.142 
The reasons for this decline from the late eighteenth century may not be solely due 
to the Methuen Treaty. The periods during which Cork was placed under embargo 
in the late 1770s, as well as the loss of Caribbean possessions in the early years of 
the nineteenth century, also harmed demand for Irish provisions. These goods were 
intended for transhipment; there was little penetration of the French domestic 
market. Although the years from 1793 to 1815 were the culmination of a long 
period of commercial expansion for Ireland, the boom concealed the true nature of 
the restructuring of Cork’s trade towards England.143 The high prices of wartime 
demand hid the loss of the major trading partners that Cork had developed over 
the eighteenth century. The West Indies, France and Portugal all saw declining 
trade with Cork. Times may have been good, but the seeds of future commercial 
difficulties were sown at the turn of the nineteenth century. 
Figure 2-13 below shows that the official value of French imports into 
Ireland collapsed after the French Revolution. Ireland had maintained a high level of 
imports from France for much of the eighteenth century. Unfortunately the data for 
exports to France after 1792 is negligible in the parliamentary report on French 
trade in 1840, yet a number of comparisons can be made using the data for British 
exports to France (see Figure 2-14). Britain saw the same collapse in the value of 
French imports from 1793 as did Ireland. However, the recovery was more 
significant. Whereas the data for Ireland’s trade points to a long term decline 
hastened by events in Europe, Britain’s relationship shows a far greater resilience. 
This is somewhat surprising considering the tensions between Britain and France at 
this time. British imports quickly recovered to their pre-revolution levels and the 
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balance of trade with France remained at a healthy level throughout all but the 
most difficult years of the Napoleonic Wars. The data available for Ireland’s exports 
to France shows a generally favourable balance of trade pre-1793, but it also 
indicates a declining trend for imports. 
 
Figure 2-13 Irish imports from France144 
 
Figure 2-14 Anglo-French trade145 
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Wine was one of Ireland’s main imports from France in the eighteenth 
century. Legg has pointed to the strong Irish familial connections with Bordeaux as 
an example of how this trade developed. A number of Irish owned vineyards traded 
Bordeaux wine in return for Irish goods such as salted meat. As a portion of this 
trade was destined for re-exportation to Britain, it made Dublin and Cork the 
principal centres for redistributing claret to Bristol and the colonies. In the six 
months from July to December 1788 Ireland imported 1,600 tuns, compared to 505 
tuns imported into London. 19 per cent of British wine imports from France and a 
large proportion of the wine imported from Bordeaux were in turn re-exported to 
Britain, with this facet of the trade comprising half of all Bordeaux-produced goods 
sold in Britain.146 It is likely that duty differentials on French wine imported into 
Ireland as compared to imports into Britain accounted for a portion of this trade. 
Lower import duties on French wines remained in Ireland until the standardisation 
of duties and drawbacks in 1824 (see Appendix 2 for comparative duty rates). For 
some periods these differences were substantial.147 Personal and familial 
connections to these Irish Bordeaux vineyards had a part to play in trade with 
Ireland. Native and expatriate Irish merchants dominated this trade on both 
sides.148 
As mentioned in Chapter One, many Cork-based merchants profited 
indirectly from the slave trade though the provisioning industries. The Tobin 
Company of Liverpool purchased the gunpowder mills at Ballincollig in the 1830s. It 
was run by Thomas Tobin. His family’s wealth derived directly from African slavery; 
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both his father Thomas and Uncle John were heavily involved in the slave trade.149 
Two families in Nantes, the Roches and the Rirdans, who were armateurs (those 
who outfitted slave ships) both claimed Cork ancestry.150 If these eighteenth-
century French slavers descended from Cork emigrants it is likely that they had 
arrived in France in the early to mid-seventeenth century. Rodgers believes that the 
Roches were in the region by the 1650s.151 She argues,  
The existence of a prosperous and heavily Catholic Irish community in France’s 
Atlantic ports attests to thriving trade links with Ireland, opportunities for new 
emigrants, a degree of small scale smuggling, the steady development of an Irish 
presence in the French West Indies… proliferating in white overseers, commercial 
agents and planters.152 
Several families that originated in Cork established themselves in both the West 
Indies and France. These included the McCarthy families and the Delaps. The Irish 
mercantile presence in France rapidly expanded during the eighteenth century.153 
This settlement pattern exemplifies the nature of Cork’s trade with France; 
providing provisions for the colonies in exchange for wine. These emigrant families 
were well positioned and connected enough to act as intermediaries for both facets 
of this trade. 
During the eighteenth century France had been one of Ireland’s best 
importers of salted beef. These provisions were ultimately destined for the 
Caribbean and by mid-century this trade was a mainstay of Irish commercial 
activity.154 However, war steadily eroded this trade and by 1800 Cork’s exports to 
France had been completely destroyed. There was a slight recovery by 1815, but a 
quarter of century of conflict had hastened a decline that had started in the 1740s. 
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A limited import trade did remain. The main products imported into Cork were 
French wines, brandies, oil products and glass, but the volumes were insignificant. 
Cork’s trading relationship with France centred on provisions for re-export. As 
France lost many of her colonial possessions to Britain it no longer had much need 
for low grade beef provisions. For similar reasons Cork’s imports from France were 
her wines and these were available from Portugal at much lower prices. From 1812 
to 1823 French wine was consistently valued at over 8 per cent higher per tun than 
port.155 There were no illusions in France as to the reason for the deterioration of 
the Irish trade. The only way for French exports to penetrate the market of the 
United Kingdom, including Ireland, was to be allowed to export at the same price as 
other European countries. Especially as the Napoleonic Wars, according to French 
commentators, had seen wine replaced by beers and liquors.156  
In 1800 a French writer pointed to the Englishman’s belief in his own 
superiority. He mentioned that they despised the Scots and the Irish, that they 
treated all other nations as slaves and they saw the Irishman as beyond help and 
suffering from a ‘low and grovelling mind’ and was irredeemable.157 This was not 
merely a xenophobic reaction to the contemporaneous conflict with Britain; by 
1836 they still referred to the ‘misery and oppression’ in Ireland that existed due to 
Britain.158 This is remarkably similar to the perspectives of Portuguese 
commentators in the 1780’s when they commented on the underdevelopment of 
Irish commercial representation and capability. 
One direct result of the Napoleonic Wars was a small export trade to St. 
Helena for a number of years after 1815. Beef, butter and pork were all exported 
there, with troops departing from Cove for that region (presumably to support the 
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British garrison that guarded the former Emperor Napoleon).159 However, this 
exportation was not one of much benefit for Cork commerce. Reports surfaced 
regarding the scarcity of provisions available on the island and at least one soldier 
arrested for desertion attributed his action to the poor quality provisions they were 
given.160 In contrast to the quality salted beef Irish commentators always referred 
to, those on St. Helena complained that they were ‘literally starving; or living upon 
the hard Irish beef… which is so hard as to be susceptible of as high a polish as 
mahogany.’161 Over the next few years the condition of Napoleon’s supply of 
foodstuffs and the general state of his confinement were subject to debate, both in 
newspapers and the House of Commons. Reports suggested that conditions on St. 
Helena were less than ideal, with even the Emperor Napoleon himself being limited 
to one bottle of wine per day. However, other records show that in one fortnight 
Napoleon and his nine adult compatriots consumed seven bottles of Constantia, 
fourteen bottles of Champaign, twenty-one bottles Vin de Grace, eighty-four 
bottles of Teneriffe, and one hundred and forty bottles of Claret in addition to 
forty-two bottles of porter. An allowance of sixty-five pounds of beef, thirty-six 
pounds of mutton, and three pounds of butter undoubtedly originated in Cork.162 
Cork’s merchants may have developed a name for themselves in the supply of 
provisions for the military and Caribbean islands, but perhaps these were not 
sufficiently refined for an emperor’s tastes. Perhaps it would have been shrewd to 
re-direct the Portuguese wines they were purchasing at a lower duty than Britain to 
St. Helena. 
Conclusion 
During his visit Coquebert noted some ominous threats to the future of 
Cork’s provisions trade. The French ports of Nantes and Bordeaux were closing to 
imports of meat and butter from Ireland. An increasing number of ships were 
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rejecting Cork’s beef supplies as crews found pork more digestible and less inclined 
to harden when salted. Finally, and of greater significance, was that the colonies in 
North America, Cuba and St. Dominique were beginning to produce their own 
beef.163 The requirements for provisions lessened and the expertise in provisioning 
these regions that Cork merchants had developed over the eighteenth century 
became rapidly irrelevant in the new form the Atlantic economy was taking in the 
nineteenth century. 
Crouzet succinctly sums up the impact that the Napoleonic Wars had 
generally on European development:  
The impact of the wars upon the long-run development of industry… was felt 
mostly through the dislocations in international trade which were brought about by 
the twenty year long conflict between Britain and France, and by the progressive 
involvement of all other European countries in this bitter struggle in which 
economic warfare played a prominent part.164 
This period led to a number of developments in Ireland’s economy, and Cork’s in 
particular, that profoundly affected its development over the course of the 
nineteenth century. Firstly, the wars hastened the re-structuring of Ireland’s 
economy towards Britain. This was a process that had already begun, but the 
straitening of continental trade and the convoy requirements for trans-Atlantic 
shipping pushed Cork’s merchants into a closer dependence on Britain. Secondly, 
demand made provisioning the military a lucrative and easy business venture. The 
presence of the admiralty’s victualling operation in Cork and the sheer volume of 
military ships and troops passing through the harbour provided a ready outlet for 
provisions. Combined with rising prices paid for supplies there was very little 
incentive to seek out other potentially riskier opportunities further afield. This was 
a myopic view of the long-term potential of military demand, even in such a long-
running conflict as the Napoleonic Wars. Military demand would inevitably shrink, 
leaving Cork’s provisioning merchants in a difficult position following a collapse in 
prices. Finally, the conclusion of the war saw a rapid collapse of both wartime prices 
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and wartime demand. Crotty and Foster argue that 1815 can be seen as the true 
turning point in nineteenth century Irish history, rather than the famine of the 
1840s, as cereal prices collapsed putting downward pressure on labour wages.165 
However, Solar points to the early 1830s as a more likely point of change in terms 
of relative pasture and tillage prices impacting upon production.166  
Neither Crotty nor Solar is incorrect in terms of dating the point of structural 
change. Indeed Solar qualifies his analysis with the caveat that although 1815 price 
changes were not as significant as those in the 1830s, they were still important. The 
difficulty with this period is that so many changes occurred in the economic, 
political, and social milieu that it is hard to definitively identify singular causation or 
dates for these changes. The mid-1820s was the most important turning point for 
nineteenth century Irish development, when the changing trade patterns of the 
Napoleonic Wars combined with the final stages of the massive political reforms of 
the Act of Union. This is similar to the view Oldham expressed in 1910, when he 
identified 1824 as the turning point in Ireland’s industrial history due to the 
introduction of free trade between Ireland and Britain, combined with the abolition 
of the post-union ad valorem duties.167 For Cork’s merchants the 1820’s were the 
period which saw the decline in several nascent industries, such as textiles, the 
removal of several protections on their butter trade, the loss or diminution of 
foreign markets and an increasing dependence on exports to Britain.  
One of the major problems in studying this period in Irish history is the 
dearth of reliable information. The customs union meant the end of recording 
separate imports and exports figures for Ireland in the 1820s. In discussing the issue 
regarding the move from tillage to pasture Solar touches on this problem. He refers 
to the role of the steamship in transforming Irish agriculture by decreasing transit 
times and facilitating livestock exports to Britain. Nevertheless the lack of 
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quantifiable evidence is problematic.168 Solar is not the only historian to have 
grappled with this problem, and it is one that is difficult to resolve. One can infer 
some probable consequences by comparing Irish data with that of Britain, but this 
cannot replace definitive proof.  
Cork’s trade with the Continent deteriorated rapidly over the course of the 
nineteenth century. Changing trade patterns, the long-term impact of various 
European conflicts, improving transport connections to Britain, and the loss of a 
variety of favourable duties and bounties in the 1820s all combined to have a 
devastating effect. This loss was not entirely surprising to those watching the state 
of Ireland’s commerce. In 1810, a pivotal point of departure for Ireland’s 
Portuguese trade, the Freeman’s Journal noted that they were ‘gratified to perceive 
such large importations from America and from Portugal, as we much fear from the 
state of our relations with these countries, that their ports will not long remain 
open to us’.169 By the time Anglo-Portuguese commerce was re-examined in the 
1840s, Cork’s merchants vehemently attacked the exclusion of Irish interests from 
the negotiations. They maintained that Cork suffered the most from this exclusion 
due to the level of commercial connectivity between that city and Portugal. They 
alleged that the exclusion of Ireland from the negotiations led to the question as to 
whether or not Ireland would be able to retain any commerce whatsoever. William 
Fagan, the merchants’ London representative was emphatic that the problems 
facing Ireland’s butter trade were due to the altered rates of duty.170 There were 
two crucial pieces of legislation for Cork’s continental trade: the Methuen Treaty, 
which broadly speaking remained in force up to the mid-nineteenth century, and 
the abolition of the separate customs in 1824 as part of the final implementation of 
the Act of Union. The Methuen Treaty from its very foundation established the 
nature of Cork’s trade with Portugal. Despite a number of setbacks during the 
1780s this trading relationship remained mostly positive. The repercussions of the 
Act of Union, however, would prove to be far more complex.
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Chapter 3  
British Trade 
Britain has always been Ireland’s most important trade partner. That simple 
fact has had broad implications in terms of Ireland’s relationship with her nearest 
neighbour and engagement with the wider world. In the twenty-first century 
decisions made in Britain can still potentially impact Irish trade and development. 
This issue goes back to initial moves for Ireland to broaden her political and 
economic interests in Europe. Ireland’s two attempts to join the European 
Economic Community in the 1960s stalled due to de Gaulle’s intransigent 
opposition to British entry, which in turn prevented the Irish application from 
progressing.1 Ireland’s relationship with foreign powers was heavily dependent on 
Britain, as previous chapters have shown. This reliance can be traced back to the 
late seventeenth century legislation that restricted the goods in which Ireland could 
trade as well as her ability to engage in trade relationships with certain foreign 
powers. From this point onwards Ireland was subject to the whims and vagaries of 
British foreign policy. Ireland’s incorporation under the Union compounded this 
dependence as her commercial, economic, political and foreign affairs became the 
affairs of the United Kingdom and vice versa.  
Despite these challenges the eighteenth century was predominantly an 
expansive time for Cork industry and business. The restrictions put in place through 
the Navigation, Cattle and Wool acts benefitted Cork’s provisioning and linen 
industries. Mark McCarthy has argued that the growth Cork experienced during the 
eighteenth century derives from some of these prohibitive acts; with the Cattle Acts 
forcing Cork merchants to move from livestock exports to provisioning the Atlantic 
economies.2 Barry Crosbie has pointed to the increase in British commercial and 
military activities in the Atlantic as ‘an important economic platform that was used 
                                                     
1 Andy Bielenberg and Raymond Ryan, An Economic History of Ireland Since Independence (2013), pp 
23–24. 
2 Mark McCarthy, ‘The Forging of an Atlantic Port City: Socio-Economic and Physical Transformations 
in Cork, 1660–1700’ in Urban History, xxviii, no. 01 (2001), p. 26; Raymond D. Crotty, Irish 
Agricultural Production, its Volume and Structure (Cork, 1966), p. 15. 
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to foster and expand Irish mercantile activity’.3 British foreign trade expanded an 
estimated six-fold between 1700 and 1800.4 Cork was in an ideal position to take 
advantage of the growing Atlantic trade. Crosbie mentions this in light of Irish 
activity in the East Indian trade in the late eighteenth century and indeed it was 
Cork that initially gained from the few concessions handed out in the company’s 
1793 charter. However, Ireland’s commercial gains from British expansion were 
also financed predominantly on British account, thereby depriving Irish merchants 
from a large proportion of the profits to be made. In the nineteenth century the 
impact of warfare combined with increased opportunities in Britain to make the 
latter a more attractive trade alternative to the trans-Atlantic market. 
Ireland’s close connection to Britain could be both beneficial and 
detrimental to Cork’s international trade. In the first instance, the removal of tariffs 
and duties theoretically gave Irish merchants equality on the British market. 
However, in practice it appears that the majority of the benefits accrued to Britain, 
as Parnell, Foster and other anti-union campaigners feared. As previous chapters 
have also mentioned, Cork’s location in the Atlantic gave it a valuable place in the 
victualling of the Royal Navy during the various eighteenth and nineteenth century 
conflicts in which Britain found herself embroiled and it had unrealised potential as 
a valuable entrepot in the East Indies trade. This was enhanced during the 
American War of Independence with Cork city taking the place Kinsale once held in 
terms of the supply of the British military. In 1776 Robert Gordon was appointed 
the Commissary for Provisions at Cork, stating that he hoped his, ‘very long 
experience of 25 years in the export business of Cork’ would be of benefit.5 Close 
connection to the Empire allowed for the importation of both a wide variety of 
exotic goods from the furthest reaches of Britain’s power and, closer to home, 
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access to the ‘workshop of the world’. Taking the subordinate position within the 
Union came with increased benefits such as these. 
Close proximity to Britain also came with serious complications. In the 1780s 
some British merchants feared that Irish free trade and later commercial 
propositions could threaten indigenous British enterprise. The crux of the issue was 
that British producers could not match Ireland’s lower cost base, namely labour 
costs. There was also a fear of the lower level of duties and rates on a number of 
goods in Ireland. During the 1780s debates on the relationship of Anglo-Irish trade 
it was pointed out that  
When England thinks it necessary to extend these duties for her own protection to 
the manufactures of so poor and infant a Country [sic] as Ireland, it is still now 
necessary for Ireland to impose them on a country abounding in still capital and 
industry, and where manufactures are fully established.6 
This type of conflict was not conducive to a productive relationship. The 
commercial propositions were in part intended to regularise trade between Ireland 
and Britain, but many of those involved in Britain had serious reservations. By the 
time of the Act of Union, articles six and seven contained details of the commercial 
aspects of this new relationship. It involved a slow process of merging duty rates, 
which in practice this meant that the Irish rates were raised to match those of 
Britain.  
British fears about the competitiveness of Irish produce ultimately were to 
prove to have no basis in the reality of increased political and economic connection 
between the two countries. By the time of the Union industrialisation in Britain had 
led to dramatic improvements in the production of goods that were also produced 
in Ireland, one example being lower quality textiles. In general Irish producers did 
not invest as much in capital expenditures. Their production of power was also far 
lower, relying very heavily on water power, such as in the Crosses Green area of 
Cork city. This may, in part, be attributed to a lack of foresight. However, energy 
                                                     
6 Memorandum on Several Points of Commerce With Ireland, The Papers of William Pitt the 
Younger, PRO. 30/8/323 ff. 117, BL. 
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supply was a far more pressing issue. Although there were limited coal deposits 
available in Ireland and they were mainly anthracite, which was not suitable for 
industrial uses. More suitable coal had to be imported at additional costs. In 
comparison, British producers were able to take advantage of both improved 
industrial techniques and vast deposits of coal, helping to fuel widespread industrial 
development. Increasing expertise in engineering, such as the Newcomen engine, 
and the discovery of new sources of high quality coal combined to advance British 
industry.  
The nature of Cork’s nineteenth-century trade was shaped by the realities of 
the eighteenth-century Atlantic economy and the history of Anglo-Irish relations. 
Some of the merchants’ failures to adapt can be attributed to those structural 
factors. This is not to solely lay any decline at the feet of a conservative and 
parochial merchant class. The changes brought about by free trade legislation and 
the Act of Union had their own part to play. Cullen argues that there was a poor 
correlation between the loss of protections due to the Act of Union and industrial 
decline in Ireland. Instead, he points to internal population increases and 
technological and organisational advances outside of Ireland.7 Nevertheless, the Act 
of Union was an important milestone in the development of Cork’s nineteenth 
century trade, even if its true implications were not immediately apparent and 
masked by the booming war time economy. The mercantile community of Cork 
expected the Union to bring prosperity, but by the 1840s the city was referred to 
disparagingly as a ‘pork and salting provincial.’8 This resulted from the changing 
relationship between Ireland and Britain and a conservative merchant class that 
became overly reliant on trade with Britain. 
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Scotland and Colonial Transhipment 
Scottish Trade 
Cork did not maintain a significant trade with Scotland. The substantial trade 
with Britain focused on cities such as Liverpool and London. These metropolitan 
areas could supply the bulk of Cork’s imports as well as absorbing a substantial 
proportion of exports. There was also a passing trade as Cork was the last stopping 
point prior to making the trans-Atlantic journey. Scotland was both physically and 
geographically isolated from this southern port. The bulk of Irish trade with that 
country was undertaken by merchants in the northern portion of Ireland. Just as 
geographic proximity and cultural links helped foster Cork’s eighteenth century 
trade with France, similar connections existed between Scotland and the northern 
counties of Ireland. 
Cork’s exports to Scotland were hardly surprising, centring on the main 
produce of the city. A small trade was undertaken in the export of barrels of salted 
pork, barely large enough to have been noticeable in the context of Cork’s pork 
exports or Ireland’s overall exports of pork products and derivatives. What is 
somewhat surprising about Irish exports to Scotland is that the main bulk of the 
pork trade went through Sligo rather than the counties of Ulster. The data recorded 
in 1805 for the 1804 trade, the year which saw Cork reach the peak of its trade in 
salted pork with Scotland (exporting 148 barrels of pork), saw Sligo export 1085 
barrels of pork, from a national total of 1,834. The following year Cork only sent out 
3 barrels, whereas Sligo supplied Scotland with 2,422 out of 3,111. This trend 
remains broadly the same for the opening decade of the nineteenth century. 
However, by 1810 when Scottish consumption of Irish salted pork began to 
experience rapid growth, Sligo’s dominant share of this trade declined in favour of 
Belfast exports. For the remainder of the data available Belfast was the pre-
eminent Irish supplier of salted pork to Scotland. In many respects the expansion of 
the Scottish pork trade tallies with Solar’s argument that in the post-Napoleonic 
War period other markets expanded and purchased some of the excess production 
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left by the contraction of naval demand.9 The increase in Belfast’s engagement with 
the pork trade could also be taken as a precursor to the decline in Cork’s 
prominence in the supply of pork to Britain as a whole. Solar’s estimates for export 
to London, Bristol and Liverpool for 1838 show Cork’s percentage supply of the 
bacon and ham trade in fifth place at 6.8 per cent, behind all other Irish cities bar 
Galway.10 These figures are for bacon and ham; it is possible that Cork pigmeat was 
still being diverted into salted pork barrels, but it is unlikely that this was the case. 
What’s more likely is that Cork’s exports to these major British ports were in fact 
livestock. However, the decline in navy contracts undoubtedly hit Cork to a greater 
degree than other Irish cities and combined with a drop off in the Irish salt pork 
trade to Britain. Some of the decline would have been offset by a rapid growth in 
the trade in hams, but this was not an area where Cork had much expertise and 
export figures remained miniscule.11  
The shift in the export of pork from Sligo to Belfast by the 1820s coincides 
with the consolidation and shrinking of the Lagan Valley linen industry, increased 
migration from Belfast to Scotland, and the introduction of steam transports 
between Northern Ireland and Scotland. Furthermore, the collapse of the handspun 
textile industry in the northern counties led to a consolidation of smaller farm 
holdings into larger more productive units.12 Larger farm holdings were more 
amenable to an increase in pasturage and an increase in livestock holdings; allowing 
Belfast and Derry to take advantage of a growing meat trade with Scotland. Many 
of the Irish migrant workers from Ulster and Connaught emigrated to take 
advantage of growing urban centres in Scotland and the employment opportunities 
therein. As merchants in the south of Ireland were well aware, growing urban 
populations had growing appetites.  
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Although the volume of Irish exports of beef to Scotland were far higher 
than the volume of pork exports, Cork’s share of the beef trade was actually 
proportionally lower overall than that of its pork trade. Dublin markets dominated, 
though as the early decades of the nineteenth century drew on Belfast slowly 
increased its share of exports. Dublin’s dominance is unsurprising as it had major 
cattle markets drawing from all around Leinster and the slaughtering regions of the 
city were close to the port, and it was in ready reach of Scotland’s markets. A 
similar situation existed in Belfast. Cork maintained a small and sporadic trade in 
the derivatives of their slaughtering industries, mainly in bones and skins, but again 
it was of little consequence. 
Cork’s engagement with the Scottish butter trade was slightly better than in 
salted meat, though still a small proportion of the trade overall. Dublin, Sligo, and 
Belfast all maintained a reasonably consistent level of butter exports to Scotland, 
with Sligo accounting for about half the total. Waterford and Limerick also 
maintained a sporadic, but at times large, level of trade with Scotland in butter, 
particularly during times of shortage or excessive demand. As with beef and pork 
this trade concentrated on the northern counties that were within both close reach 
of Scotland and Scotland’s own trade networks.  
Small trades existed in products such as grass seeds from Scotland, which 
comprised a large proportion of Cork’s trade with that country. Some small trades 
existed in secondary and tertiary products. There was a small trade in various 
finished and semi-finished iron products from Scotland, but again nothing of major 
significance. A similar situation existed with Cork’s imports of muscovado sugar, yet 
in terms of either Cork or Ireland’s overall trade with Scotland this was miniscule. 
The importation of print types into Cork saw Scotland contributing a significant 
proportion of Cork’s admittedly small imports, with the rest coming from England. 
A slightly more significant trade occurred in glass, with Cork importing a small 
selection of glassware, including windows, bottles, and glass cases. The largest of 
these was the import of glass cases, with Scottish items comprising the vast bulk of 
glass case manufactures imported into Cork. In terms of importation from Scotland 
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Cork had a small level of trade in a few, but nevertheless important products. There 
were some sporadic imports of tobacco in the opening years of the nineteenth 
century, as well as occasional imports of rum. However, both of these products 
could be sourced from elsewhere with greater ease. The same was true for coal 
imports, which although steadily increasing over the opening decades of the 
nineteenth century remained below ten per cent of total Irish imports from 
Scotland.  
Cork’s most significant importation from Scotland was herring. Cork’s 
proportion of the herring trade from Scotland fluctuated between ten and twenty 
per cent of the national total importation, but it generally remained around the 
lower end of the spectrum. If one considers Cork’s distance from the producer it is 
quite a respectable level of trade. Scotland accounted for thirty to forty per cent of 
Cork’s overall importation of herring, with the balance comprising of imports from 
Sweden, England and Newfoundland. Some of these imports were destined to be 
re-packaged and re-exported to the Caribbean from Cork. However, most were for 
domestic consumption as the level of herring export was low and declined further 
as the years drew on.  
Overall trade with Scotland was insignificant. The geographic distance and 
types of goods on offer, from both parties, meant that any meaningful trade was of 
little value. The products were readily available from markets closer to home. 
Scotland sourced much of the key goods that Cork could offer from Dublin, Belfast 
and Sligo. For Cork it made more sense to purchase sugar, tobacco and other exotic 
products from London or Liverpool.  The only trade of any real significance was in 
herrings and glass cases. Here again there were other market sources for these. 
Cork had connections to both the Swedish and Newfoundland herring trades that 
could easily have been substituted for Scotland’s supply. As they were intended for 
domestic consumption there was no need to source them from Scotland. Similarly 
glass cases could be sourced from almost any manufacturing base in Britain, or 
even made locally. Scotland was just too far removed from any of Cork’s particular 




In the final years of separate Irish customs records the clerks began to 
specify trade with Britain in ‘Foreign or Colonial’ products. Some, but not all, goods 
were further defined to distinguish whether or not they originated from the East 
Indies. In terms of Cork’s imports the goods explicitly defined as originating from 
the East Indies were in the main relatively small trades, but there was a substantial 
importation in some high value products, such as pepper, indigo and nutmeg. Other 
products imported include aloes, coffee, spices, rubber and oils. These were the 
types of cash crops that made trade connections with Asia so valuable, both for 
Britain and the East India Company. The implication here is that up to this point the 
East Indies trade was entered under the English series, which, considering the 
structure of the East India Company’s charters, is unsurprising. For much of the 
lifetime of the East India Company Ireland was severely limited in how she was able 
to trade with the company. Despite being prohibited for the majority of that 
monopoly’s existence, representatives were located in Cork and Limerick to secure 
its own commercial interests. This primarily resulted from Ireland’s strategic 
position on the edge of the Atlantic as well as Cork being a safe port in times of 
conflict. Commercial agencies had existed in Cork for almost the lifetime of the 
company, with Cork’s agency established in 1706 and Kinsale’s in 1708.13  
Ireland’s ability to trade with the East Indies had long been a point of 
disagreement between Ireland and England. During the negotiations of the 
Commercial Propositions in 1784 Thomas Orde detailed to William Pitt several of 
the objections Irish MPs had to his current proposals. In terms of the East Indies 
trade they argued that the phrasing of the third proposition precluded any 
possibility of the importation of East Indian goods to Britain from Ireland and a 
provision was needed to allow for the return of goods to Britain that were damaged 
or unsaleable. In this correspondence many of the complaints were due to phrasing 
rather than problems with ideological intent. The main point of contention was the 
ninth provision:  
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Complaint is made here…of the unreasonable limitations which would hereby put 
to any possible future trade of Ireland… as in [the] case of the extinction of the E. 
India’s Company’s charter many of these countries would be considered of course 
as foreign, and as it is not the principle of this compact to restrain the foreign trade 
of Ireland she would not acquiesce in all the extent of restriction… in such case 
Ireland should agree to be put upon the same footing with regard to the trade to 
the E. Indies, as she now is to submit to with respect to the commerce to the 
colonies in the West Indies or America.14 
Orde suggested that part of the issue at hand was the belief that this provision 
could grant Britain the power to limit Ireland’s foreign trading options, whereas 
John Foster hoped the provision could allow for the possibility of supplying a 
proportion of the British goods the East India Company transported to the region. 
Foster’s attempt to have Ireland designated an accepted warehousing 
location for East India goods fits into the broader pattern of the Irish free trade 
movement. It sought to position Ireland as an equal partner in Britain’s mercantile 
network, rather than simply a passive location for sourcing provisions and 
secondary supplies to support trade. In a 1784 letter to Thomas Orde he detailed 
Ireland’s advantages. He thought Ireland was one of the best customers for East 
India Company goods and if company ships were allowed to off load there it could 
be a valuable warehouse for exotic goods for both countries. Ireland, due to 
‘superior advantages of situation’, would be an ideal place to establish such a 
depot. In the event this occurred British capital would fund it and British ships 
would transport all goods. Foster asserted that Ireland, as part of the Empire, was 
entitled to reap the benefits from it and that part of this would be permitting East 
India ships to land cargo there, rather than having Irish merchants source these 
goods from third party suppliers in London at inflated prices.15  
There were conflicting views on the legality of such a trade. Foster saw the 
East Indies trade as something that was being denied to Ireland as no Irish 
legislation prohibited trade between Ireland and the East India Company. As Irish 
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ports were generally the first landing point for returning East India Company 
vessels, though the cargoes were not off loaded until they reached Britain, those in 
favour of free trade believed there was a benefit to having company store houses in 
Ireland. Orde’s dismissal of this perspective was both accurate and condescending. 
Despite the lack of a ban on the importation of East India Company goods into 
Ireland, the company itself was effectively prohibited from doing so under threat of 
forfeiting goods, ships and even its charter by the Navigation Acts and the 
conditions of their charter. The writer suggests that perhaps the Irish had not 
properly thought about why they wanted this trade opened to them, asking, 
to what part of the east would Ireland wish to trade? China is open to them if they 
consider themselves as not bound by the prohibitions in the charters and acts 
relative to the East-India Company.16 
He goes on to suggest that the reason that Ireland wished to take part in the East 
India trade was to ‘give opportunity to them [the Irish] to smuggle much more than 
they now do.’17  He argued that Britain did not have an unfair advantage over 
Ireland as the Irish could trade with the same channels that the people of Britain 
accessed East India Company goods: ‘It must be observed also that the East India 
company are no more connected with England that with Ireland.’18 Although this 
may be strictly true the tone of the argument suggests a deliberate bureaucratic 
mis-representation of what the Irish sought. Proponents of free trade believed that 
the situation as it stood – having the goods stop in Ireland but not off-loaded, then 
re-exported back to Ireland from Britain – led to unwarranted extra expense and 
was patently absurd. There was little appetite in Britain to renegotiate the 
situation, especially as it would have involved a drastic review of both the 
Navigation Acts as they applied to the East India Company and the company’s 
charter. Furthermore, as the panic and disruption of the American Revolution 
subsided so did the incentive to pander to the Irish political establishment.  
                                                     





This is not to say that the issue completely disappeared. During various 
points in the renegotiations of the Company’s charters references were made to 
the potential for smuggling that opening trade to Ireland, as well as Scotland, could 
cause. During the negotiations for the East India Act, 1814 the Company’s 
deputation petitioned the Earl of Buckinghamshire, Robert Hobart, to warn of this 
danger:  
How much more [tea], then, is smuggling, beyond all bounds, to be expected, when 
the ships shall be unlimited in number and size, and may resort to the outports of 
England, Scotland, and Ireland? This practice would be much facilitated… it would 
be easy for them to break bulk in the passage home… to put tea… [and] other 
articles chargeable with duty, on board ships and cutters destined either for the 
ports of the continent, or the remote coasts of Scotland and Ireland… Ships might 
stop at intermediate ports for orders, and there smuggle… at Cork and Falmouth… 
on the Irish and Scotch coasts.19 
By this point the company’s monopoly was breaking up. The East India Act, 1793 
had begun to allow for limited trade between Ireland and the East Indies, with a 
corollary to the act allowing for the export of goods from the Port of Cork. It also 
allowed the company to ship eight hundred tons from the Port of Cork between 
October and February of every year.20 This provision led Sir John Newport to start a 
correspondence with the Committee of Merchants regarding its use. However, this 
brief correspondence ended with the Committee stating that sufficient time had 
not been allowed to avail of any of the advantages from the provisions of that act.21 
The act was later repealed by the 1813 Act, but only to allow it to be broadened to 
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encompass all properly equipped ports in Great Britain and Ireland. By 1832 this 
meant that Dublin, Belfast and Cork were approved for warehouses for East Indian 
goods. Cork’s bonded warehouses were approved as special security areas. 22  
However, Cork’s commerce with Great Britain was focused almost in its 
entirety on England itself, especially England’s southern and western ports such as 
London, Bristol and Liverpool. Scotland was too far removed from Cork to become a 
major trading partner, especially as Bristol and Liverpool would have had far more 
lucrative markets. In terms of the East Indian trade, although there was limited 
provision made for ships to land in Cork it would not have been sufficient to 
represent a major commercial venture. Cork merchants already had long standing 
connections with London’s mercantile community and a pre-existing trade with 
them. They could purchase colonial luxuries from middlemen there. Cork relied 
heavily on British shipping to move its produce around the world and this 
developed partially in response to the inherent cost and risk involved in operating 
ships. To the minds of such risk averse merchants it would have made far more 
sense, both financially and commercially, to use these same networks to access 
valuable colonial produce. 
Legislative Restrictions, Free Trade and the Union 
Eighteenth Century Restrictions 
Starting at the end of the seventeenth century and continuing up to the 
1770s the British political establishment began moving to protect indigenous 
industrial development. This manifested itself in a number of legislative and 
commercial restrictions. From 1700 the importation of silks and calicoes were 
forbidden, the export of textile machinery banned, and the emigration of artisans 
restricted. The woollen industry was the central concern of much of this legislation. 
This manifested itself in the limitation of Irish wool exports to Britain.23 The Cattle 
Acts restricted the pre-existing live cattle trade from Ireland to Britain. 
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Furthermore, the Navigation Acts curtailed the Irish export trade and forced Irish 
merchants to rely on English merchants to conduct much of their foreign trade. 
Denis O’Hearn has argued that the Cattle and Wool Acts forced a transition to 
provisioning and linen respectively that would not have come about otherwise. 
Ultimately they operated as means for Britain to exert its hegemony not only over 
Ireland, but also over the Atlantic trade as a whole through the ability to restrict or 
curtail the supply of such provisions to continental powers.24 
The Navigation Acts and other commercial restrictions cost Irish merchants 
dearly. Although the Cattle and Wool Acts helped foster a provisioning trade with 
foreign powers, they restricted Irish merchants’ ability to import from British 
colonies, instead forcing them to rely on re-exports through Britain. Combined with 
shipping on British account this cost the Irish merchants dearly, both because of the 
value of the voyage and the more valuable return voyage with colonial goods 
accrued to British account. This remained a sticking point until the passage of free 
trade legislation. Some loopholes temporarily permitted trade with the East Indies 
and the West Indies, but these were the exceptions to the rule.25 Cullen argues that 
this structure of the export trade actually benefitted Cork and Dublin. Shipping on 
British account increased the mixed composition of the financial sector: it 
quickened the movement of peripheral trade to central locations and increased the 
number of commissioned deals being undertake through Cork and Dublin.26 
Some of the results of these restrictions were detailed in a 1750 report on 
the state of Irish trade 
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But after some years they found [a] way of salting, barrelling, and exporting their 
beef. So that in lieu of exporting 70,000 head of live cattle to England…which they 
manufactured afterwards, and exported, and had all the hides and tallow into the 
bargain. Ireland now manufactures and exports that Beef to the value of £200,000 
per annum, of butter near £200,000 more…and about 3,000 raw hides to England 
and 70,000 raw hides to France, Spain &c where they are tanned to the vast 
advantage of our enemies and manifest loss of England and Ireland.27 
Although this extract treats the changes as an abject loss to both Britain and 
Ireland, this was not necessarily the case. Rather than remaining the food basket 
for the empire, where primary produce was exported to Britain for further 
processing, Ireland had readjusted and was now completing much of the processing 
of secondary produce from the burgeoning provisioning trade indigenously. A 
proto-industrial environment developed around the provisioning trade and there 
was nowhere that could benefit more from this than Cork. Moreover, as the 
authors emphasized, Ireland was also developing trade with other European 
powers, broadening and deepening connections with the continent established by 
Irish migration there from the 1600s onwards. However, reliance on British or 
foreign shipping limited the ability to exploit these connections. Despite an increase 
in shipping requirements, the tonnage of Irish shipping decreased by nearly twenty 
five per cent from 1723 to 1772, suggesting a crucial weakness in the potential for 
Cork’s trade.28 A further trend these seventeenth century restrictions initiated was 
the increasingly dominant position that Britain began to occupy in Ireland’s trade. 
Exports to England increased from 45 per cent in 1700 to 85 per cent in 1800 and 
England’s share of imports rose from 54 to 79 per cent. Much of this increased 
importation from Britain was composed of colonial goods, which Ireland could not 
import directly.29 
                                                     
27 John Perceval Egmont, A Representation of the State of the Trade of Ireland, Laid before the House 
of Lords of England, on Tuesday the 10th of April, 1750, On Occasion of a Bill before that House, for 
Laying a Duty on Irish Sail Cloth Imported into Great-Britain. (Dublin, 1750), pp 18–19. 
28 Alice Murray, A History of the Commercial and Financial Relations between England and Ireland, 
from the Period of the Restoration (London, 1903), pp 77–78. 
29 Thomas Bartlett, ‘Ireland, Empire, and Union, 1690-1801’ in Kevin Kenny (ed.), Ireland and the 





The passage of the Act of Union marked the turn of the nineteenth century, 
tying Ireland politically and economically to the United Kingdom. For quite some 
time Ireland and the Irish legislature had been subordinated to the Westminster 
parliament, especially since the late seventeenth century, but this was nonetheless 
a radical restructuring of the nature of Anglo-Irish relations. The Irish parliament 
would be abolished, customs rates rationalised and exchequers merged. No longer 
would Ireland be the ‘second kingdom’. The passing of the Act of Union was the 
crowning moment in twenty years of dramatic political, economic and social 
upheaval in Ireland. It was, and still remains, one of the most contentious issues in 
Irish and British history; it fundamentally altered not just the Irish political system, 
but also that of Britain. Political stratagems, opinions and disputes that otherwise 
would have remained Irish affairs became topics for discussion in the Imperial 
parliament, a fact that politicians such as O’Connell and Parnell took advantage of. 
The question under examination here is not the political legacy of the Act of Union, 
but how it impacted Ireland’s commercial community. The twenty-year period prior 
to the Act of Union saw some of the most dramatic shifts for nineteenth century 
Irish development. Political, economic, and international events, many of which 
were outside the control of Ireland’s mercantile community, set the scene for the 
future evolution of Ireland’s industrial and commercial character.  The restrictions 
in place since the seventeenth century were slowly dismantled. By the late 1770s 
international affairs set in motion a series of changes that would have a dramatic 
impact on Ireland’s merchants. The American Revolution led to a number of 
important developments in terms of Anglo-Irish relations. The instability caused by 
the Revolutionary War in the American colonies provided an added impetus to the 
push in Ireland for greater autonomy as well as presenting a unique opportunity for 
Ireland’s merchants to seize upon. 
Throughout the eighteenth century Britain had placed trade embargos on 
Ireland during times of war. The practice both served to deprive their enemies of 
valuable provisions for their colonies as well as boosting the supplies available to 
the British military. These restrictions were less than popular with Irish merchants, 
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with numerous petitions sent by representative bodies in Ireland in an attempt to 
ameliorate them. In 1776 the Committee of Merchants in Cork petitioned the King 
to ask him to grant permission to provision non-prohibited shipping and they also 
sought permission to ship to Great Britain without convoy. In one of the 1776 
petitions, signed by 488 inhabitants of the city, they stated their position in relation 
to the embargoes imposed because of the American Revolutionary War:  
[We] now most humbly supplicate your majesty to remove those evils of which we 
complain [the embargo]. To direct the sword to be sheathed. That our commerce 
may be restored, and that economy, union, peace and liberty may be permanently 
established thro’ all parts of the empire.30 
The restrictions on Ireland’s ability to trade with the outside world, combined with 
limitations on access to British markets, added fuel to the free trade argument.  
With the majority of Britain’s colonial markets off limits, and trade with the 
Continent curtailed, where could they sell their wares? Irish merchants felt that the 
restrictions they laboured under were destroying indigenous Irish industries. The 
following year the Cork merchants re-petitioned the Lord Lieutenant arguing that 
they were close to losing their provisions trade with Spain, Portugal and Holland.31 
At least a portion of the trade going through Holland was re-exported to supply 
France, so from that perspective there was at least some justification for limiting 
this trade. Throughout the eighteenth century there was evidence of Irish and 
Dutch merchants cooperating to evade British restrictions. During the War of the 
Austrian Succession Irish beef exports to the Dutch rapidly expanded, with beef 
sent from Cork to the French Caribbean under the flag of Dutch firms.32 
Furthermore in March 1780 the Governor of the Leeward Islands informed the 
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British Treasury that ships cleared from Cork traded with the French through the 
Dutch colony of St. Eustatius. The following year, due to a declaration of war 
between Britain and the United Provinces, this clandestine trade was redirected 
through Ostend in the Austrian Netherlands.33 In fact Cork had pre-existing ties to 
Ostend, with one James Tobin having established a short-lived company there. The 
Tobin family later developed ventures in Nantes and the East Indies.34 British 
restrictions were not to stand in the way of a tidy profit. However, the Iberian 
Peninsula was a valuable trading partner for Irish merchants and its loss would deal 
a devastating blow to Ireland’s commerce. At this time imports from Portugal into 
Ireland were overtaking those of France, especially imports of port wine. With the 
loss of the Portuguese trade they would also lose the transhipment market for their 
colonial provisions to South America. 
By 1782 many of these grievances were being addressed. The Irish 
Parliament had gained greater legislative independence with the repeal of 
Poyning’s Law, which had restricted their activities. Furthermore, a degree of free 
trade had been achieved. The process of liberalising Ireland’s commercial 
enterprises was not a smooth one. Increased political, social and military agitation 
had forced the hand of Westminster. The Irish Volunteers had become a thorn in 
the side of the political powers. The Volunteers were an armed body of Protestants 
that gathered to compensate for the reduction of the military presence in Ireland 
due to troops being sent to fight in America. Although they had assembled under 
the auspices of defending the crown against the traitorous Americans, they also 
became involved in political agitation, demanding greater Irish freedoms in return. 
A gathering of Volunteers in College Green in 1779 saw the artillery drape banners 
over their cannons, with a number bearing the phrases ‘free trade or a speedy 
revolution’ and ‘Free trade or this’. The implication was neither subtle nor 
ambiguous and this was one of a number of similar demonstrations in Dublin that 
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forced the passage of free trade legislation.35 Fifty-six Volunteer corps were extant 
in Cork during this period and of these only eleven had existed prior to 1778.36   
Although the passage of free trade saw the Volunteers march through the 
city and discharge guns on The Mall, the Cork Volunteer groups were more 
restrained than their Dublin counterparts. Dickson explains this as partially due to 
the lack of artisan guilds, present in Dublin and Belfast, to ferment the patriotic 
cause in Cork.37 However, despite their restraint the Cork Volunteers were still a 
potential threat. In 1792, during a period of increased Catholic agitation, the Cork 
Gazette noted that the Cork Volunteer corps were seeing substantial new recruits 
and a re-established Cork cavalry would be ‘of singular advantage for making 
excursions into the country’.38 At the same time when Great Britain was losing hold 
on her American colonies, she also faced potential insurrection in Ireland. James 
Livesey described it as more of a reflection of the momentary weakness of the 
British establishment than the power of Ireland’s position, but either way it led to 
the removal of some of the restrictions on Ireland’s trade, giving her greater access 
to the valuable colonial markets.39 
Although free trade had been established it was far from perfect. Certain 
restrictions, especially regarding trade with Britain, remained in place. Freedom 
from the Navigation Acts placed Ireland into increased competition with British 
manufacturers. Even shortly after a measure of free trade was implemented there 
were questions as to how ‘free’ the trade actually was. A Guild of Merchants 
petition to the Irish House of Commons in 1781 questioned whether the promises 
of free trade would ultimately prove illusory, since war restricted trade anyway.40 
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To cap all this off there was uncertainty surrounding whether or not the free trade 
achieved by Ireland was ever intended to be permanent. In order to rectify some of 
these issues measures were taken to place the freedoms Ireland had gained on a 
more clearly defined basis. A series of commercial propositions intended to 
regulate trade between Great Britain and Ireland were proposed and debated in 
the mid-1780s. Ultimately the Irish Parliament rejected these propositions, with 
some fearing they would lead to unification by the backdoor. The debates provide 
insight into the union that was soon to come. In Pitt’s words,  
There will never be any real peace between the British and Irish ministry until such 
a time as there is a final settlement between the two countries in point of trade, 
for until that happens… the giving of one thing will only cause another to be 
demanded.41 
These Commercial Propositions and the difficulties of implementing them served as 
a testing ground for the Act of Union. Many of the issues that arose here, especially 
those raised by the British mercantile community, were addressed by that later 
legislation.   
Commercial Propositions 
In 1785 the Chief Secretary for Ireland, Thomas Orde, laid before the 
parliament eleven commercial propositions on trade. After several months of 
passing backwards and forwards between parliaments and legislators those eleven 
propositions swelled to twenty, but the general intention of Orde’s propositions is 
illuminating. Essentially Orde proposed a customs union. Taxes on both foreign and 
domestic goods traded between Ireland and Britain would be equal, there would be 
prohibitory tariffs on foreign imports if the same article was produced by either 
country and surplus hereditary revenue would be paid to support the Royal Navy. 
Marx, expressing a similar view to John Curran, noted that the changes in tariffs and 
taxation would sacrifice Ireland’s Continental and American trade.42 John Curran, a 
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definitive opponent of the propositions, argued that the English feared that free 
trade for Ireland would lead to Irish goods out-competing English goods on the 
British market. This analysis is borne out by the repeated invectives made by 
various British representatives. They argued that increased Irish access to imperial 
markets would both lead to Irish goods undercutting British manufactures as well as 
supposedly an increase in smuggling of colonial goods via Ireland to take advantage 
of lower Irish duties. Curran refused to accept the revised twenty propositions as 
‘each addition [was] a fresh injury.’ He dismissed the entirety of the propositions, 
stating that ‘we cannot ratify their slavery.’43 Curran feared that the propositions 
would be a stepping stone to the introduction of a union of the two countries, a 
concept he abhorred as pre-empting the annihilation of Ireland. Despite the 
propositions being examined and re-examined and debated and re-debated, there 
was a view that the revised propositions, ‘gave us nothing in substance but the re-
export trade which we would have gotten without it.’44 
A letter dated 1784 from Richard Atkinson indicates how merchants in 
Britain viewed the prospect of free trade for Ireland. As a director of the East India 
Company Atkinson was a thorough mercantilist. His views can be summarised 
thusly: firstly, that Ireland’s trade with the sugar plantations was a gift from Britain 
and the sugar islands were more valuable than Irish exports to them. Matters of 
political expediency were irrelevant. Secondly, without harmonisation of taxes and 
duties between Britain and Ireland freedom of commerce was a threat, either due 
to price differentials or smuggling. Thirdly, that Irish labour was so cheap ‘that 
unless the manufactures of Ireland in general are prohibited those of England must 
be ruined’. Finally, that no benefits should be accrued to Ireland that could threaten 
any aspect of British trade or manufacture.45  
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Petitions of contemporary British manufacturers echoed these views. They 
based their opposition on the perceived advantages of the Irish manufacturers as 
well as the potential threat to indigenous industries. Although all seem to be of the 
mind that Ireland and the Irish were ‘British’, they nevertheless were fearful of the 
lower duties, taxes, and cost base of the Irish market. Approximately fifty petitions 
from British merchants and manufacturers survive in the Pitt papers. 
Unsurprisingly, these petitions centred on the more industrialised areas of Britain 
(see Map 3-1). If the petitions from general merchant or manufacturing interest 
groups are put to one side, the majority of the remaining petitions came from those 
involved in the textiles industries and to a lesser extent metallurgy.46 The fears they 
expressed follow the same lines as those of Atkinson, albeit tailored to their 
respective industries. 
Although they all were ‘infused with the sincerest wishes for the prosperity 
of Ireland’ they were ‘at same time… justly alarmed at some of the resolutions for a 
commercial arrangement which has lately passed in the Irish parliament’.47 One of 
the complaints was that since the changes in 1779, duty differentials between 
Ireland and Britain meant that ‘illicit importations ha[d] greatly increased, to the 
manifest injury of the Irish revenue, and the fair traders of both countries.’48 Duty 
differentials not only gave ‘the manufacturers… in that country a decided 
advantage… in the American market’, they also ‘operate[d] as a bounty and 
induce[d] workmen to leave this kingdom and settle there [Ireland]’.49 The loss of 
experienced craftspeople to a potential neighbouring competitor was a disturbing 
prospect for Britain. Ireland had already demonstrated some success in their native 
textile industries and a drain of expertise from Britain’s textile regions to Ireland 
would further increase competition. Though this was perceived as a serious threat, 
by the time of the full Union quite the opposite turned out to be true. Rather than 
                                                     
46 Petitions from British Merchants and Manufacturers, The Papers of William Pitt the Younger, PRO. 
30/8/321, BL. 
47 Ibid. Petitions from Paisley ff 89-91. 
48 Ibid. Petitions from Glasgow & Paisley ff 87-88. 
49 Ibid. Petitions from Nail and Iron Manufacturers Dudley ff 101-102; Petitions from the merchants 
and manufacturers of Birmingham ff 93-97. 
158 
 
the migration of British textile workers to Ireland, Irish cotton workers from the 
Lagan Valley areas moved to Scotland to take advantage of the growth of the 
Scottish textile industry.50 Of course the objections were also framed in a wider 
imperial context and Ireland’s expectations based on her contribution to the 
imperial enterprise. It was hard for the British mercantile and landed communities 
to fathom how Ireland could gain such benefits, because ‘not having contributed a 
proper quota towards the general expenses of the Empire she cannot in justice 
expect a participation of all its advantages’.51   
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Map 3-1 Petitions opposing the Commercial Propositions52 
How well-founded were such fears? In 1784 Dublin-based merchant Edward 
Forbes corresponded with Christopher Champlin, his American counterpart, 
regarding their future trade dealings now that America was independent. He stated 
that Ireland could produce all of the same types of goods as England and that Irish 
goods were cheaper than those shipped from London.53 In some respects this letter 
echoes many of the fears British merchants expressed at this time. They felt that 
their Irish counterparts would be able to destroy their industry through lower 
duties, lower cost bases and access to British goods. However, in terms of 
provisioning and some textile exports the free trade legislation had a negative 
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impact on Ireland’s Portuguese trade. At several stages in the early 1780s Portugal 
had refused to accept Irish manufactures or that the provisions of the Methuen 
Treaty should still apply to Ireland.54  
Pitt’s Commercial Propositions ultimately failed to pass. The Cabinet finally 
decided to stop the commercial arrangements in 1786 after numerous setbacks and 
vocal opposition. The failure of the propositions to pass was due to the fears of 
British manufacturing interests that they granted far too much to Ireland and the 
fears of some sections of the Irish population that they represented a form of 
insidious union of the two countries. Orde sought to move Ireland’s relationship 
with Britain to a point where it operated on a more equal level, where the two 
economies were closely intertwined in a state of ‘dependent equality’. This position 
would not win much support from the industrial areas of Britain. Furthermore, 
while the hereditary payments proposition was at best problematic in the Irish 
parliament, Orde’s suggestion that it should be used to create a small fleet for 
Ireland was never going to garner support in Westminster.55 Alvin Jackson, while 
acknowledging these reasons for the failure of the propositions, points to a far 
more fundamental issue that blocked their passage; the Irish economy in the late 
eighteenth century was vibrant.56 Nonetheless, the lessons of the debate would not 
be forgotten. The petitions and grievances would be somewhat addressed by the 
Act of Union. 
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Act of Union 
‘This dog-collar union’57 
The push for full unification began in 1798, though some form of union had 
been long mooted between Ireland and Great Britain and the Commercial 
Propositions brought it closer. Opinions on the Union were complex and divided the 
Irish parliament. There was a popular hostility towards unification, with 
manufacturers and merchants expressing fears of increased taxation and an influx 
of cheap British goods. However, legislators were more concerned with the political 
aspects of unification than the commercial or financial arrangements.58 Both sides 
deliberately embellished the truth with hyperbole. Lord Clare stated that by 
supporting the Union he wished ‘to advance [Ireland] from the degraded post of a 
mercenary province, to the proud station of an integral and governing member of 
the greatest empire in the world’.59 On the other side of the debate Grattan argued 
that the costs of the Union were underestimated and manufacturers felt that 
Ireland was not in a position to profit from it.60 The 1780s and 1790s had been a 
relatively prosperous time for Ireland. It seemed to many observers that a Union 
could offer little that had not already been gained to some degree by free trade and 
that in fact they could even lose out in the face of direct competition with British 
manufacturers. 
The commercial and financial aspects of the Act of Union were contained in 
Articles six and seven. Article six had particular importance for Irish commercial 
interests as it provided for full access to the colonial trade and a customs union 
between Ireland and Britain. Some restrictions were maintained, with duties on 
prescribed articles including textiles until 1821, and full free trade did not come into 
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force until 1824. Article seven dealt with tax harmonisation and the contribution to 
the government coffers, setting the ratio at 2/17 for Ireland. Although the debates 
centred on the political ramifications of the Union, these two articles were not 
overlooked. Lord Castlereagh, an advocate for the Union, argued that ultimately 
Article six would benefit Ireland, as it would benefit sail cloth manufacture, though 
perhaps the cotton industries might suffer from the loss of protective duties. 
Furthermore, the debt ratio had been based on his calculations of the correct 
proportions of Irish finances to British.  
Foster argued that Castlereagh’s calculations failed to consider the 
respective shipping abilities of both countries and that he erroneously credited the 
benefits of Irish goods shipped on British account to Ireland. He further contended 
that Castlereagh deliberately overstated the financial problems in Ireland and any 
change in duties would destroy Ireland’s manufactures to the benefit of Britain.61 
As British merchants financed the bulk of Irish trade, the benefits of returns, such as 
the import of sugar and other cash crops, accrued to Britain.62 This argument has 
plenty of supporting evidence, with the Portuguese pointing to the lack of an 
indigenous Irish navy, the disparity between departing vessels and returning ships, 
and simply the locations from where Ireland was importing such goods. This was 
one of the primary arguments posited against Castlereagh’s estimation of the 
financial benefits of the Union, as he had credited this benefit to Ireland’s account. 
It is difficult to assess the level of contemporaneous local mercantile 
support for the Union. Much of the public debate centred on politicians’ views and 
their statements should be taken with caution. Similarly, the newspapers should be 
treated with care, but they do provide a slightly less biased view than those of the 
pamphleteers. In the lead up to the Union debates in parliament Finn’s Leinster 
Journal had regular front page articles with petitions of support for the Union from 
much of Ireland, mainly focused on Ulster and North Leinster, though parts of the 
West and South were also represented. However, the support expressed in this 
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paper was not universal, with the bankers and merchants of the city of Dublin 
rejecting any moves towards union and resolving ‘that impressed with every 
sentiment of loyalty to our King, and affectionate attachment to the British 
connexion, we conceive that to agitate in Parliament a question or legislative union 
between this kingdom and Great Britain would be highly dangerous and impolitic’.63 
Several months later, representing the same organisation, Dublin banker William 
Digges Latouche, stated that the Union would make any damage caused by this 
legislation ‘irrevocable’.64 The fear being generally expressed was that any union 
between the two countries would be disastrous to the burgeoning Irish industries 
and be a massive step backwards on the achievements since free trade. This fear 
took many forms; there was the fear of the loss of protective duties, fear of an 
inability to compete on the British markets and a fear of increased taxation.  
In some cases this fear was of the more mundane legal implications. J.C. 
Beresford, M.P. for Dublin, brought a petition to the Irish Commons from the 
Booksellers and Stationers, who argued that union would destroy their trade. 
However, it was his contention that their petition should be ignored, as their trade 
was based on continually pirating works on the London market and re-selling them 
in Ireland.65 The complaint from the booksellers is an interesting one, as similar 
objections had been raised by the Speaker, Edmund Pery, regarding the one of 
Pitt’s twenty Commercial Propositions dealing with copyright and potential damage 
to the Irish printing industry.66 Similarly the Irish parliament had earlier complained 
that the usual quantities of hats, stockings and shoes that the Portuguese liked to 
smuggle from Ireland as English goods were now being rejected by Portugal.67 The 
uncertainty was damaging Ireland’s more illicit trades. Not all of the commercial 
opposition to the passing of the Act of Union stemmed from altruistic concern for 
Ireland’s economic growth. 
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Earlier mercantile support for closer ties with Britain had been based on an 
erroneous supposition. It was believed that the Irish Union would be similar to that 
of the Scottish Union of 1707 and would give the merchants increased access to 
British markets, while allowing them to benefit from the protectionism that was a 
defining characteristic of eighteenth-century mercantilism. The Scottish Union gave 
access to English domestic and colonial markets, while protecting Scottish 
production under protective tariffs, which would not continue during the free trade 
period. Devine argues that the 1707 Union was far more favourable than the 1801 
Union as the former left merchants free from English interference. Furthermore, he 
argues that Scotland was not as dependent on the Union for growth and simply 
used it to enhance pre-existing systems to create a successful modernisation of the 
economy.68 But the Scottish Union was a century earlier and undertaken in a very 
different political and economic climate. By 1800 the international commercial 
environment had changed irrevocably. Free trade and more open borders were to 
define nineteenth-century trade. Although there seems to have been a belief that 
Irish merchants deserved the protections they felt they were due under the Union, 
times had changed and laissez-faire was the order of the day.  
The depression that hit in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars saw a 
reversal of the fears of the eighteenth-century British merchants. Overstocked 
British industries began to dump goods, mainly textiles, on the Irish markets, 
crippling indigenous industries and effectively devastating them for much of the 
remainder of the nineteenth century. Textile manufacturers around Ireland were 
devastated, bar those in Ulster, with the majority failing due to insufficient 
industrial development and specialisation. The Southern textile regions were most 
severely hit, with textile towns such as Bandon left in dire straits. The devastation 
of the Bandon textile manufacturers saw up to 3,000 reliant on charity by 1830, a 
further 3,000 emigrating to Britain and Bandon becoming one of the prime Irish 
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recruiting grounds for the British navy.69 Many of the former textile workers left for 
the manufacturing regions of Britain to secure employment. It was exactly what 
British merchants had predicted would happen to British textiles if the commercial 
propositions had been implemented, except in reverse. Furthermore, the 
Napoleonic Wars sped up the implementation of the merging of the exchequers. 
Unexpected war expenditure had led to Irish expenditure ballooning from £41 
million before the Union to £148 million by 1815. Amalgamating the exchequers 
and removing the proportional contribution system remedied Ireland’s difficult 
financial situation.70 
Liam Kennedy identifies three essential results of the Union: first, the 
abolition of customs duties. Second, it saw the harmonisation of taxation and the 
exchequers. Third, it moved economic power from Dublin to Westminster.71 In 
terms of the previous arrangements what benefits accrued from these changes? 
Irish merchants and politicians had sought the abolition of customs duties for 
several decades. They had already achieved a certain level of this by the 1780s. 
There was a fear that a full customs union would not benefit some Irish 
manufacturers, because they would lose the benefits of protective duties keeping 
British manufactures out of Ireland.72 Of course much of the contemporaneous 
debate was rather subjective. The pro-Union advocate, Lord Castlereagh, disputed 
the Union’s potential harm to Irish manufactures. It is a matter of perspective, but 
with hindsight those reticent about a full customs union were probably closer to 
the reality of what happened. Without the scant industrial protections available, a 
spiralling level of debt and loss of investment capital to Britain made it difficult to 
keep Irish industries afloat.  However, no one in 1800 could have foreseen the 
length or impact of the Napoleonic Wars. Although contemporaneous anti-Union 
campaigners were generally proved correct, it was in many respects due to the 
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repercussions of that conflict. If the wars had ended sooner, and had the War of 
1812 been averted, it is possible that Irish trade may have rebounded stronger than 
ever. However, it is important to separate contemporaneous arguments from the 
nationalistic views on the Union that arose with Daniel O’Connell. Although there is 
much truth in these invectives they were written in a different context and with a 
different purpose. 
The delay and staggering of the full implementation of the Union’s 
provisions makes it difficult to attribute responsibility for the changes in the 
structure of the Irish economy to any one event. However, the Irish textile 
industry’s collapse in the 1820s can be taken as an example of the realisation of the 
fears of some sectors of the Irish economy, especially as it was one of the few 
relatively successful indigenous industries. A combination of a widespread 
economic depression in the 1820s, in conjunction with improved production 
methods in Britain and the lack of Irish protective duties, led to the dumping of 
British textiles on the Irish market, devastating native industry. It is difficult to 
definitively attribute this to the Act of Union, but the lack of any customs barriers 
cannot have helped the ailing Irish textile industry and it certainly enabled the 
penetration of British goods into the market. Shifting the economic decision-making 
from Dublin to London took away the merchants’ ability to deal directly with their 
representatives, while also distancing them both in real and political terms from the 
decision-making process. However, the main issue with the move of Irish 
representation to Britain relates to the lack of unity among Irish MPs in 
Westminster. They rarely presented a unified face for Irish commercial interests, 
more often than not reverting to parochial bickering. Of course they should not be 
judged too harshly for this. The early nineteenth century was still decades away 
from a whip-based parliamentary system. In many respects, what more loyalty 
would a Cork MP have to his Dublin counterpart than a Bristol MP who might be of 
more use in the future, or a Liverpool MP with similar trade interests? 
By 1843 Cork’s merchants again queried Ireland’s commercial agreements 
with Britain: ‘Are Irish interests, as in this case, to be always sacrificed, and 
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sacrificed to those of England? Such would be the question of any man who 
remembered that “those countries” were united.’73 The Union, by giving Britain a 
greater input in Irish political and economic affairs, created unequal development 
between the two countries.74 It forced Ireland into a situation where she had 
essentially become a peripheral annex within the United Kingdom. This 
oversimplifies both Irish development in the eighteenth and nineteenth century as 
well as the Union itself. Irish trade had gone through a gradual re-focusing onto 
British markets since the mid-eighteenth century. With the victory over Napoleon in 
1815 it was unlikely that Ireland would find any other market with such a voracious 
appetite for her produce. Ireland had been ignoring more distant markets. It was 
not solely a myopic view of the potential for development in trade with Britain. 
Despite the many nefarious means used to circumvent British restrictions on trade, 
the almost constant series of international conflicts during the latter half of the 
eighteenth century impacted upon trade. Furthermore, Irish industrial expansion in 
the late eighteenth century relied on external markets that depended on Britain, 
such as the West Indies and American Colonies. Even after gaining free trade in the 
1780s much of Ireland’s trade with these regions went on British shipping and 
accounts. Ireland did not maintain her own commercial fleet, nor did she have 
sufficient credit to offer the generous terms that could be had in Britain. 
Delays in the implementation of the Union’s full measures make 
ascertaining its true impact problematic. What is undeniable though is that the Act 
of Union left one of the most enduring marks on Ireland’s political and commercial 
character. In 1861 Goldwin Smith asserted that ‘It must readily be granted that 
unless the Union was for the good of both parties, it was for the good of neither’.75 
For Smith there was greater advantage in the Union of the two countries: Ireland 
could benefit from what Britain had learned in the art of politics and the Irish would 
be in a position to support parliamentary democracy. There was no feasible 
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alternative for him as there was ‘no basis whereon Irish nationality can be 
established’.76 Smith wrote in a period when the foundations of the modern 
European nation state were being laid.  
Was the Union good for Ireland and Cork and, if not, was it to the detriment 
of both countries? Jackson argues that the Union did not grant Britain economic 
control over Ireland as that had already been achieved due to the growing 
eighteenth century dependence Ireland formed on the British economy. He instead 
points to the Napoleonic Wars as a more substantive changing point.77 In this 
regard he agrees with Ó Gráda’s argument that the impact of the Union was 
economically minor, but he does point out that due to the multitude of political 
issues at the time it is difficult to analyse the role of any single issue in isolation.78  It 
is true that the end of the Napoleonic Wars was a far more important event in early 
nineteenth century Irish development. But would Ireland have suffered as much 
devastation to burgeoning indigenous textile industries without the access the 
Union granted British manufacturers? There are a multitude of other factors that 
have a bearing on the economic depression of the mid-1820s. Nevertheless, the 
Union marked an important transition point for Ireland, which undoubtedly meant 
that she lost a fair proportion of agency in her commercial and industrial 
development. The depression of the 1820s would highlight some of the thorny 
issues of a union between two economies of such unequal size.  
Was the Act of Union a poor choice for Ireland or was it inevitable? C.G. 
Otway asserted that the old protectionism had been a disaster, that Irish merchants 
had thought they could create customers by statue through premiums and it was 
basic weaknesses in Ireland’s economy that led to the collapse of the textiles 
industry.79 The thirty year period between the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the 
onset of the Great Famine did witness a certain amount of de-industrialisation and 
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the foundations of many of Ireland’s commercial interests were weakened through 
overreliance on trade from Britain. There was also a lack of capital investment to 
develop the limited industrial potential that existed. Some of this may be 
attributable to the Act of Union, but it can also be linked to improvements in 
transportation, which brought Ireland much closer to the growing populations of 
Britain’s industrial regions. There was money to be made in supplying the growing 
British industrial towns and cities and this facilitated a shift towards pasturage in 
response to market demands. A booming Irish population also meant less 
incentives to expend capital on fixed investments for small gains in productivity, 
when it was more expedient to increase the workforce at lower wages than were 
paid in Britain. De-industrialisation in Ireland resulted from a confluence of many 
factors, including transport, legislation and population, but it also encompassed 
credit availability, changes in colonial supply, and wider political and social reform 
in Europe. Ireland’s position so close to the world’s largest industrial economy in 
many respects directed the Irish economy to a position where she supplied the 
demands of British industrial development, whether this was in terms of labour, 
raw materials or foodstuffs. It is difficult to support Engel’s view that it was, ‘the 
vocation of the Irish people to be shipped over the ocean in order to make way for 
the cows and sheep’, but in rejecting this assertion, it must also be said that it was 
based on a kernel of truth.80 Ireland found her position in the Empire and it was 
mainly to supply the food for industrial cities and soldiers for imperial wars. 
Trade Patterns 
As Figure 3-1 shows Ireland’s trade with Britain dwarfed that of all other 
nations combined. In the period between 1790 and 1826 both Irish imports and 
exports with Britain increased by approximately two hundred and fifty percent. In 
comparison, trade with foreign powers stayed at a comparatively low level, with 
some increase in imports, but a decline in the value of exports. This decline is 
representative of the decline traced in the previous two chapters, partially due to 
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the increasing focus on the British market. In the appendix to the First Report on the 
Commercial Relations between France and Great Britain the growth in Anglo-Irish 
trade was attributed to the removal of commercial restrictions between Ireland and 
Great Britain and the languishing of Irish trade with all other parts due to tariffs.81 
The comparative growth rates of trade with Great Britain and trade with foreign 
powers are quite striking. British trade exploded, whereas foreign trade had 
stagnated. Two conclusions can be drawn from this: first, there was clearly 
substantial growth in Irish commerce over this period, with an overall expansion of 
both exports and imports. Second, this growth depended on the British market and 
very little had been done to develop foreign commerce. This indicates the level to 
which the Act of Union had integrated Irish and English commercial interests and 
increased the dependence of Ireland on Britain, both economically and politically. 
 
Figure 3-1 Irish commerce82 
Much of Ireland’s trade was conducted on English account. As discussed in 
Chapter One the shipping figures for 1804 show over one hundred and twenty 
vessels leaving Cork for the West Indies, but only a fraction of that number 
returned. Such a pattern had implications for the manner in which Ireland’s trade 
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developed. It added credence to Parnell and Foster’s arguments against the Union. 
They had argued that Castlereagh, in collating his exchequer figures for the benefits 
of the Union, failed to account for the lost revenue of shipping on British accounts. 
Money was to be made in shipping trade goods and he had credited this to Ireland’s 
accounts, erroneously or otherwise. More importantly, this meant that although 
the West Indian trade was lucrative many of the major benefits were not accrued to 
Ireland, namely the valuable sugar, tobacco and cotton exports to be had from the 
American trades. Rather than directly importing them from the producing regions, 
which had been permissible from the 1780s onwards, these goods were shipped in 
increasing quantities via Britain. The direct trade undertaken was not proportional 
to the exports sent out from Ireland. Indeed Ireland increasingly relied on Britain 
for the importation of these commodities.  
England had always been the preeminent source for such luxuries, but the 
dominance of English imports had begun to take on a new character. Until the 
latter half of the eighteenth century there had been at least a limited trade 
undertaken between Ireland and Scotland in Scottish re-exports of colonial produce 
(tobacco and sugar mainly) though admittedly this would not be preferential to a 
direct trade. For reasons that included a resurgent continental market for Scotland 
from the 1780s onwards this trade was in decline and not only in a manner that 
affected Ireland. For a period, when continental markets were essentially closed to 
British produce, Scotland re-exported much of their colonial imports to Ireland. 
With the re-opening of the continent to Scottish exports, the relative importance of 
tobacco exportation to the overall Scottish economy declined and this combined 
with a greater reliance of Irish merchants on England as the source for such 
luxuries.83  As much of this trade focused on the northern counties of Ireland it had 
few direct implications for Cork, but it exemplifies the increasing  dominance of 
England in Ireland’s importation of some of the most valuable consumer goods 
available in eighteenth and early nineteenth century Ireland.  
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An example of these trading patterns is how trade with Ireland’s southern 
region centred on Bristol’s trade patterns with the Caribbean. As one of the most 
important slave trading ports in Britain, and the closest to Cork, it exemplifies the 
position of Cork’s merchant community, both their place in the trans-Atlantic slave 
trade and their relative position in Britain’s larger trading environment with the 
Americas. Kenneth Morgan, in his excellent work on Bristol’s eighteenth century 
trans-Atlantic trade, details the shipping patterns of the city’s merchants 
throughout that century. The data he gathered demonstrates both the peripheral 
nature, as well as the inherent value, of Ireland’s provisioning industries (Table 3-1). 
Morgan explicitly identifies the main southern trading ports in this context as Cork, 
Youghal, Kinsale and Waterford, with Cork having the dominant position. In terms 
of the trade routes he discusses, only a few do not include Ireland in some regard. 
These routes in general are approximately twenty per cent of the overall tonnage 
shipped to these destinations. These figures show that Cork, although occupying an 
important position in both provisioning these vessels and providing essential 
information on market prices, was little more than a quick stop to add value to the 
journey and relay useful information. It was the place where ships could 
rendezvous with convoys and ensure that the journeys maximised their potential 
for profit. On none of the voyages that he tabulated did the vessels make the return 
journey via Ireland. In fact, many of the routes demonstrate opportunism as a 
deciding factor in stopping in Cork.  
This is exemplified by the voyage of the Sarah in 1719 from Bristol to the 
Caribbean via Cork. Three members of the crew stopped in Cork to load three 
hundred barrels of herrings, which were likely sourced from either Scotland or 
Scandinavia, as an investment opportunity. These goods were traded in Madeira for 
wine, which was in turn traded for Muscovado sugar and cotton. Cork-supplied 
provisions carried weight and it was noted that the ability to supply Irish salted 
provisions to Caribbean merchants ensured a solid trade of such valuable produce, 
but it was an ancillary trade to the more valuable goods that formed the basis of 
these routes. If the prices were too high, the layover in Cork would be abandoned 
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to maximise profit.84 Bristol’s trade patterns demonstrated in Table 3-1 show that 
while many vessels may have left Cork for these abundant islands it was not 
necessarily in their interest to return via the same route. Although Cork was both 
proximate to Bristol and had reasonably strong trade connections there, only 
fifteen Irish-owned vessels entered the port of Bristol from 1785-97.85 Irish 
merchants conducted their trade on British account and British-owned vessels. 
Another example of this is in the bills of lading for the Beamish and Crawford firm 
were mostly for cargoes bound for London, but the other destinations included 
were Lisbon, Trinidad, Jamaica and Barbados, indicating the ultimate destination of 
Cork produce shipped via Britain.86 A strong trans-Atlantic provisioning trade did 
not equate with a high level of Irish owned mercantile ships or a high level of Irish-
financed voyages.  
Contemporary commentators recognised the problems of how Ireland’s 
foreign trade was undertaken. The Cork-born Richard Cox, who later became Lord 
Chancellor for Ireland in 1703, wrote to the House of Lords regarding the Woollen 
Acts and took issue with the structure of the trade, pointing out that much of it was 
undertaken through English finance and English ships:  
they [the Irish] toil for our advantage, they sow and we reap... whatever Ireland 
gets by trade from the whole world centres in England, and is returned hither by 
Bills of Exchange from Spain, Holland, France, the West-Indies, and other places. If 
they gain’d ten millions a year, it would come to England.87 
Nearly a century later, in 1785, James Laffan noted that because of the interest an 
Irish merchant paid for a voyage to foreign markets, he was unable to compete with 
British merchants on the same routes. A British merchant could make a profit of six 
per cent on a trip, whereas Irish merchants had to sell at a three per cent higher 
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cost on the same goods to break even.88 In both access to shipping and access to 
financing Irish merchants had difficulty competing with their British counterparts, 
so it is understandable that Cork’s merchants were willing to transact business for 
British merchants for a two and a half per cent commission, rather than at their 
own expense.89 Cullen contends that this lack of a direct colonial trade and re-
export market reduced the need for sophisticated financial institutions.90 The lack 
of an indigenous direct trade hampered the development of comprehensive 
financial institutions that could have provided more favourable terms to merchants. 
However, in the context of Cork’s position in the late eighteenth century it is rather 
unlikely that this could have happened. A competitive merchant fleet required too 
much capital and there was little chance that provincial Irish financial institutions 
could match the prodigious wealth of Britain’s major port cities.  
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Table 3-1 Bristol Shipping Routes via Ireland that stopped in Cork, 1749-7091 
                                                     




Solar has described Irish trade in the late eighteenth century as a classical 
trade due to the fact that there was little to no overlap between imports and 
exports. Agricultural goods, such as provisions and textiles, dominated Irish exports, 
whereas exotic goods such as sugar and tobacco dominated imports.92 Nowhere 
better is this exemplified than in Cork’s trade with Great Britain. In fact Cork was 
probably the best representation of Solar’s view in early nineteenth century Ireland 
due to both the agricultural basis of its export trade and connections with the trans-
Atlantic (and to a far lesser extent the East Indies) trade. However, although a 
quarter of all Irish trade was still with foreign countries in 1780 (Figure 3-2), the 
value of Ireland’s foreign trade remained broadly the same in 1826 and the ratio 
drastically shifted in favour of British trades in relative terms.   
Although Cork was in a position to take advantage of the trans-Atlantic 
colonial trades, the trade in exotic produce and cash crops was predominantly 
through transhipments from Britain. Returning vessels rarely stopped in Ireland or, 
as in the case of East India Company vessels, if they stopped on the return voyage 
they did not offload their produce there. By the 1830s Cork was a designated 
warehousing port for East Indies goods, but that permission was not granted until 
1824.93 Two of the most valuable cash crops at this time were sugar and tobacco. 
Almost the entirety of Cork’s sugar importation came through Britain and all of this 
trade would have derived from colonial possessions. Despite Ireland having legal 
access to free trade with the Caribbean since the late 1770s the majority of 
importation was on British account. This only began to change with more direct 
imports around 1810, with larger volumes of goods imported directly from 
Barbados and Jamaica. There are a number of reasons why this was the case. Even 
though direct importation increased, still over half of Cork’s importation was via 
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Britain. It’s likely that the requirement to ship via convoys in the first decade of the 
nineteenth century restricted the return movements of many trans-Atlantic 
voyages. The convoy system already limited the number of voyages to a handful. 
Any ship making that trip would look to maximise the potential profits. Those 
profits were not going to be fully realised by shipping to Cork. Although the volume 
of sugar imports from Britain declined, the total importation remained relatively 
consistent from the mid-1800s up to 1822. However, the levels of imports coming 
through Britain begin to steadily decline from this point onwards. From 1800 
onwards the total importation of sugar from all locations, excluding Britain, was 
increasing and from 1808 it exceeded the quantity imported through Britain (Figure 
3-2). It appears that by the second decade of the nineteenth century Cork took full 
advantage of the ability to ship these goods directly rather than via Britain.  
 
Figure 3-2 Imports of sugar of all types into Cork94 
In terms of the other valuable cash crop, tobacco, the inverse applies. Cork 
was almost entirely supplied with tobacco from Britain. Only a miniscule amount 
was importated from foreign countries (Figure 3-3). Excluding a large import from 
                                                     
94 ‘Abstracts of Irish Exports and Imports, in 24 Vols, for the period 1764-1823’, MSS 353-76, NLI. 
178 
 
Virginia in 1810, the importation of tobacco from foreign ports almost entirely 
disappeared over the opening decades of the 1800s. The reason for this trend was 
the War of 1812 between Britain and the United States. As the US was the only 
other location from which Cork imported tobacco that trade completely 
disappeared. Despite a small resurgence after the war’s conclusion, from this point 
onwards Cork remained reliant on Britain for the importation of tobacco. 
 
Figure 3-3 Cork's tobacco imports95 
An 1834 Parliamentary report on Anglo-Franco trade detailed specifics of 
the changes in Ireland’s trade. Massive increases were seen in the importation of 
cotton yarn, cotton wool, woollen yarn and coals. Large decreases occurred in the 
consumption of foreign wine and spirits, almost certainly due to the changes in 
tariffs and duties that encouraged indigenous Irish distilling, as well as the 
disastrous impact of the Napoleonic Wars on foreign wine consumption.96 Around 
1810 there was a dramatic reduction in the importation of wine and after 1815 a 
massive increase in the importation of cotton yarn. Cork’s imports of these 
products came almost entirely from Britain. Although there was an increase in coal 
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imports, it was nowhere near as dramatic. The lower growth rate in the importation 
of coal could perhaps be taken to indicate both a lower level of steam driven 
industrial development as well as the demonstrable dependence of Cork’s 
industries on water power from the river Lee.97 Figure 3-4 shows that the majority 
of Cork’s coal imports, naturally enough, came from England rather than Scotland. 
The three largest coal exporting regions in England and Wales were Whitehaven, 
Liverpool and Swansea, though Llanelly exported only minutely less than Swansea. 
Whitehaven was by far the largest exporter, sending 173,794 chaldrons of coal to 
Ireland in 1822, 46 per cent of the total.98 It is unfortunate that the customs ledgers 
did not record specific accounts for the Welsh trade, as it would be possible to 
ascertain the comparative levels of coal sent from Welsh collieries to Cork. The 
likely sources for the majority of coal imported into Cork would either be Swansea 
or Liverpool due to geographic proximity and pre-existing trade routes 
respectively.99 
 
Figure 3-4 Coal imports into Cork100 
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An 1822 report on the collection of revenue in Ireland describes the 
situation of Cork’s woollen industry at this time. The officials who drafted the 
report conducted an interview with Abraham Lane, whose family had been involved 
in the woollen trade for about seventy years. Abraham Lane handled the financial 
aspects of the family business from Dublin while his brother, James, ran the mills in 
Cork. His interview details the state of the business since the Union. Lane stated 
that his family was almost exclusively involved in the manufacture of military 
clothing as an earlier venture in fine cloth manufacture had not taken off. He 
believed that the decline in his family’s woollen business was due to recent 
regulations in the military that gave colonels the power to source clothing where 
they desired. As they had close personal connections to English clothiers, by 1821 
half of the army sourced cloth from England. This occurred despite Lane’s ability to 
supply cloth 2.5 per cent cheaper due to the soon to be extinguished protective 
Irish duties.101 Lane also provided details on the structure of the business. Most of 
the managerial staff were English, whereas the workers were almost exclusively 
Irish. Bielenberg notes that during the Napoleonic Wars Mahony’s Mills, which also 
fulfilled military contracts in Cork, had hired Yorkshiremen to introduce steam 
spinning. It is highly likely that Lane did the same.102 The hiring of English staff 
implies that there was a certain level of skilled migrants from Britain to Ireland, 
potentially to take advantage of the lower duty levels. Throughout the nineteenth 
century skilled workers, such as miners, were brought to Ireland to take advantage 
of their expertise in their field.103 This adds credence to the complaints of Britain’s 
commercial interests in the 1780s that a custom’s union between Ireland and 
England could lead to a loss of expertise. However, as the protective duties were to 
be abolished by 1824, and as the Irish indigenous woollen industry was quite small, 
the loss would not have had a major impact on British woollen manufacturers. Even 
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Lane points out that to him it seemed personal connections played a stronger role 
than costs in securing contracts. 
Two events threatened the future of Lane’s business. The ending of 
protective duties in 1824 led the family to look at selling their business because he 
believed that the loss of the 2.5 per cent protection would devastate their industry 
in the face of British competition. The second event was the end of the Napoleonic 
Wars and the related de-mobilisation of the army. Lane observed:  
If the war had continued I should have had a greater chance of demand. The 
demand of the army was so great, I could come in competition with the trade in 
England on a fair ground... we should say, that if we are deprived of the army 
clothing we could not employ ourselves in any other way as manufacturers of 
cloth… I could import cloth so much cheaper than I could manufacture it.104 
On a more positive note he suggested that the Union had dramatically increased 
the sale of coarser fabrics and that instead of exporting wool yarn Ireland was now 
producing cloth with it. However, by becoming so dependent on the production of 
these lower quality fabrics they set the stage for future difficulties. 
Almost all of Cork’s raw wool trade was undertaken through England, 
reflecting the seventeenth century desire of British interests to restrict the Irish 
woollen trade. From 1698 an act of parliament constrained the Irish export of 
woollen goods, prohibiting the export of wool, woollen yarn and drapery to 
England. One of the goals of this act was ostensibly to discourage the growth of 
woollen manufactures to the benefit of linen manufacture; the exportation of 
woollen products only consisted of wool yarn.105 Imports of Spanish and foreign 
wool was through Britain rather than directly with the originating country. Both the 
importation and exportation of unprocessed wool from Cork remained small. The 
agricultural land that supported the economy of Cork city was well suited to 
providing raw wool for processing and it is likely that indigenous woollen 
manufacturers absorbed much of the production of raw wool. Although there was a 
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slight increase in the exportation of raw wool to England from Cork after the 
Napoleonic War up to 1820, it does not appear to have been sustained.  
Military demand for clothing during the Napoleonic Wars was a boon for 
various woollen manufacturers in Cork. Mahony’s Mills in Blackpool took in up to 
fifty thousand pounds of wool for army clothing.106 The vast quantity of wool 
needed was primarily sourced locally. This helps explain why so little raw wool was 
exported from Cork, as well as why there was a sudden increase in the export of 
raw wool from 1815 to 1819. In fact, during 1815 Cork exported 8,680 stone of 
wool, approximately 70,000 pounds, which potentially was the shortfall in domestic 
consumption for military clothing. What is striking is the dramatic shift in the 
consumption of processed woollen goods from England after 1820. Imported yards 
of British woollen drapery goods exploded from almost nothing to over 200,000 
yards per year by the opening years of the 1820s. This explosion is commensurate 
with accounts of the glut of textile productions on the British markets being off-
loaded on Ireland and leading to the devastation of the Irish textile industry. An 
1822 report into revenue collection in Ireland noted that, since the Union, Ireland 
consumed almost the entirety of her output of wool, as opposed to the state of 
affairs in 1777 when over three quarters of it was exported. It also assumed that 
due to this there was a boom in the manufacture of finished woollen goods in 
Ireland.107  
Bar some minor sporadic importation from Scotland and Guernsey Cork 
imported all drapery products from England. The importation of drapery products 
steadily increased over the course of the Napoleonic Wars, peaking in 1809 and 
1813. After 1815 importation rapidly fell to about half of the apogees reached 
during the war (see Figure 3-5). Cork’s overall drapery exports were propped up by 
exports to Portugal at the turn of the nineteenth century. However, this trade 
dramatically collapsed around 1800. The reasons for such a rapid decline are 
unclear. It is likely that a combination of British military demand and increasing 
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tensions over the fate of the Iberian Peninsula combined to make exports to the 
region unattractive. Abraham Lane attributed some of the collapse in the trade with 
Lisbon to trade combinations, as such groups led to contracts being lost to 
competitors. At the height of the trade Lane exported 500 to 1000 pieces of 
camblet to Lisbon, each 100-150 yards long.108 Furthermore, under Article six of the 
Act of Union the duties between the two countries were regularised so that drapery 
goods traded between the two countries paid the same level as used to be levied 
on drapery imports into Ireland. However, estimates from 1804 placed the rate of 
duty on the exportation of new drapery at 2/6 d per yard and old drapery at 7/6 d 
per yard, which decreased to ¼ d per yard and 7 s per yard respectively after the 
Union was enacted. This brought the British duties payable by Irish manufacturers 
on exportation to England down to 8 ½ d per yard on old drapery and 2 ¾ d per yard 
on new drapery. At the same time the duty on imported new drapery goods fell 
from 2/6 d per yard to 1/6 d per yard and on old drapery from 14 s per yard to 10 s 
per yard (7 s per yard by 1803).109 It is possible that the collapse in the exportation 
of Cork drapery products derived from two events: the increase in demand for 
military clothing in Cork and the new lower duty rates making transactions within 
the Union more attractive. Cork wool merchants took advantage of the wartime 
growth in the export of wool to Britain. Of the £1,250.13.10 paid for licenses to 
export to Britain, £1,214 was paid by Cork merchants, Merrick, Persse, Sadlier, and 
Lecky and Mack.110 By the 1820s drapery imports began to increase and it is likely 
that this was due to issues alluded to by Lane; that it was cheaper in some instances 
for Irish manufacturers to import from Britain than to produce their own products. 
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Figure 3-5 Drapery imported into Cork111 
Figures 3-6 and 3-7 below show that the abolition of duties in 1816 led to a 
spike in the importation of cotton yarn, though from 1808 a period of decreasing 
importation foreshadowed the reduction of duties. However, comparing the data 
for cotton yarn imports to that for worsted yarn imports tells a different story. The 
importation of cotton yarn declined at about the same period as rising tensions in 
Anglo-American relations, culminating in the War of 1812. At this point there was a 
sharp and dramatic rise in the importation of worsted yarn. It is likely that tensions 
with America restricted the supply of raw cotton from the United States to Britain. 
From 1815 onwards there was a rapid growth in the importation of raw cotton from 
the United States into Britain, which accounted for somewhere between a third to 
half the overall British imports of raw cotton. This coincided with rapid growth in 
the export of cotton twist and yarn from Britain, rising from nine million pounds in 
1815 to thirty-four million pounds by 1824.112 The increased importation of worsted 
yarn primarily served the increased demands on the region’s textile and clothier 
manufacturing industries to produce goods for the military. The fact that this trade 
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almost completely collapsed at the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars and 
coincided with the increase in cotton yarn imports serves to reinforce this point. 
The volume of cotton yarn imports into Cork from Britain steadily increased 
up to 1806, at which point there was a precipitous decline that only began to 
recover in 1812. It is highly probable that the drop was predominantly due to 
demand on the British market for cotton goods during periods of conflict. The 
increase in the importation of cotton yarn into Cork coincides with the increase in 
the re-exportation of British cotton imports.113 Unsurprisingly, the drop in British 
cotton imports due to the War of 1812 is reflected in British cotton re-exports but 
this dates much later than the decline in Cork’s cotton importation. The decline in 
importation does not correspond with any similar decline in British importation. It is 
probable that it was due to wartime demand in England. The United States formed 
the majority of Britain’s cotton imports and any disruption in this trade would have 
been reflected in Britain’s exports. The Irish trend also reflects the rapid growth of 
the importation of cotton into Britain in the early decades of the nineteenth 
century, with cotton imports from 1801 to 1811 increasing by 39.5 per cent, by 93 
per cent for 1811 to 1821, and 85 per cent from 1821 to 1831.114 However, in terms 
of overall cotton trade Ireland was but a small component, with exports in 1831 
being only £76,118 and dropping to £27,399 by 1833. This compares to a declared 
value of £17,182,936 and £18,459,000 for Great Britain for those respective 
years.115  
If Edward Baines’s estimates of British cotton production are accurate it is 
unsurprising that Ireland held such a minute share of this trade: ‘the yarn spun in 
this country in a year would, in a single thread, pass round the globes 
circumference 263,775 times; it would reach 51 times from the earth to the sun; 
and it would encircle the earth’s orbit eight and a half times!'116 Baines placed the 
production of spun yarn at 4.89 billion miles in 1833. Whether or not these 
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estimates are accurate is beside the point; it would be nigh on impossible for a 
country such as Ireland to come anywhere close to British textile production levels. 
Several decades of industrialisation in Britain had left Irish production far behind. 
By the 1830s the cotton production of Ireland was concentrated in the northern 
part of the country, with Cork only accounting for one out of the twenty nine mills 
in operation in 1833. The one was John Wheeler’s mill at Lisnagat and it did not 
survive the decade.117 The massive increase in the importation of textiles is almost 
certainly one of the main reasons for the near complete collapse of the Irish textile 
industries in the 1820s. It is telling that the largest increases in importations listed 
here were in cotton yarn, with importation jumping from 2,294 pounds to 630,426, 
pounds an increase of nearly 27,482 per cent. This is a phenomenal level of growth 
and one that indicates the extent to which woollen industries in Ireland were 
devastated by better production methods in Britain. This was especially true in 
regions in Cork such as Blarney and Bandon that saw their textile industries all but 
wiped out by lower cost British products. 
 
Figure 3-6 Comparison of cotton imports into Cork and British re-exports118 
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Figure 3-7 Cotton Importation from Britain119 
The trend in Cork differed from that nationwide. In terms of the worsted 
yarn imports overall it was broadly similar, with Irish imports spiking in 1808 before 
dropping again in 1816, though there was not as dramatic a collapse as in Cork 
(Figure 3-8). Overall Irish imports of cotton yarn increased and the increases can be 
linked, as was done in parliamentary reports, to changes in duty levels. However, 
no change in duty levels can account for the collapse in importation, even in what 
was such a volatile trade. Cork’s imports of cotton yarn only took off in 1815/16, as 
shown in Figure 3-9, with a brief decline followed by a resurgence in importation. 
Much of the demand for this product throughout the period was probably linked to 
the more developed textile manufactures in Ulster. The success of the abolition of 
duties on cotton manufacture led the Manchester Secretary to the Chamber of 
Commerce, a Mr. Mathews, to explore the establishment of cotton manufactures in 
Ireland, based in Belfast. The conclusion drawn from ‘the only branch of cotton 
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manufacture in which the experiment of free trade has been tried’ was that this 
system could lead to the expansion of foreign markets for Irish produce.120 
 
Figure 3-8 Worsted yarn imports into Cork121 
 
Figure 3-9 Irish yarn imports122 
                                                     
120 Fourth Report of the Commissioners of Inquiry into the Collection and Management of the 
Revenue Arising in Ireland; &c., p. 14.H.C. 1822 (634) xiii, 1295 




Irish textile exports, although in a reasonably healthy state during the 
Napoleonic Wars, faced stiff competition by the 1820s. Although the fourth report 
on the revenue of Ireland celebrated the removal of the restrictions of the Woollen 
Acts, perhaps their support for unrestricted free trade might not have been as 
strongly felt by Irish textile manufacturers. Those who drafted the report noted,  
It is gratifying to perceive, that the spirit of commercial jealousy in which this 
erroneous policy [the woollen acts) was founded, is now rapidly subsiding. Strongly 
as it manifested itself in England in the year 1785, on the question of the 
commercial propositions, and subsequently in 1800, it is to be observed that… not 
a complaint has been heard, or a wish expressed, to have recourse to what is called 
a protecting system.123  
The abolition of duty on imported worsted yarn led to the collapse of Cork’s 
worsted industry. The report noted that Irish woollen products were not exported 
as they could not compete on Britain’s market. On the Irish domestic market Britain 
made serious inroads in the sale of higher quality textiles.124 This was an area in 
which Cork manufacturers were seriously disadvantaged. 
Exports 
Exports of corn and meal from Cork steadily increased during the opening 
decades of the nineteenth century for a variety of reasons. Firstly, Britain witnessed 
an exploding urban population as the Industrial Revolution took hold. The 
burgeoning working class demanded foodstuffs, which Ireland happily supplied. 
Secondly, the impact of both the Napoleonic Wars and the War of 1812 created an 
increased demand for foodstuffs. The latter in particular created a brief boom in 
Cork’s exports to Britain as supplies of corn from the American market ceased and 
Britain needed to substitute American with Irish imports. As Figure 3-10 shows, the 
increases and lulls in corn exports corresponded to times of increasing conflict. The 
initial wartime boom quickly diminished after the peace in 1815, but the 
introduction of steam transit across the Irish Sea encouraged a rapid increase in 
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corn exports as the decrease in transit times led to an improved quality of corn 
reaching British markets.125 Such an increase may indicate a move from pasturage 
to tillage or at least the increasing value of tillage exports compared with a decline 
in demand for salted meat. Furthermore, the increasing acreage being turned over 
to tillage encouraged investment in the milling industries.126 
 
Figure 3-10 Corn exports to Britain127 
The export of salted meat and other provisions to Britain remained 
remarkably stable throughout this period. It is surprising that the conflicts of the 
time did not lead to a marked increase in the export of provisions to Britain. In fact, 
the exports of barrels of pork and beef, as well as butter, were far more consistent 
and less prone to dramatic fluctuations throughout the Napoleonic Wars than the 
total exports for Ireland as a whole in the same goods. This is not to imply that the 
wars had no impact on these exports. Decreases in the export of salted meat 
products during the opening two decades of the nineteenth century correspond 
with lulls in fighting. However, they were far less susceptible to dramatic drops than 
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overall Irish exports. This is demonstrated by the massive decline in Irish beef barrel 
exports seen in Figure 3-11 after 1815, but Cork’s exports stayed remarkably stable.  
 
Figure 3-11 Salted beef exports128 
This data leads to a number of conclusions regarding Cork’s agricultural 
produce. The beef supply remained stable and consistent during this period due to 
its quality. There was always going to be a demand for salted beef for victualling the 
navy. Cork’s produce was of a proven high quality. Massive increases in demand 
and soaring prices led to the purchase of produce that in peacetime would not have 
been suitable, but in war necessity led to its purchase. These much larger 
requirements for salted meat would not have maintained much of a market share 
after the war, but a demonstrably high quality good would always be able to find a 
purchaser. Pork exports exhibit a similar, but less pronounced, trend. The marked 
variability in exports of pork barrels supports the conclusion that the decline in pork 
and beef barrel exports was closely aligned to military demand. Part of the stability 
of beef exports came from the demand from colonial possessions for Irish salted 
beef. Salted pork did not have the same historical preference as beef. Much of the 
growth in demand was from the British navy, as it was deemed to be a more 




palatable product than beef. All the major increases and decreases coincided with 
military actions. Unfortunately the data does not continue beyond 1823. From the 
data available it is likely that pork barrel exports settled into a level commensurate 
with peacetime demand and Cork remained the major supplier. As Figure 3-12 
shows, the exports of salted barrels of pork from Cork remained far more stable 
than those of the rest of the country. This indicates that some of the product was 
sourced elsewhere out of necessity and that such suppliers were not deemed 
suitable for peacetime needs. 
 
Figure 3-12 Barreled pork exports129 
The collapse in demand is also represented in price changes. The Napoleonic 
Wars saw prices for a variety of provisions increase due to demand. Whereas butter 
and pork prices rose by 144 and 70 per cent respectively, that for beef only rose by 
47 per cent. Liam Kennedy questions why the demand for beef lagged behind other 
provisioned goods, but it is most likely a matter of changing tastes.130 Beef had 
been the prime provision export for the eighteenth century, but salted pork 
became a more popular provisioning meat for the navy and demand for beef 
declined. Figure 3-13 illustrates that although the price for salted pork readily 
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tracked that of beef the increases in price, especially during conflict, were far more 
pronounced. Salted pork prices also appear to have maintained a higher value for 
longer. The prices for butter on the same market were more consistent, 
experiencing increases and declines corresponding with outbreaks of conflict or 
otherwise. After a rather dramatic drop to a twenty five year low in the late 1820s, 
following the de-regulation of the Irish butter trade, prices remained reasonably 
stable, though perhaps not as stable as butter producers may have liked. The 
Napoleonic War truly was the high point for Irish butter sales, with the value 
staying consistently above eighty shillings a hundredweight and peaking in 1811 at 
one hundred and twenty five shillings. The market prices in Cork and London for 
butter remained very close, reflecting the quality of the product Cork was 
producing. This was markedly different than the case for beef. The price on the 
London market was, on average, thirty-five to fifty per cent higher than Cork as 
demonstrated (see Figure 3-14). 
 
Figure 3-13 Irish beef and Pork prices in London131 
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Figure 3-14 Comparative butter prices132 
This data can also reveal the preferences of the Royal Navy and the British 
public.  Beef exports remained steady, but they declined noticeably over the course 
of this period. Pork exports were far more volatile, but increased at the expense of 
beef exports. Rarely did pork exports drop below 2,000 barrels per annum, peaking 
at nearly 7,000 in 1808. On the other hand, beef exports struggled to reach 2,000 
barrels per year. This demonstrates the changing preference for salted pork over 
beef. The increase in demand for pork products is also demonstrated by the 
remarkable increase in demand for flitches of bacon. Barrelled pork and beef were 
almost certainly destined for re-export, or at least a large proportion were. 
However, flitches of bacon were mostly destined for the open market in Britain and 
the increase in bacon exports coincided with the introduction of more factory-style 
processing plants for that product in Ireland.133 Exports of bacon flitches from Cork 
showed a dramatic and inexorable rise to cater for the consumer demands of urban 
Britain. Whereas a substantial proportion of the total beef and pork exports from 
Cork were destined for a variety of markets other than Britain, which considering 
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these products longevity and purpose is understandable, exports of bacon flitches 
were virtually in their entirety sent to Britain. 
Though Cork may have dominated the supplies of salted beef and pork 
exports, the same was not true for bacon flitches. Although exports to Britain 
steadily increased and experienced remarkable growth over the first two decades 
of the nineteenth century, Cork exports were only a small proportion of the Irish 
trade. This market was served by other parts of the country and Cork’s rising 
exports merely echoed the national total, rarely breaking above 3 per cent (see 
Figure 3-15). Surprising as this may seem given the expertise developed in the 
provisioning trade, these preservation skills were not necessarily suitable for the 
British domestic market. Heavy salting for long distance transport meant that the 
meat was serviceable, if perhaps a little unappetising. The majority of pork 
produced in Cork was destined for salted barrels intended for victualling use and 
transportation. That was where the local demand was; flitches would have been 
much less salted due to the proximity of the British consumer. There simply was not 
enough excess to service both markets. This is indicative of later problems in the 
food sectors in Cork. Heavily salted products like beef, pork and butter had 
constituted the mainstay of market activity for over a century by the 1820s. 
Merchants saw no reason to change practices that had served for that period. 
Indeed the Committee of Merchants had been established, in part, to preserve and 
maintain the standards necessary for these products. Extended periods of war had 




Figure 3-15 Bacon Exports134 
The Napoleonic Wars had also hidden some of the true costs of the Union 
and the disparity between Irish and English economic activities. Distances to the 
markets in Britain were shrinking and would soon seem miniscule with the advent 
of steam tramp services. Military victualling was a distinct type of service and the 
domestic British market had neither the taste, nor the need, for the heavily salted 
products Cork produced. Cork’s merchants were by and large a conservative group 
of men, slow to change tradition in the face of market demands. This issue was one 
that gradually gained momentum throughout the nineteenth century, to the 
detriment of the region’s traditional butter trade. Furthermore, evidence of the 
1838 trade in bacon to London, Liverpool, and Bristol shows that Waterford was the 
dominant exporter of Irish bacon to these ports. It had a fifty per cent share of the 
trade whereas Cork barely came up to seven per cent of the same. Solar estimates 
that from the mid-1840s onwards Cork became increasingly involved in the trade, 
basing his estimates on London receipts. But in the pre-famine period Waterford 
absolutely dominated the Irish exports of bacon and ham products.135 It is possible 
that Waterford’s dominance in this trade came about, at least in part, due to Cork 
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dominating the victualling of pork products. While Cork focused on her traditional 
outputs, Waterford took advantage of a market opening. 
Where Cork maintained a strong provisioning trade with the wider world, 
the secondary goods generated by this trade went to Britain. Skins, hides, animal 
horns, tallow, lard and almost every other by-product of the slaughtering process 
were sent to England for further processing into finished goods. Cork produced 
some finished goods from these by-products, such as candles and shoes, but they 
were, more often than not, exported to the Caribbean rather than Britain. There 
are several possible reasons for this. First, it is likely that the exports of finished 
goods such as shoes and candles were used to supply ships that stopped in Cork 
before making the trans-Atlantic journey. These goods would have had a ready 
market either on the Caribbean islands or for the journey itself. Such products were 
possibly used to fill ships to get as much return as possible on their trips. As has 
been shown in the case of the Bristol trade routes, often the stopover in Cork was 
used to fill empty space to maximise the profitability of the trip. Second, the ships 
that travelled between Cork and Britain would have focused on goods with a 
reasonable rate of return on British markets. It is likely that there was more value in 
transporting the secondary products of the slaughtering trade, namely leather, 
skins and tallow, for finishing by superior workshops in London than there was in 
supplying the finished product. Finally, it is likely that local markets in Cork 
absorbed many of these products.  
Cork was not as invested in the live animal trade as other regions in Ireland. 
This was probably due to both the distances involved and the necessity of having 
animals to slaughter for the food trades. Until the advent of regular steam trade 
between Ireland and Britain, livestock lost value due to the weight lost on a long 
journey.136 Even so, Cork’s livestock exports saw substantial increases from 1810 
onwards (see Figure 3-16). The majority of these increases derived from live pig 
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exports. Donnelly has noted that pig breeding was important in dairy regions such 
as Cork as a means of disposing of waste. However, he concludes that while 
nationally pigs were rarely exported to Britain live, this was not the case in Cork.137 
It is possible that such a volume of pigs were sustained by the dairy regions that 
those exported merely represent the excess. The data from Cork is somewhat at 
odds with the national picture, shown in Figure 3-17. Overall the trend in live 
animal exports increased during the period from 1810 to 1816, but not as 
dramatically as it did in Cork. While nationally the dominant livestock export was 
cattle, the export of pigs remained a close second. Due to the manner in which the 
data was collated, data for the United Kingdom in years where Cork did not export 
certain goods there were not recorded. This is more of an issue for sheep exports, 
but it is a weakness in the data sets. The data available shows that Cork was the 
exception. In terms of pig exports Cork supplied the vast bulk of live animal exports 
to the United Kingdom, which in turn represented the majority of livestock exports. 
However, exports of live cattle from Cork were miniscule compared to the total 
number of animals exported. The difference in cattle exports can be accounted for 
through exports from Dublin, with cattle being driven into the larger markets and 
fairs that were closer to Britain. Live cattle driven into Cork were diverted to the 
slaughtering areas of the city for processing. As Devine noted regarding Irish trade 
with Scotland, Dublin had a distorting effect on the exact provenance of goods 
exported, with materials transported there from surrounding counties to take 
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advantage of the larger markets and more reliable and frequent transports
 
Figure 3-16 Cork’s livestock exports138 
 
Figure 3-17 Irish Livestock Exports139 
Cork’s linen exports to the United Kingdom were miniscule in terms of the 
national total, barely exceeding 4 per cent. Cork was not a major player in the linen 
industry, but Britain was the primary consumer of the region’s products. Figure 3-
                                                     




18 shows a dramatic fall in the exports of linen at the turn of the nineteenth 
century. This fall could be attributed to the collapse of the Sadlier mills and a more 
widespread economic depression.140 Linen exports continued to remain volatile 
until the end of the Napoleonic Wars when there was a dramatic decline in linen 
exports to Britain. By 1820 exports of linen from Cork collapsed. In the main this 
resulted from the oversupply of textiles in Britain.  
However, from 1821 total exports from Cork rose, when exports to Britain 
declined. Until this point Cork’s linen trade was almost solely supported by exports 
to Britain, whereas at this time a small but noticeable difference was taken up by 
exports to Gibraltar, Jamaica, and to a lesser extent Maryland, Barbados and 
Canada. It is possible that the overreliance on Britain and the devastation British 
textiles caused on the Irish market had led Cork’s linen producers to explore new 
markets. The collapse of the domestic cotton industry and increasing investment in 
plant engines to drive production may also have had an effect.141 Without the data 
after 1823 it is difficult to see if this was part of a trend or merely a few exceptional 
years, but Cork had made important strides in the exportation of low cost linen 
from 1816 onwards. Part of this increase can be attributed to the expansion of 
Besnard’s linen business in Douglas taking in linens from all over the country for 
processing and re-export.142 However, the initial success was soon lost; the failure 
to mechanise and adapt new techniques left Cork’s linen producers behind their 
rivals in Northern Ireland and Scotland. 
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Figure 3-18 Cork's linen exports143 
The true impact of the British textile industry on Cork’s indigenous production can 
be seen by comparing the employment figures in 1800 with those in 1834 (Table 3-
2). Employment in all branches of textile manufacture all but disappeared, with 
those employed in worsted weaving collapsing from around 2,000 in 1800 to 90 in 
1834. This trend occurred across southern Ireland as textile manufacturing 
collapsed. Mechanisation would have played a part in reducing employment 
figures, but the limited industrialisation of the Irish textile industry cannot account 
for the bulk of this collapse.  
Cork 1800 1834 
Braid Weavers 1,000 40 
Worsted Weavers 2,000 90 
Hosiers 300 28 
Woolcombers 700 110 
Cottonweavers 2,000 220 
Table 3-2 Textile employment in Cork144 
Marx attributed the collapse to the consequences of the Union, stating that 
‘every time Ireland was about to develop industrially, she was crushed and 
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reconverted into purely agricultural land’.145 This assessment is unduly harsh. While 
it is true that the decline in Irish textiles did relate to the full implementation of the 
Union in the mid-1820s, that coincided with a general economic depression. 
Although British competition devastated Cork’s textile industries, it is equally likely 
that in better economic circumstances Irish industries could have adapted and 
adjusted their business practices to operate successfully. The recovery of the 
southern textile industries in areas such as Blarney later in the century attests to 
the ability of Irish textile manufacturers to find, locate and exploit available 
opportunities. Marx approached the topic from a particular political perspective, 
overlooking other evidence. In 1848 two other commentators, Pim and O’Kelley 
saw the collapse of the Irish textile industry through a different lens. Unlike Marx, 
who attributed the decline solely to British political machinations, they attributed 
the collapse of the Irish textile industry to the growth of the factory system in 
Britain:  
to conduct a large manufactory with success requires capital, intelligence, 
unremitting attention and industry. Few persons in the south of Ireland possessing 
these requisites have been willing to undertake a business involving so much 
labour, and requiring so large an investment of capital.146 
To their minds there was a lack of entrepreneurial drive in the South of Ireland and 
a reticence to invest the necessary time and resources to build successful industry 
in the region. More recent commentators have considered the slow investment in 
capital infrastructure, the introduction of steam spinning forty years after Britain, 
overreliance on low wages, lack of capital and poor quality Irish engineering to 
produce steam engines.147 Entrepreneurial development of Cork’s industries relied 
heavily on parliamentary intervention and protective duties. As Chapter 4 
addresses, there was difficulty in attracting private capital for the development of 
infrastructure in the region. While there were many reasons for such a poor level of 
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investment at a local level, an underdeveloped financial system cannot have helped 
matters.  
Conclusion 
John MacNeill, quoting a Mr. Fawcett at a public meeting in Shoreditch in 
1881, attested that Ireland was  
to a great extent, what England had made them… [a] mass of vexatious restrictions 
were imposed on her industry, and… if any branch of Irish trade interfered with 
English profits, that branch of Irish trade was immediately to be discouraged.148 
That was a common sentiment in the burgeoning nineteenth century Irish 
nationalist movement. Nationalists lay the blame for all Ireland’s woes at the feet of 
a cold and distant Westminster elite that perceived ‘the vocation of the Irish people 
to be shipped over the ocean in order to make way for the cows and sheep’.149 This 
debate poses the question: What was the economic relationship between Ireland 
and Britain in the nineteenth century? Fawcett’s assertions come with a grain of 
truth, as the entire structure of Cork’s eighteenth century trade was formed around 
restrictions imposed on Ireland in Britain. The very nature of Cork’s economy was 
designed to avoid interference with British development and to service British 
requirements. Some of this was by design and some fulfilled a necessary role in the 
Atlantic economy. Eric Strauss reiterated these nineteenth century views of 
Ireland’s relationship with Britain, stating that the Union was used to preserve 
Ireland as a source of food and labour while removing any potential for industrial 
competition, which in turn strangled Ireland’s engagement with the wider world.150 
The central issue is: Was Ireland simply a colonial holding of Britain, the testbed for 
future colonies or, over the course of several centuries, had Anglo-Irish relations 
evolved into something more complex? 
As has been discussed in previous chapters, Ireland fulfils many of the 
definitions of a peripheral, or secondary, economy in Wallerstein’s World Systems’ 
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Theory. Her relationship with Britain both politically and economically was far too 
complex to simply be regarded as a colonial possession. According to Wallerstein’s 
definition,  
the periphery of the world economy is that geographical sector of it wherein 
production is primarily of lower-ranking goods but which is an integral part of the 
overall system of the division of labour, because the commodities involved are only 
for daily use.151 
Peripheries supplied the commodities for more advanced economies to process, 
but were not in a simply extractive relationship. This fits much of the nature of 
Ireland’s relationship with Britain. Smith goes further, however, arguing that if one 
looks at production in the periphery, it involved production of goods of a low 
capital investment and a high amount of low-skilled labour investment, but he 
would not class Ireland as a periphery. Instead Smith has a separate class that he 
terms dependencies. A dependency had the potential to operate as an independent 
entity, whereas a true periphery could not. He contends that in a dependency, as 
the relationship matures a different style of production comes about, which 
requires more skill and intrinsically develops more value.152 For Smith, the crucial 
difference for Ireland in her relationship with Britain was proximity. Although this 
proximity left Ireland an easy conquest, it also meant that Ireland was a potential 
weakness in Britain’s domestic affairs. There was always an underlying fear of both 
Ireland’s ability to threaten British industry and the military weakness of Ireland 
that meant she could never be simply perceived as a colonial holding. Furthermore, 
the Anglo-Irish were a political force in their own right, as either allies or rivals to 
the British establishment.153 To put it simply, Ireland’s relationship with Britain was 
unique. 
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O’Hearn has argued that the position of Ireland under the Union had led to 
potentially beneficial industrial developments being exchanged for peripheral ones. 
In essence, he claims that Ireland was subjugated and transformed to benefit 
England’s global ambitions.154 Centuries of restrictions had left Ireland in a position 
where she was unable to compete with Britain. The Cattle Acts, Wool Acts and 
Navigation Acts all acted as brakes on any natural economic development in 
Ireland. However, in the context of Cork were these necessarily harmful 
restrictions? The simple answer is yes. The Navigation Acts curtailed the benefits 
that could have accrued to Cork if it had full access to the Atlantic trade and the 
Wool Acts curtailed the region’s textile industries. However, in response to the 
restrictions of the Wool Acts Cork developed a strong linen industry, aided by the 
recent Huguenot immigrants. It moved from livestock exportation to producing 
finished foodstuffs for export and developed strong secondary industries around 
the provisioning trade that soon proved successful. Shipping restrictions and 
embargoes were also an unwelcome intrusion, but the Cork merchant class became 
adept at finding alternative trade routes, such as through the Dutch in order to 
trade with the French. Yes, these restrictions were debilitating, but the region’s 
merchants worked within them to create a strong local economy for much of the 
eighteenth century.   
Given the ability of Cork’s merchants to source new business opportunities 
for themselves, what happened in the fifty years before the Great Famine that led 
to a reversal of the city’s fortunes in the textile and provisioning industries? The 
simple answer is the Union, but in itself that is not wholly adequate. Many in Cork 
greeted the Union as an economic benefit at the time. It realised their desires to 
gain a more equal footing with Britain in the Colonial and Atlantic economy.  
A telling sign of things to come was the nature of Cork’s Caribbean trade. 
Although free trade with the West Indies was achieved in 1778, Cork’s merchants 
still traded via Britain. There were several reasons for this. A lack of shipping was a 
debilitating factor as was the fact that it was safer and more economical to ship 
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under British accounts. A lack of sufficiently long credit lines was also problematic. 
These problems could have been managed. Cork has a large and safe harbour with 
industries well used to equipping and repairing large vessels. There is no real reason 
why Cork’s merchants could not have developed their own small fleet of merchant 
vessels. Yes, there were convoy restrictions at times, but these convoys were 
departing from the city. What better place to have a merchant fleet? Shipping 
under British account made sense – it involved less risk – but there was also less 
chance of profiting from cash crops, the true value of trans-Atlantic trade. The issue 
of low levels of access to credit was somewhat more intractable. Cullen concludes 
that the want of direct colonial trade led to the lack of a fully developed financial 
sector.155 This was surely an issue that could have been managed more effectively, 
yet the Cork merchant class made no attempts to find a remedy for the lack of ships 
or to establish stronger financial institutions. 
Once trade with Britain opened completely Cork and Ireland began to 
increase their trade with Britain and to allow other foreign trading partnerships to 
languish. Even though conflicts interspersed the period Cork had both commercial 
and familial links with all its main trading partners. These lines of communication 
could have been kept open. However, the most damning evidence comes after the 
Union was fully implemented and steam transit across the Irish Sea became 
available.  Livestock exports increased while those of processed foodstuffs 
decreased.156 Cork’s provisioning industry collapsed in the face of both convenience 
and entrenched local production techniques. Ireland’s relationship with Britain had 
become more colonial in nature and not solely because of British machinations. 
There is an argument to be made that this occurred due to the acquiescence of Irish 
commercialists to the convenience of conducting trade with Britain. 
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Chapter 4  
Development in Cork  
In 1832 Daniel O’Connell wrote to Thomas Lyons, a textile merchant and 
later Mayor of Cork, to discuss the repeal of the Act of Union. Referring to the 
Westminster Parliament O’Connell asserted, 
It is equally impossible for that parliament to be sufficiently informed of the wants 
wishes resources and local interests and capabilities of Ireland-these can be 
properly attended to solely by an Irish Parliament… The persisting causes of our 
wealth is all clearly disappearing.1 
O’Connell created a direct connection between the loss of an Irish representative 
house and the dramatic changes in Ireland’s commercial intercourse in the 
intervening three decades. However, the Committee of Merchants in Cork had 
managed to maintain a degree of independence in the regulation of their butter 
trade from Westminster up to 1829. In this context it is worthwhile examining how 
the commercial activities within Cork changed over the course of the first industrial 
revolution. In 1800 Cork butter and hide merchants secured an exclusion from the 
implementation of prior and successive acts for the regulation of their trade. An Act 
for the Better Regulation of the Butter Trade of the City of Cork found that previous 
acts had been ‘inexpedient’ and gave new provisions for separate regulations for 
Cork.2 The Committee of Merchants had maintained a sufficient level of power to 
be exempted from the 1812 act for regulating the butter trade in Ireland with 
section twenty-seven guaranteeing that nothing in that act would apply to Cork. 
This exemption continued in the 1824 butter regulation act before being abolishing 
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by the 1829 butter regulation act.3 Although these men were far from a 
representative parliament, they did come from the upper echelons of Cork’s 
political and mercantile classes and wielded considerable influence over policy, at 
least for a time.  
From the beginnings of the repeal movement many Irish people laid the 
blame for Ireland’s economic woes on the Union. Nor was this opinion restricted to 
Irish repealers. In a letter to Julius Besnard, the Mayor of Cork, the Scottish MP 
Joseph Hume argued that ‘the present restrictions and prohibitions in the 
Commercial Code of this Empire present serious obstacles to the extension of its 
trade’.4 The abolishing of duties and tariffs between Ireland and Britain and the 
move of political decision making to Westminster had limited Ireland’s ability to 
control the nature of its trade. These changes, most importantly the removal of any 
protective duties, did lead to long term problems in Ireland’s indigenous industries. 
This was most notable in the devastation caused to the Irish linen industry when 
the removal of various protections and bounties on Irish linen opened up that 
industry to the full force of British competition.5 However, these changes also had 
the potential to improve Irish access to the British market.  
The impact of the Union with Britain in terms of Cork’s international trades 
has already been addressed, but at a local level how did Cork’s commercial classes 
work towards creating a viable infrastructure that could maintain international 
trade? Furthermore, to what extent can the impact of the Act of Union be 
separated from the decline in exports of provisions and butter that had been 
occurring since the late eighteenth century? Why was the North in a position to 
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capitalise so quickly on the Union, leaving the South in a declining spiral to the 
extent that it was characterised as being ‘in every respect inferior to that of the 
northern’ despite being ‘eager for instruction; and readily trained… to habits of 
order and steady industry’.6 
The issue of weakening trade had been considered from the early years of 
the Union. In 1810 the Freeman’s Journal discussed an ongoing decline in exports 
and imports. According to the article this could ‘easily be referred to the low state 
of public credit, and the consequent deficiency of means, to enable any trader or 
merchant to carry on or support that system of speculation’.7 The report goes on to 
point out that Cork’s butter and provisions were sold cheaper on the London 
market than in Cork and this indicated the impact poor access to credit had on the 
city’s commercial development. Due to the restricted availability of credit and the 
narrow trade with foreign nations the article concludes that Cork ‘must bear all the 
profit and losses within itself.’8 However, despite the article citing the value of Cork 
butter on the London market as indicative of deficiencies in the Union, it is perhaps 
more an indicator of the niche role that Cork-produced butter occupied. Cork 
butter, or at least the vast bulk of it, was not produced for the London market. It 
was designed to be exported vast distances to warm climates, such as the West 
Indies. This required heavy salting to preserve the quality. When it came to closer 
markets, such as London, the Cork product was too salted for popular tastes and 
this ‘gives it a bad flavour’. When a lower salted version went to that market it was 
‘uncommonly well liked.’9 It was more an issue of sending the wrong product to the 
London market than anything else. The low salted butter was demonstrably 
marketable in London, yet the merchants appear to have persisted in trying to 
market the heavily salted West Indian butter there. This seems to have been more a 
result of a lack of market awareness than any insidious political manoeuvring.  
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The analysis in the preceding chapters of Cork’s imports and exports reflect 
the regions strengths and weaknesses. Cork had very strong agricultural production, 
but lacked a developed industrial base or the natural resources to develop a strong 
industrial economy. The city and region occupied a niche role in international trade 
but when the trading environment changed Cork proved unable, or unwilling, to 
adapt to a new economic reality. 
The Committee of Merchants 
Political Influence 
‘The merchant-kings of the modem Irish Venice.’10 
Cork’s international trade was built around butter and its ancillary 
industries. The success of Cork’s butter depended on the ability to transport it 
unaltered across long distances to warm climates. This was achieved through the 
insistence on high quality casks and pickling. Those interviewed for the Report from 
the Select Committee on the Butter Trade of Ireland, published in 1826, consistently 
made this point. The Cork Committee of Merchants – the most powerful body in 
Cork and one of the most powerful trade organisations in Ireland in the early 
nineteenth century – had an unprecedented level of control over the economic and 
political fortunes of Cork city. Founded to properly regulate the butter trade, by the 
time of the Union their influence had spread to make them the de facto 
representative body for Cork’s external trade. They represented the region’s 
interests at a broad level outside their specific concerns with the butter trade, 
dealing with regulations on the importation of foreign flour imports, the manner 
through which import duties were paid on tobacco and the milling industry in 
general.11 They achieved this because their members were drawn from the city’s 
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political and mercantile elite. The membership lists over the years included 
representation from all the major Cork trading families of the nineteenth century. 
The membership roll embodied the moniker of ‘Merchant Princes’ adeptly, both in 
terms of their wide ranging involvement with Cork’s trade networks as well as the 
almost hereditary nature of their composition. The names of Beamish, Lane, and 
Crawford all make regular appearances in the minutes. The most powerful of those 
families’ remains etched on the city itself in the names of Cork’s streets and 
laneways. This sweeping membership allowed them to call on support from 
members of parliament and the admiralty and the location of the admiralty 
victualing centre in the city gave them a fulcrum from which they could leverage 
power. Furthermore, the Committee maintained a salaried representative in 
London to communicate with parliament, who in 1826 was former Cork banker 
James Roche.12 Throughout the long life of this organisation they wielded their 
power to further the interests of Cork city in mostly positive directions. This has 
been seen in earlier chapters where the Committee would regularly make 
representations to Westminster or powerful individuals on matters of imperial 
policy in an attempt to protect their interests.  
The Committee of Merchants created a very restrictive environment for 
Cork butter merchants. Regulations controlled every facet of the trade. Casks were 
required to be of a specified size and construction, made from seasoned oak, 
sycamore and beech. They were required to be bound by twelve iron hoops so that 
they could hold the pickle for preserving the butter. Once brought to market the 
butter was tasted and branded with a quality mark before being sold. The casks 
were then inspected to ensure they were appropriately constructed.13 Every aspect 
of production, from farm to export merchant, was regulated and even after the 
point of sale the Committee attempted to ensure that no fraudulent use of their 
particular marks occurred in ports such as London and Liverpool. This was a highly 
restrictive trading environment, but one that saw the receipts for butter increase 
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from 100,000 firkins per year in 1770 to a peak of 314,597 in 1820.14 The success of 
the Committee of Merchant’s regulatory efforts in promoting the export of high 
quality butter was such that one butter buyer, William Fagan, thought that freeing 
the trade would devastate the industry. However, his rationale was that without 
legislative restrictions informing them of the best course of action the country 
farmer would be unwilling to take the advice of those better attuned to the tastes 
of the market, the butter buyers.15 He followed this condescending statement with 
another one, asserting that the country people wished for the butter buyer to take 
care of the sale and price of their product as they ‘think that unless a person in a 
good coat assists them, they will never be done justice to in any court in Ireland’.16 
As a member of the elite represented by the Committee of Merchants it would be 
untoward to suggest that his views would have been in any way biased, but it is 
noteworthy that at this point there was not one representative of the farming 
community on the Committee, though apparently this was because the country 
people neglected to send a representative.17  
It is difficult to precisely gauge the overall efficacy of the merchants’ 
lobbying efforts, as Cork was ultimately a small provincial city. However, they did 
call on the attention of larger merchant groups in Britain for support with some 
success. Securing an exemption in 1800 from the majority of butter legislation 
imposed by Westminster that lasted until 1829 was probably one of their more 
successful endeavours in the early nineteenth century.18 It helped Cork maintain its 
hold on the foreign butter trade to the exclusion of other Irish producers. However, 
both the implementation of the freedoms that the 1800 act gave the Committee of 
Merchants and the subsequent loss of these exemptions caused many difficulties 
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over the decades. The most fruitful exploration of their multifaceted attempts to 
curry favour and influence political decision-making comes from their minute 
books. At the turn of the nineteenth century these books contain vast quantities of 
references to balls, dinners, and assorted events that they either hosted or 
arranged for military and political figures, as well as details of lobbying on wide 
ranging topics. However, the detail in the minute books is susceptible to the 
vagaries of those keeping the minutes and from the late 1820s onwards the 
previously fastidious collation of these records lapsed. There are tantalising hints of 
continued lobbying, but the records of such activities are lacking. Accounts in the 
Committee’s papers, as well as various appearances in the Chief Secretary’s Office 
Papers and the British Parliamentary Papers, demonstrate how this body busied 
themselves with almost every aspect of Cork’s trade. Some issues seemed directly 
relevant to their interests, such as flour, corn, and other agricultural concerns, 
while others, such as tobacco, fell far beyond their self-appointed remit. 
On a political level, the Committee of Merchants were quite vocal in arguing 
for or against duties and rates that they deemed important to their business 
interests. The issue of duties on products was a point of contention in the period 
before the Act of Union and continued to be so up to its full implementation. In a 
Memorandum on Several Points of Commerce with Ireland the issue of reciprocal 
protective duties in Ireland’s trade was discussed. The argument from the Irish 
perspective was that nascent Irish industries needed some protections from the far 
more advanced and wealthy British industrial sector. Similarly, it was argued that 
Britain laid protective duties on goods that were similar to her own manufactures 
and that Ireland should also have that right.19 In terms of Cork’s interests, the 
Committee opposed changes in duties on cotton imports in 1794, salt and herrings 
in 1797, wine in 1800, and sugar in 1831.20 They lobbied on any trade good that 
Cork may have had an interest in. Irish commerce relied heavily on protective tariffs 
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and duties to further their business interests, rather than on innovative production 
methods or an awareness of changing tastes. They were far more interested in 
preserving the status quo than broadening their market base. During the 
nineteenth century the volume of trade undertaken with countries other than 
Britain declined and this increased reliance on Britain and protective duties would 
prove detrimental. 
The Committee regularly expressed their views to Westminster and the 
Chief Secretary’s Office. They vociferously opposed any changes in the duties or 
tariffs on Irish produce, issuing petitions and sending their London-based 
representatives to solicit support from members of both houses of parliament and 
other interested parties. When Robert Peel proposed to change the tariffs in place 
on imported provisions in 1842 a number of London’s provisioning houses wrote to 
the Board of Trade arguing that duty reductions would deprive the Irish 
manufacturers of cured beef and pork of their English markets. The language used 
was just as hyperbolic as that employed by the Committee of Merchants with the 
petitioners arguing that  
The effect of the repeal… is virtually to put an end to all fair competition between 
the home and foreign manufacturer, and absolutely give the foreigner the 
monopoly of supplying the British mercantile marine.21 
They argued that the only consequence of these changes would be for Irish 
producers to stop all manufacture of salted meat production and lay off all their 
coopers and labourers. However, the retort from government was that if the 
matter was so important, why had none of the Irish Members of Parliament 
opposed the changes. At a meeting in Cork on the subject John Gould, a member of 
the Committee of Merchants, suggested that it would be ‘better far it were for 
Ireland that she were a colony of England than an integral portion of the empire… 
Ireland is to be ruined and sacrificed, because, forsooth, America is to be quieted 
and conciliated.’22 A more sarcastic attendee added to this that it could be useful to 
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offer the 105 Irish MPs to Peel for they did no good to Ireland. The Committee of 
Merchants constituted a political force in their own right, with a long-standing 
tradition of leveraging their connections in Britain to advocate for political change.  
It is strange that Gould complained about a lack of any representation by 
Members of Parliament. One of Cork’s representatives at this time was Edmund 
Roche, no relation to the Roche banker that was at one point employed as an agent 
by the Committee. The other member for Cork was Daniel O’Connell. Neither 
broached the topic of duties on provisions. It is probable they were more 
preoccupied with the repeal movement than with seemingly trivial items like duty 
rates. Later in life Edmund Roche appears to have been an improving landowner, 
writing letters in newspapers arguing for the value of giving tenants long leases, 
criticising excessive sub-letting and arguing for improved funds for Cork harbour.23 
However, in 1842 Roche was a young and inexperienced MP, just elected as a 
repealer. Despite their position as Cork’s elected representatives, neither Roche nor 
O’Connell broached the topic of the city’s trade. In terms of political representation 
the Committee of Merchants, at least on this issue, was far more engaged with the 
requirements of Cork as a city and less concerned with the more intangible Irish 
repeal movement. 
In 1860 the Committee of Merchants wrote a memorial to Lord John Russell 
in his position as Foreign Secretary to lament the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty, which 
secured free trade between France and Britain. The merchants complained that the 
treaty removed the duties on butter that had protected it on the English market. 
They explained that they now faced stiff competition from the improvements in 
both quality and quantity that were being made in France and the United States.24 
This is somewhat misleading as Cork butter had not been selling well on the 
domestic British market for some time. In the 1820s it had been noted that the 
levels of salt in Cork’s butter did not suit the tastes of the London market and that 
the lighter salted butter from Carlow or Belfast sold at a better price due to this. It 
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was also noted in 1826 that although Dutch competition on the British market 
should have had the effect of inciting improvements in the production of Irish 
butter this had not occurred.25 Furthermore, one London based importer, William 
Strange, estimated that in 1826 the quantity of Dutch butter brought into London 
was greater than that of Irish butter.26 Irish butter had faced competition from 
Holland nearly forty years prior to the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty, but relied on 
protective duties to preserve its market share rather than producing a product that 
catered for the British market. Such a reliance on protective duties rather than 
improving their product was short sighted and ill advised, especially at a time when 
the foreign market for Irish butter was in decline. 
Butter Regulation 
Established in 1769, the Committee of Merchants acted as a regulatory body 
that would respond to market pressures and ensure that the butter exported from 
Cork was suitable for the open market. Part of the reason for its establishment was 
the comparatively small share of the English market that Cork’s butter merchants 
held compared to their share of the Irish butter market as a whole.27 By the 1820s 
the composition of the Committee of Merchants consisted of fourteen exporters, 
seven butter buyers and three representatives of the tanning trade.28 The control 
and regulation of the butter trade was the Committee’s primary function and it is 
reflected in their minute books. As well as details of the election and nomination 
process these records contain a large number of petitions and communications for 
the regulation of the butter industry. Despite the power of the Committee of 
Merchants as an organisation, including exacting charges on their services, they 
operated without any form of statutory powers. This in itself is a remarkable 
achievement, especially once the scope of their concerns broadened beyond the 
butter trade. One could even regard the Committee of Merchants as a form of 
monopoly, in that all sales of butter through the city had to occur through their 
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processes and the sale of butter without their marks was dealt with harshly. Their 
power was only assured through the consensus of the majority of the merchants 
and buyers of the city.  
Considering the tone of the Committee’s petitions as previously mentioned, 
it is somewhat surprising that at times they were quite supportive of parliamentary 
interference. In 1800 a parliamentary act was passed to regulate the specifics of the 
butter trade of Cork city. Previous legislation for the Irish butter trade had been 
found to be ineffective for the Cork butter market, so this new act provided 
separate legislation for the Cork butter trade. Its most pertinent aspects related to 
the construction and inspection of casks and the volume of butter within with each 
cask.29 In 1804 the Committee noted the benefits of this act for the regulation of 
the tares of butter casks. Their support of this act was such that they actually 
warned their members that any changes to it would injure Cork’s butter trade.30 
The 1800 act remained in force in Cork, to the exception of all other acts of 
parliament relating to the Irish butter trade, until 1829. Up to this point the 
Committee of Merchants were able to maintain exceptions for the Cork butter 
market at the highest levels of government. 
As discussed in Chapter One, large quantities of American timber were 
imported to supply the coopers for the construction of butter casks. American 
timber was the preferred material and this preference remained stable throughout 
the early nineteenth century.31 The methods that Cork’s mercantile community 
devised for the provision trade led to it becoming ‘the most advanced meatpacking 
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industry in the eighteenth century world.’32 Cork’s coopering methods were ideally 
suited to handling the high temperatures of the Caribbean. In combination with 
coopering high quality casks, an appropriate preservative pickle was required to 
ensure quality and longevity. The exact composition of this pickle is unknown, but 
Colin Rynne draws a number of clues based on the limited information available. He 
believes that in England salt was refined through boiling on a slow heat, whereas 
the salt refined in Cork was heated on a more moderate heat which produced a 
finer salt.33 As discussed in Chapter Two the preference for finer refined salt over 
British-produced rock salt was not confined to Cork’s merchants, so it is likely a 
combination of local refining methods and better quality salt from Portugal created 
the optimal pickle. 
In 1828 Thomas Courtenay, then vice-president of the Board of Trade, wrote 
to the Committee of Merchants stating his intention to bring a bill before 
parliament regulating the butter trade. This bill was based on suggestions proposed 
by the Committee of Merchants which are unfortunately lost.34 The proposed bill 
sought to regulate the branding of butter and make it an offence to falsify a master 
cooper’s brand. It would also regulate the penalties that could be imposed for 
breaching branding or casking regulations.35 Although this legislation may have 
been brought through by the machinations of the Committee of Merchants, their 
influence was still quite limited. By the time the bill had passed the committee 
stages it had been amended to remove the exemptions that had applied to the 
butter trade in Cork for nearly thirty years.36 Alterations to the butter regulations 
precipitated a number of changes in how the Committee of Merchants regulated 
the butter trade in Cork and the working conditions of the coopers who relied on 
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the butter trade for their income. In October 1829 the Committee convened to 
compose new regulations for the future regulation of the city’s butter trade.37 
From the 1830s onwards Cork’s butter merchants became quite concerned 
with fraudulent Cork branded butter sold on the British market. In April 1833 the 
Committee of Merchants sent an inspector to Liverpool to report on the sale of 
fraudulent butter. The inspector was tasked with engaging with Liverpool 
merchants on the subjects of these breaches. This was part of the Committee’s 
broader push to more stringently control the sale and distribution of Cork-produced 
butter. These controls were to be applied not only to Cork’s merchants and 
suppliers, but also actively enforced by sending representatives to Britain to 
enforce Cork’s brand.38 In 1830 they published a notice directing their butter 
inspectors to remove any of their branding from casks of butter found to have been 
soaked.39 The practice of soaking was used to add weight to the packaged butter, 
and involved leaving the barrel of butter absorb water. This practice damaged the 
quality of the butter as well as injuring the reputation of Cork-produced butter. The 
practice had been earlier prohibited under the 1800 Cork Butter Act. It seems likely 
that the repeal of the exemptions for the Cork butter trade had also had the 
inadvertent effect of removing the prohibition on the use of ‘bog timber’ for the 
construction of butter casks. 
In 1831 the Committee of Merchants produced a resolution to be signed by 
all export merchants in Cork to solely export butter bearing the Cork quality marks. 
The resolution pledged these merchants would only export butter approved by the 
Committee of Merchants and they would not damage or in any other way change 
the assigned quality marks. Forty-six exporters and exporting companies signed the 
pledge. Furthermore, the butter buyers in Cork, with the support of thirty-one of 
their members, also resolved to undertake a similar pledge ‘to uphold and protect 
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the character of the Cork butter in English and Foreign markets.’40 These were not 
empty promises and several cases were taken against individuals accused of 
breaching the resolutions. In 1832 Charles Sugrue was accused of faking brands on 
butter bound for Lisbon, but it was ruled that though a breach in spirit had occurred 
it was unintentional.41 Later that year John Gould was accused of shipping butter to 
Jamaica without appropriate brand marks, but the Committee ruled that no breach 
had occurred as he had merely replaced bad kegs with good ones after the 
branding had been applied.42 The following year Benjamin Tanner was accused of 
making or repairing imitation Cork brands and he was found to have violated an 
agreement made with the export merchants in May 1833, though he was provided 
with the opportunity to rid his name of ‘such infavourable impression’.43 The 
Committee actively pursued alleged breaches of their trade rules and the number 
of reported violations was probably assisted by the promise to reward any 
notification of breaches of branding regulations. Indeed, shortly after the 
publication of a notification promising such rewards William Cannon, a blacksmith 
previously employed by Tanner, accused him of violating those rules. 
Over the course of the 1830s and 1840s the Committee of Merchants’ 
minute books noted any breaches of the regulations. In 1838 a letter was sent from 
London to inform the Committee of how fake casks made to look like those 
produced in Cork were very nearly sent to Sydney.44 In 1842 a Richard Townley in 
Liverpool informed the Committee that Hamburg butter had been shipped abroad 
branded as Cork butter with the usual markings from the Cork weigh house.45 
Despite the Committee’s best efforts frauds continued. Part of the problem was 
that as much of their product was destined for distant markets it was quite difficult 
to prevent their packaging from being misappropriated. Furthermore, the 
Committee relied on self-interest for their enforcement powers. They needed 
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buyers and sellers to have an invested interest in ensuring that butter was not sold 
fraudulently under the Cork brand as they had no actual powers of enforcement. By 
1850 the situation had become more pressing with the Committee receiving 
reports of butter being ‘frequently’ shipped from Cork with misrepresented brand 
marks and the practice spread throughout the south-western ports of Ireland. In an 
attempt to halt this practice they sent five hundred copies of resolutions to 
merchants and traders in London, Liverpool, Bristol, Portsmouth and other ports in 
England. The Committee pushed for the adoption of measures prohibiting the sale 
of any butter marked as Cork butter ‘except such as bears the genuine marks and 
brands of the inspectors and weighmasters appointed by the Committee of 
Merchants of Cork’.46 In essence they wanted their brand of butter to have an early 
form of protected food status! 
According to William Fagan’s statement to the select committee on the 
butter trade in 1826 false brands were never substituted for Cork brands before 
being marketed in Britain. He did, however, state that attempts had been made 
some years prior but the deception was detected and the butter seized.47 Fagan’s 
assertion is difficult to reconcile with the apparent increase in fraud only a few 
years later. It is possible that the regulatory changes in Cork precipitated by the 
1829 Butter Act were a response to a perception that increased fraud could occur. 
There was a noticeable increase in the detection of frauds and the prosecution of 
breaches of regulations from 1830 onwards. However, the increase in detection 
could have resulted from financial incentives being offered for the reporting of any 
such activities and an increased investment in security measures to detect potential 
fraud, both in Cork and in the United Kingdom. Unfortunately the minute books for 
the Committee of Merchants covering the period 1818 to 1829 are no longer 
extant. While the earlier minute books showed more concern with the conditions of 
the transatlantic trade and legislative changes rather than local frauds, the later 
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minute books are fastidious in documenting local and foreign breaches of the Cork 
Butter Market’s marks.  
The 1829 Act removed a substantial weapon in the prevention of fraud from 
the Committee’s arsenal. In practice up to this point only Cork-produced casks 
could be used for the transportation of butter and this helped prevent local frauds. 
It was ultimately the butter firkins that would prove to be the weakness for the 
Committee of Merchants. The coopering of the casks had been strictly and 
successfully regulated to ensure that the pickle held over long distances. However, 
there were no statutory protections for Cork butter and from the 1830s onwards 
there are regular accounts of fraudulent casks, or even the reuse of old Cork 
produced casks, being used to pass off inferior products as Cork butter.48 Moving 
later into the nineteenth century it was the Committee of Merchants’ long-lived 
insistence on retaining the traditional firkin that helped erode Cork’s share of the 
British market, with British consumers showing a preference for the smaller and 
neater packaging of continental suppliers.49 Despite William Fagan’s assertion that 
no fraud was conducted through re-branding of butter, Thomas Fitzgibbon, a 
former butter merchant, stated that he personally knew of frauds being conducted 
in the Cork butter trade, with weight added by using heavier hoops for casking.50 
Discord 
In many respects the Committee of Merchants did their utmost to lobby on 
behalf of the best interests of Cork’s mercantile community. The records show an 
active organisation that undertook a wide variety of measures to further the 
interests of their members on a political level. However, such a powerful 
organisation would not have arisen or had such a long lasting legacy without similar 
efforts closer to home. In the main the Committee’s influence was predominantly 
positive, but such power opens the potential for abuse as well as criticism. 
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Increasingly over the nineteenth century the stringent application of their own self-
created regulatory systems combined with their innate conservatism led to an 
organisation unable to adapt to changing circumstances. A number of incidences 
over the early nineteenth highlighted the potential, if not necessarily the reality, of 
having invested so much power in an organisation that had few checks and 
balances on their actions. Complaints from individual merchants regarding the 
conduct of the Committee of Merchants arose on occasion.  
Although there were several notable incidents during the lifetime of the 
Committee, an 1819 letter to the Chief Secretary of Ireland, Charles Grant, from a 
J.B. Latham details some of the concerns regarding its operation. While some of the 
claims made are unverifiable, the letter does highlight the more dubious practices 
of the committee, as well as the potential for abuse. The letter relates to a petition 
Isaac Hewitt presented to Parliament that year regarding a proposed bill for the 
improvement of Cork harbour, the Ballast Bill.51 Although such a legislative act 
would appear innocuous, especially considering the deplorable state of Cork 
Harbour at the time, the petitioner was quite exercised on the topic. However, 
Latham’s concerns were not with the substance of the bill, but the relationship of 
the Committee of Merchants to the passage of such legislation. Latham alleged that 
the Committee comprised ‘a certain number of merchants self-chosen and self-
called a committee, neither under control of the merchants at large nor choosen 
[sic] by them’.52 Latham continued, complaining that the Committee had appointed 
themselves to the position of levying tolls and enacting trade legislation.53 This was 
true: the political influence of the Committee repeatedly allowed them to gain 
favourable terms for their interests in Parliament. With regards to the levying of 
tolls, the Committee charged for the branding and repacking of butter. These fees 
                                                     






were divided between the Committee, the Harbour Commissioners and the Wide 
Streets Commission.54   
Latham alleged that the committee had mismanaged their position of power 
and that the tolls levied, far from being used for the benefit of Cork’s economic 
development, were ‘sometimes misapplied to the purpose of paying what can only 
be considered private tavern bills’.55 Neither Latham, nor those he was associated 
with, objected to the bill itself. They objected to the Committee of Merchants being 
granted any say in the apportionment of the funds. Latham believed that any funds 
derived thereof would not be entirely committed to improving the harbour of Cork. 
It was his desire that  
the remaining merchant commissioners purported to be added to them under this 
new ballast act shall not, as at present, be name by themselves [sic] subject neither 
to a ballot nor to the control of the merchants at large as all Committee of 
Merchants ought to be.56  
This was in no small part due to the nepotism that he perceived to be at the heart 
of the Committee of Merchants. He noted the ‘extraordinary fact that amongst the 
merchant commissioners in the proposed bill four of them are partners in one 
mercantile house in this town, three another’.57 He also observed that surprisingly 
two of the other merchants had no residence in Cork, instead living in London and 
Newry. 
Notwithstanding any personal grievances or biases Latham may have held it 
is undeniable that at this point in the nineteenth century the political and economic 
power of the Committee of Merchants made them almost unassailable. Their 
unique position in the city’s commercial life, as well as their composition coming 
from the wealthier elements of Cork’s commercial class, left them vulnerable to any 
charges of nepotism or unfair dealings. Latham was not the only merchant to bring 
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to attention some of the more dubious aspects of their dealings. In 1812 a petition 
was placed before the House of Commons complaining that the exemption granted 
to Cork from butter regulations had caused ‘unjust and unequal consequences’.58 
This particular petition concerned the manner through which weighmasters were 
appointed and the funds raised therefrom. The petitioners sought to have one third 
of the revenue raised from the weighing, branding and inspection of the 
weighmasters applied to the improvement of the harbour and river channel.59 This 
petition pre-empted the establishment of the Harbour Commissioners in Cork in 
1813 who from that point received one third of that revenue. The mismanagement 
of these funds was the source of Latham’s ire. In a further complaint regarding 
political interference by the Committee, Thomas Fitzgibbon placed the blame for 
Cork’s decreasing butter in the mid-1820s on restrictions on cask sizes introduced in 
1822. Fitzgibbon did not specify that these changes were brought about by the 
Committee themselves, but it is inconceivable that any such changes could have 
come about without their acquiescence. He alleged that regulatory changes were 
surreptitiously buried in an act for paving and lighting the streets, to the surprise of 
those involved in the butter trade. This change made casks of miniscule variance 
liable for seizure. When asked if he had heard anyone complaining of this law he 
said he had not, ‘because we all feel the necessity of violating the law’.60 Again the 
implementation of this act fell to the weighmasters, under the jurisdiction of the 
Committee of Merchants. 
One of the most enduring issues the Committee of Merchants faced in the 
first half of the nineteenth century was their relationship with the coopers of Cork. 
The coopers held a unique position of power in Cork’s international trade network. 
High quality barrels were required to export all provisions out of Cork and the 
barrels had to be of sufficient quality to last for several years while preserving the 
quality of produce within. The construction, repair and maintenance of barrels was 
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an industry in its own right with large volumes of timber imported for barrel staves 
and large number of hoops imported to bind the barrels. Not only did the coopers 
provide the barrels for Cork-produced provisions, their expertise was also deployed 
to repackage goods for re-export, such as herring, as well as to conduct repairs on 
barrels inspected at the butter market. The coopering trade in the city supported 
several other businesses, such as Harvey, Deaves & Harvey, which imported timber 
for the construction of casks. The importance of wood stave imports to Cork’s 
economy was such that by 1807 Cork had over thirty seven per cent of the national 
stave import business, with that partnership accounting for over twenty per cent of 
the Cork share in the trade.61 
There was almost constant tension between the coopers and the 
merchants, with conflicts arising every few years. Although it was never 
acknowledged in the Committee of Merchant’s papers, they were utterly 
dependent on the skill of Cork’s coopers. Without the proper construction of 
barrels for export their provisions would not hold the brine for preservation or last 
during transit. In some respects the Committee themselves were instrumental in 
giving the coopers so much power. As previously mentioned, the Committee, 
through their political machinations, had ensured that they were exempt from Irish 
butter legislation. This exemption focused on allowing the Committee to enforce 
regulations on the size, construction and type of firkin used for Cork butter. This 
meant that in practice only Cork-coopered barrels were permitted. Of course 
conflict between the coopers and the Committee existed before this legislation 
came into effect. Having such a degree of tacit power in Cork’s provisioning trade 
meant that any dispute with the coopers always had the potential to become a 
crisis for Cork’s commerce.   
For almost a decade, starting in the 1790s, the Committee of Merchants 
faced a series of trade disputes with the coopers. The issue arose with the 
journeymen, who began agitating over pay and conditions. The dispute had its 
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origins in the late 1770s and soon expanded to bridge the passing of the Act of 
Union. In 1776 the Committee sent notices to Dublin, Waterford and Limerick 
declaring that they would not undertake trade with any persons found to have 
employed a Cork journeyman that had broken his agreement with his master. The 
journeyman coopers appear to have breached the wages agreed upon by the 
magistrates in Cork and sought extra compensation for their labour.62 Details on the 
origins of this dispute are scarce but it relates to the retraction of customary 
agreements that provided coopers working in the cellars of merchants with an 
allowance of the produce that was being barrelled. This was known as their 
‘trimming’ allowance. The market price of provisions in Cork city had steadily 
increased over the years and this trimming allowance was a valuable supplement to 
the cooper’s wages.63 The merchants themselves wished to either convert the 
trimming allowance into a monetary figure while removing the allowance on 
repacking, or to limit the allowance granted. The initial issue was resolved by the 
summer of 1784 with the journeymen agreeing to forego the allowance in 
exchange for two shillings and six pence a day for cellar work.64 However, it arose 
again in September of that year, with reports arriving to the Committee that some 
master coopers encouraged their journeymen to refuse the allowance and offered 
them allowances of beef or pork instead.65 The dispute was sometimes violent in 
nature. In 1792 sixty coopers attempted to assault a journeyman cooper who 
abided by the regulations. Those assembled were only dispersed when the master 
cooper chased them away and hit one with an axe.66 In April 1793 the master 
coopers informed the Committee that it was the intent of the journeymen to apply 
for a raise in wages and that they would no longer work in the merchants’ cellars 
until they received a ‘trimming’ allowance of butter.  
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This was the beginning of an escalating series of conflicts between Munster-
based merchants and journeymen coopers. Merchants in Waterford agreed to 
cooperate with Cork’s merchants to try and eradicate the combinations. The 
Freeman’s Journal called it ‘the misfortune of Ireland, to have her prosperity 
considerably retarded by combination’.67 Merchants in these cities would send 
journeymen back to Cork for prosecution if and when they were located. After 
journeymen in Limerick began to decline work in an attempt to force wage 
increases the Committee resolved not to employ such men in Cork.68 The 
Committee resolved to crush any such combinations in their city and went so far as 
to pay for the arrest and prosecution of journeymen found to support trade 
combinations.69 Furthermore the Committee promised to take action against any 
master coopers who perpetuated the practice of trimming. They established a fund 
to support their resolutions and compiled a list of journeyman coopers that could 
be shared amongst affected merchants.70 
Agitation by the coopers subsided at times, but periodically re-emerged. 
However, the nature of the disagreements changed. By the late 1830s the coopers 
accused the Committee of causing a loss in trade through the repeal of the previous 
acts regulating the butter trade. The 1829 removal of Cork’s exemptions had 
dissolved the legislative controls in regulating the size and construction of firkins. 
The changes in the trade environment caused them to labour under ‘a condition 
much worse than that of the Negro apprentice about which we hear of so much 
laudable sympathy’.71 They asserted that this change had led to a situation where 
coopering for the provisioning trade could be undertaken by anyone and the 
relaxation of the laws had led to a situation where ‘any man [was] now able to 
purchase a few logs, or a sugar hogshead can become a master cooper.’72 The 
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reference to a sugar hogshead referred to the change that removed the restriction 
on the size of the barrels and on the manner of their construction. A hogshead 
barrel was six times the size of the traditional firkin and its construction was not as 
skilled as that required for a butter firkin. The butter firkin was designed to be a 
liquid tight container and the size was judged best to allow a farmer fill the firkin 
with fresh butter without a mixture of butter qualities. A sugar barrel was far too 
large to ensure a product of consistent quality and as it was intended for holding 
dry goods would not have held the preservative pickle. The coopers may have used 
hyperbole, but they did touch on some salient points. They accused the merchants 
of seeing  
the evil accruing from an open and unrestricted trade and when you tried (and 
failed) in your regulations that you would at once throw the aegis of your powerfull 
[sic] protection over the Butter trade of this country, for altho it is true that frauds 
do not abound as much at present here, as they did, can the same be said for other 
parts of Ireland.73 
They accused the merchants of being complicit through inaction against the forging 
of the Cork brand in England and the reshipment of Dutch butter. The coopers 
pointed to the contradiction in stringently maintaining the butter acts provisions 
despite the fact that Cork, according to the claimants, was the only place the acts 
were actually applied.74 
The coopers went so far as to bring their disagreement to Parliament. In 
1830 they sent a petition to the House of Commons stating that they were close to 
starvation and sought finance to emigrate to America. They blamed the 1829 Butter 
Act, which, ‘in consequence of it, they had been reduced to a state of the greatest 
distress.’75 MP for Cork, Daniel Callaghan, presented the petition. He recommended 
that funds should be made available to remove them to America, ‘not only for the 
sake of humanity, but also because such a number of distressed persons might at 
any time occasion much mischief in a large commercial city like Cork’.76 It should be 
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noted that Callaghan came from a successful merchant family in Cork and was 
himself a butter merchant. Furthermore, he stated to the Select Committee on the 
Butter Trade of Ireland that the previous regulations were too strict and he would 
have them lessened.77 It is unsurprising that he would support the removal of 
coopers as he himself was a proponent of the removal of many of Cork’s particular 
regulations. Callaghan was not alone in entertaining a degree of scepticism 
regarding the old regulations of the Cork butter market. Thomas Fitzgibbon, a 
former butter merchant, described to the same committee the work the coopers in 
the market did as ‘abominable’ and that it cost far too much. He further alleged 
that the exemption given to Cork had created a ‘monopoly’ for the coopers and 
damaged the city’s trade.78 
Maura Cronin touches on the later stages of the problems Cork’s coopers 
faced. From 1841 to 1901 the numbers of Coopers employed in Cork declined from 
725 to 275.  Cronin argues that this decline was due to several factors: from the 
mid-1850s there was an increasing preference for butter boxes over firkins, there 
was the indirect impact of the post Napoleonic War peacetime slump and finally 
from 1842 tariffs on imported timber contributed.79 By 1843 the coopers again 
began to agitate for more remuneration, but the agricultural society urged the 
Committee of Merchants to let the butter buyers and the coopers to ‘fight it out’ 
amongst themselves.80 However, the problems Cork’s coopers faced, at least in the 
provisioning trade, are more attributable to the 1829 withdrawal of the exemptions 
given to Cork’s butter producers in the production of their firkins. Cork’s coopers 
had for several decades held a virtual monopoly on the production of casks for the 
provisioning trade. This is not to detract from their undeniable skill. Almost all 
commentators on the success of Cork’s international provisioning trade cite the 
construction of the casks as central to its success. However, such a monopoly was 
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destined to end once the Union came into effect. Giving an exemption to Cork’s 
butter trade in terms of casking their goods was anathema to the free trade 
movement and the intention of the Union. It would be hard to reconcile such an 
exemption to the concomitant dismantling of trade restrictions between Ireland 
and Britain. Furthermore, both Cork’s mercantile community and political classes 
advocated for the removal of such an exemption, though those two groups were to 
an extent synonymous. The coopers had a degree of power over the Committee of 
Merchant’s business that was intolerable to the merchants and its removal came as 
a relief. Of course the Committee did try to impose its own regulations on the 
butter trade to make up for the changes in the 1829 act. Quality had to be assured. 
Transportation 
No matter how powerful the body or organisation, the development of a 
strong international trade requires a well-developed and considered transportation 
network. Even though much Irish trade was conducted on international account the 
infrastructure to support regular shipping routes needed to be in place. 
Furthermore, internal trade networks were required. Cork drew from a vast 
hinterland, centred on Cork and parts of Kerry, but encompassing most of Munster. 
Although this land was ideally suited to support the trades that were Cork’s bread 
and butter, it also presented several challenges. West Cork and Kerry have difficult 
terrain over which pack animals and livestock had to traverse. Improvements in 
roads were undertaken from the 1760s onwards and, though ad-hoc, they did leave 
a favourable road network throughout Cork and Kerry. English visitors commented 
on the quality of the road network and its superiority to the roads in many parts of 
England. Unfortunately much of this was down to the extremely limited heavy 
goods traffic on the road so they remained in a good state of repair.81 However, the 
cornerstone of the Industrial Revolution, the one defining innovation that 
immediately comes to mind when it is mentioned, was steam power. The 
applications of steam were multifarious and refinements and improvements led to 
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ever-increasing uses for it, but it was as a motive power that it was best epitomised. 
Steam-powered shipping and railways connected the world in a manner never 
previously envisaged and more than any road network these innovations had the 
potential to revolutionise Cork’s trade networks. 
Before the introduction of steam-powered navigation there was the 
potential for an equally important transport innovation that remained 
underdeveloped in Munster: canals. Canal systems left a far less enduring mark on 
Ireland than Britain. However, several were completed and for a time they were 
considered an invaluable method of transportation. The benefits a canal could bring 
were much the same as those of railways: cheaper transportation, improved 
connectivity and access to raw materials. Not much evidence remains for the 
development of a canal system in Cork, but it was considered and work began 
before the scheme was abandoned. In 1810 Townsend recorded that the only canal 
implemented in County Cork was in Mallow, with the intention of improving 
connectivity to the Duhallow collieries. The route of a canal connecting Cork and 
Limerick had been measured, but he was unable to supply any information 
regarding the costs or requirements for construction.82 It is unsurprising that the 
only constructed canal section in the county was for the use of a colliery. This 
pattern of development also played out in early infrastructural improvements in 
Britain, with isolated mines being connected to urban markets by canal and later by 
rail. 
The canal to which Townsend referred was the same that was mentioned by 
the Cork Mercantile Chronicle in 1802. It was to connect Cork to the Blackwater, 
and from there to Limerick, with an additional dissector connecting to the Mallow 
collieries.83 The proposed route was ambitious to say the least. Dickson notes that 
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this canal would have granted Cork a ‘phenomenal trade network’. However, he 
argues that the endeavour failed because the connection to Limerick would have 
had a two-way impact. Cork would benefit from improved access to goods and 
materials, but would also have to share the benefits of imports gained from Cork’s 
port.84 Reports from the Mercantile Chronicle in 1803 support this argument. It 
mentioned a degree of hostility in Limerick to the proposed canal. The reporter 
stated,  
The advantage of position clearly must be enjoyed by Limerick in the event of 
making the New Canal. She will draw to herself, from the interior of her own fertile 
county, many articles now inaccessible to her from the great difficulty of conveying 
them. She will have the market of Dublin on the one hand, and of Cork on the 
other, and she can play one against the other, from the ease with which she may 
supply both.85  
The hostility in Limerick derived from the opinion that Cork was superior in her 
export capabilities and would drain away the wealth of Limerick. The reporter 
argued that Limerick would benefit from the improved connectivity to Cork as well 
as the improved access to fuel, and ultimately flourish from it. The reporter made 
comparisons to similar constructions in Holland, Scotland and England, as well as 
the development of other inland transport networks, such as roads: 
Let us suppose that no road had ever existed between this city and Limerick, and 
that it were proposed to make one, what sort of a dolt would that man be 
considered, who should object to it, least all the bullocks of the county of Limerick 
should run away to Cork and leave the city of Limerick without beef? What is a 
canal but a road?86   
However, there was a far more compelling reason for the failure of this canal, 
detailed in a report that submitted to the Chief Secretary’s Office. In 1821 a report 
was compiled on the subject of a railroad for the Dromagh Collieries to improve 
both the access to coal and lime for the surrounding tillage districts and the sales at 
the colliery. Sales had collapsed from eighty pounds to eighty shillings a day in a few 
short weeks due to the banking crisis that begun in Cork in 1820. This report 
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detailed the proposed canal network Townsend referenced as it was supposed to 
connect to those collieries (see Map 4-1).  
 
Map 4-1 Proposed Canal route (in red) overlaid on the 1838 assessment of the Relative quantities of 
traffic in Ireland87 
The report’s compilers, John Killaly and Alexander Nimmo, identified several 
reasons for the failure of the canal, which had been authorised in the dying days of 
the Irish Parliament. Those in charge of the works commenced cutting the canal 
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between Dromagh and Mallow for about three and a half miles.88 The location 
chosen to commence work was  
neither at the sea where as far as it might proceed it would have been of 
immediate benefit for commercial purposes, not at the collieries to which it would 
have been of vital advantage, but mid-way where they began a canal of great 
breadth and depth and after purchasing thro’ the best lands and expending many 
thousands what was executed has never been used.89 
The idea for starting the work in such a bizarre location was as cynical as it was 
stupid. According to Killaly and Nimmo’s account the work commenced there to 
force parliament to complete the entire construction and not to withdraw financing 
after a viable length of canal opened. The outbreak of the Napoleonic Wars 
improved the levels of employment and the prices available for the produce that 
was to be transported along this route. This led to the suspension of construction 
after heavy investment, though apparently work was not abandoned entirely. At 
this point attempts were made to induce investment from landlords whose estates 
were contiguous with the route, but this failed and no alternative sources of 
funding were located when the government of the day declined further support for 
the project.90  
It is difficult to see how this canal could have been completed without 
government financing. If the construction had begun in a more amenable location, 
rather than one which was chosen for cynical rather than commercial reasons, it is 
possible that some alternative sources of funding could have been secured. Given a 
more viable location, some landlords may have seen some benefit in investing in a 
route that had the potential to generate revenues. However, this is supposition 
and, as Lee has demonstrated in his work on investment in the Irish rail network, it 
was not guaranteed that indigenous capital could be found to bear the initial 
construction costs once government support disappeared. The pattern Lee 
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identified was that English investment came in first to bear the initial risk and only 
once profitability was demonstrated did Irish capital buy out the English 
investment.91 The major appeal in investing privately in this canal was government 
subvention, with the government advancing a third on the subscriptions. This 
meant that an investment of one hundred pounds by a private individual would 
gain them canal stock worth one hundred and fifty pounds.92 The total expense of 
this endeavour was estimated at two hundred and ten thousand pounds.93 
Furthermore, up to the point when the report was compiled, the economy of the 
region was in rude health, but wartime prices were declining. Funding dried up due 
to the prices on offer, making the canal appear a diminishing return to government. 
It is hard to imagine landlords financing an expensive project such as a canal in a 
period of decline as there was no guarantee it would turn a profit.  
Despite the collapse of this canal in the early years of the nineteenth 
century the topic sporadically arose in newspapers until the eventual opening of rail 
communications. In 1833 the Southern Reporter, while discussing a proposed 
railroad between Limerick and Waterford, noted that due to this proposed railroad 
and a government investment of one hundred thousand pounds for the 
improvement of the Shannon there were renewed calls for the recommencement 
of work on this canal. The article also stated that they had no idea as to why the 
canal was cancelled, whether because of Westminster or otherwise.94 The 
construction of the canal would have been a phenomenal capital project for 
Munster as it would have opened up a cheap transportation network between 
Limerick, Cork and Waterford. As plans were already in place to improve 
communications on the Blackwater from Youghal the canal would have connected 
three major ports directly, facilitating improved internal and external trade. 
However, considering the costs of such a project it is difficult to picture the British 
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government continuing to finance it as the Napoleonic Wars progressed. While the 
canal would have connected the major commercial towns in the region, it is hard to 
envisage it having a wider impact. Canals were useful for transporting large bulky 
materials, such as mineral deposits. Munster had no such resources of major 
significance. Perhaps it would have changed the dynamic of the relationship 
between the farmers producing butter and the butter buyers, as it would be easier 
for the farmers to bring their produce directly to market, but even if that occurred 
it would be limited to a confined area. It is far more significant to note the inability 
to secure private finance for this project, despite public discussion of its benefits in 
the newspapers. This problem in capital investment was one that resurfaced 
repeatedly over the nineteenth century and made it difficult to undertake large 
scale infrastructural projects in Ireland without significant government backing. 
Quays and waterways 
The proposed canal would have created an invaluable internal route for 
transport and communication. Of more direct importance to Cork’s development 
was the state of the quays and harbour of the city. As sea connections were the 
cornerstone of Cork’s commercial success it would be easy to assume that this 
meant a consistent level of care was taken of the port facilities. However, Cork’s 
quays suffered from an inconsistent level of maintenance. The first two decades of 
the nineteenth century saw repeated petitions for money to improve the port and 
harbour. By 1815 the situation was such that Lloyds Coffee House transmitted a 
warning that the river and quays of Cork were deemed unsafe. This lead to a 
memorandum from the port authorities stating that since 1790 the political 
disturbances in both Ireland and abroad had led to the interruption of many public 
works and since that time no money had been made available for necessary 
repairs.95 
The quays had been in a poor state for several decades by 1813. John 
Curwen, visiting Cork in that year stated, ‘the quays do not correspond with the 
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opulence and importance of the place, nor did I see these improvements carrying 
on, which in other places we have noticed with pleasure’.96 The river was too 
shallow for larger vessels to make the journey from Passage West to the city and 
required lighters to carry goods the rest of the distance. The navigation wall was in 
a poor state of repair and the quays were poorly constructed.97 The Harbour 
Commissioners were established in 1813 to maintain and repair the conditions of 
the upper harbour of Cork, but lack of finances and the poor condition of the 
facilities meant that for the first fifteen years of their existence they predominantly 
concerned themselves with repairing existing quays and the navigation wall.98 The 
initial establishment of the Harbour Commissioners comprised the membership of 
the mayor, sheriffs, and twenty-one merchants of the city. An 1820 act expanded 
this membership to encompass the MPs for Cork city, the mayor, sheriffs, five 
members of the city council and twenty-five merchants.99 
Despite the establishment of the Harbour Commissioners many of the 
maintenance issues remained unaddressed and by 1820 a petition was sent to the 
Lord Lieutenant seeking money to improve the port’s connectivity. The petition 
lamented that ships were required to discharge cargo to lighters two miles outside 
of the city due to the shallowness of the approaches and that improving them 
would ‘probably be the immediate occasion of an increased intercourse between 
this city and England.’100 This particular entry in the port books is telling, as they 
specifically discussed the benefits of trade with England rather than elsewhere. This 
may have been merely diplomatic phrasing, as the Lord Lieutenant was the official 
representative of the monarch and they were more likely to receive monies for 
improvements by appealing to the benefits of trade with Britain rather than France 
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or the Continent. However, it may also reflect the increasing volumes of trade 
conducted with Britain as well as the decline in trans-Atlantic and continental trade. 
The state of Cork’s harbour was a long-running concern of the city’s 
denizens. The port was the main arterial route for almost all aspects of the city’s 
economy. In 1819 Thomas Cuthbert, then president of the Committee of 
Merchants, forwarded a solicitation for a parliamentary bill to improve the 
condition of the harbour. The proposal argued that the river channel had been 
problematic since at least 1761, with long periods of neglect leading it to becoming 
choked up and seriously impeding navigation. Although money was provided to 
rectify some of these issues at the time the finance had not continued. The river 
and harbour had been neglected since then and the obstructions had returned to 
the extent that at times parts of the navigable portions of the channel were dry. 
Although Cuthbert sought a parliamentary bill to improve conditions it is difficult to 
see this issue other than one related to normal accretion of a river channel and an 
issue that Cork was simply unable to alleviate on its own. The proposal contained a 
lengthy discussion of the practice of vessels discharging ballast at will into the river 
and stated that the people who supplied ballast were ‘men of the lowest rank in 
life’ who had no concern regarding the problems they caused, including allegedly 
removing material from the quay walls for ballast.101 Some funds were diverted 
from the weigh house dues for the upkeep of the harbour, river and quays under 
the management of the Harbour Commissioners, but these limited funds were 
barely sufficient to maintain the quays. The petitioners sought to secure a fund for 
the repair and upkeep of the harbour under the management of the Harbour 
Commissioners and a body of twenty-seven mercantile men (the Committee of 
Merchants). This was vital to the future of the city as Lloyds considered Cork a 
riskier harbour that that of London.102 
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Based on the petition, Nicholas Colthurst had brought a bill before 
parliament to improve the harbour on the 5th of June, 1819.103 Five days later a 
petition against the bill was submitted.104 Over the following month a deep 
disagreement emerged between the desires of the Committee of Merchants and 
those of other merchants in Cork. On the second reading of the proposed bill MP 
for Cork, Christopher Hely Hutchinson, stated that he had letters both supporting 
and opposing the bill from Cork’s mercantile community. Part of the opposition 
stemmed from the increases in taxation that improvements to the harbour would 
require. Hutchinson believed that the division in the opinions of Cork’s merchants 
stemmed from finances. He argued that it would not be the wealthy merchant who 
would feel the increase in taxation, but the more humble merchant. The opposition 
to this bill, aided by the strength of a petition presented by Isaac Hewitt of the 
Hewitt distilling family, caused the bill to be voted down at this stage.105 The Hewitt 
family were wealthy and influential distillers in Cork city. Their petition protesting 
the harbour improvement bill was the same one Latham referred to in his protest 
against the Committee of Merchants. Latham’s complaints centred on alleged 
mismanagement of funds by the Committee of Merchants, whereas Hutchinson 
stated that the opposition was based on taxation. This can be reconciled by the 
manner through which the weigh house charges of the Committee of Merchants 
were distributed, with 1/3 being ostensibly for the maintenance of the harbour. It is 
likely that this was the cost Hutchinson referred to and the mismanaged funds 
alleged by Latham. Having Isaac Hewitt present the opposing petition gives 
credence to the view that the Committee of Merchants, far from representing the 
best interest of Cork’s mercantile community, was in fact a domineering force in 
the local economy. One letter from a relatively unknown individual called Latham 
could be considered a fringe, but the Hewitts were not on the fringes of Cork’s elite. 
It seems, at least around the period from 1819 to 1823 that the Committee of 
Merchants were, in the minds of some residents of the city, over stepping their 
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remit in an unforgivable manner. According to allegations made against them in the 
1826 commission into the butter trade, they had slipped extra details for the 
regulation of the butter trade into an act for improving and widening the streets of 
Cork.106  It was difficult to see such actions as anything but a deliberate obfuscation 
of the remit of purpose of the Committee of Merchants. 
In 1821 a civil engineer Mr. Killaly (presumably John Killaly who undertook 
surveys for the Chief Secretary’s Office for public works) submitted a report to the 
Port Commissioners outlining some of the works required to upgrade the port. His 
plan outlined creating a new river channel, dredged to eighteen foot, a basin and 
lock at the terminus of the channel capable of holding twenty-five ships, a floating 
dock, upgraded quays that could facilitate fifty vessels, and a canal beginning near 
Blackpoint. Overall he estimated that these improvements would cost £103,500, 
which he considered ‘a sum very small in proportion to the advantages which the 
trade of Cork and the revenues of the Kingdom would derive there from’.107 The 
improvement of the city’s quays and docks was a long-standing concern of all 
parties involved in trade. At various points in the early 1820s ship owners, brewers 
and the trustees of the corn market met separately with the Port Commissioners to 
push for the improvement of the city’s dock facilities. However, the Port 
Commissioners remained unconvinced of the importance of dry dock facilities and 
argued in March 1823 that the erection of a dry dock at Passage West was a private 
concern and not a matter for public involvement.108 The following year they 
decided that a wet dock was of general utility and worth consideration, but the 
sweeping improvements Killaly advocated did not occur. Between 1827 and 1834 
£34,389 was expended improving the city’s quays and navigation.109 A large sum, 
but nowhere near the £103,000 Killaly estimated proper repairs and improvements 
would cost. 
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The facilities for shipping in Cork continued to be topical issues throughout 
the decades. Despite the Port Commissioners rejecting the proposals for a dry dock 
as something that should be privately funded, agitation continued. In 1832 the 
Committee of Merchants met to consider an application to Lord Lieutenant W. 
Packer for assistance in creating a dry dock at Passage West for larger vessels. The 
Committee of Merchants communicated their support for this proposal as they 
thought such a construction in Passage West would not interfere with the rights of 
those about to erect patent slips.110 The timing of this proposal was almost certainly 
related to the removal of the naval depot at Cove. MP for Cork, Callaghan 
presented complaints from Cork’s denizens to Parliament. The complainants stated 
that the Union had deprived them of many advantages, that all nationality had 
been destroyed and Ireland was now a ‘conquered province’ rather than a country 
that was formerly a kingdom. Of course the main element of the complaint was 
financial. The complainants alleged that as there was chronic underspending from 
the military budget in Cove, property values would deteriorate due to the removal 
of the depot and ships of war could no longer be repaired there causing loss of 
employment.111 The petition attempted to fill the gap left by the removal of the 
depot and to enable Cork to have proper ship repair facilities within the harbour. 
Callaghan alleged that the types of repairs previously carried out in Cork were being 
redirected to Portsmouth. Frederick Trench supported this opinion, stating that 
removing the depot from Cove would ‘rob the country of the prodigious advantages 
of having the means to repair ships of war at Cork’.112 
Although in the early stages of the nineteenth century Cork had one of the 
strongest ship building and repair facilities in Ireland it suffered from a number of 
issues that impeded development and by the 1840s Belfast overtook Cork in 
tonnage built.113 The poor conditions of the upper harbour prevented larger ships 
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from progressing much past Passage. Many of the raw materials for ship 
construction were imported; ship hulls, masts, oars and trunnels or treepegs from 
Portugal, Norway, Prussia and the Americas.114 However, the volumes of these 
imports were quite small, reflecting the focus of the industry on fishing vessels.115 
More importantly, Cork’s industry failed to capitalise on early innovations and 
developments in indigenous ship construction.  
Despite Cork-built ships having a poor reputation a number of innovations 
occurred in Cork during the first half of the nineteenth century. In 1816 William 
Hennessy, after constructing the first Irish-built paddle steamer, completed a 
second powered by a Hive Iron Works engine, the first marine engine built in 
Ireland.116 A dry dock at Passage West, possibly the same one Packer proposed in 
1832, operated by William Brown was completed in the mid-1830s and it could 
accommodate large ships of up to 1,200 tons. By the 1850s this dock had been 
expanded and renamed the Royal Victoria Dockyard.117  One of the most promising 
developments was the amalgamation of R. J. Lecky’s Steam Packet Iron Works and 
Engineering Establishment with the Beale family’s iron mills. This led to the first 
construction of an iron hulled ship in the city, soon followed by the construction of 
screw steamers.118 However, for a port that relied so heavily on shipping for its 
commerce it is surprising not that such innovations took place, but that there was 
not a stronger link between the commercial merchants and the burgeoning 
engineering industry. Cork’s merchants had the finance to underwrite such 
innovations and they also needed shipping. It is interesting to speculate what may 
have become of Cork’s trade network if the Committee of Merchants had invested 
as much into promoting local engineering enterprises as they did petitioning 
Westminster to construct new packet stations and railway networks in Britain. The 
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surprise in Cork’s ship building industry is not in the innovations that occurred 
there, but that the mercantile community failed to capitalise on them. 
Steam Packets 
By 1822 discussions had begun on the viability of opening up a steam packet 
route between the West of England and the South of Ireland. the Committee of 
Merchants were vocal in suggesting that if, as proposed, the existing packet station 
was moved from Milford to Bristol Cork would be a more suitable location for a 
station in Ireland than Dunmore. They demonstrated the usual zeal for the interests 
of their city:  
I shall not dwell upon the geographic position of our port, it being obviously the 
centre of the South, but I must take the liberty to observe that its being the naval 
rendezvous of Ireland, the residence of an admiral, and the chief Irish arsenal, are 
circumstances which plainly indicate its peculiar fitness for a packet station… and in 
time of war… the importance of a direct and speedy communication between Cork 
and Bristol must appear to their Lordships very obvious.119 
On 25 June 1825 Lecky gave notice to the Port Commissioners that steam packets 
from Bristol and Liverpool were shortly expected to arrive and carry on a regular 
trade with Cork.120 This marked the point when steam transportation made its 
regular appearance in the trade of Cork city, though a number of years passed 
before the impact was truly felt. The importance of the steam packet services 
increased dramatically, but in the early years the service to Cork was far from ideal. 
The organisation of the packet station routes to the South of Ireland was a 
long process. Although issues surrounded the Milford packet station there were still 
packet routes out of Cork city and they depended predominantly on transporting 
cargo for their profitability.121 As early as 1825 petitions from the inhabitants of 
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Pembroke cited the importance of the Milford Haven packet station for ensuring 
communications with Ireland. They focused especially on Cork as ‘the great 
rendezvous of the American and West Indian Trade’.122 In the mid-1820s there was 
unhappiness with the packet service available; it proved so unreliable that there 
were reports of the commercial interests in Cork and Limerick relying on sending 
their post to Holyhead via Dublin rather than from Waterford to Milford.123 
Furthermore there were reports of long delays in dispatches received in London 
due to the lack of a communication facility with London in Cork.124 This issue was 
not resolved appropriately and by 1829 the Committee of Merchants wrote to the 
Duke of Wellington to complain about the irregularity and insufficiency of the 
steam packet service between Holyhead and Dublin.125 Milford was the least 
frequented of all the routes to Ireland and the most expensive to the public at a 
cost of £12,000 a year. Abolishing the station was considered in 1834, but rejected 
both due to the potential opposition in both Milford and Waterford, as well as the 
need to keep direct communication with the South of Ireland.126 
By 1836 a new steamship company was established in Cork, The Cork Steam 
Packet Company, ‘for the purpose of trading and carrying goods, merchandize and 
passengers between the Port of Cork and such other port or ports’.127 The new 
company had an initial capital of £100,000 available for the purchase of vessels. It 
was a locally created venture. A very large proportion of the initial subscriptions 
were issued to people with Cork as their place of residence and they comprised of a 
broad section of Cork society. Of those that provided professions there were 
merchants, auctioneers, glue manufacturers, ship owners, confectioners, 
cabinetmakers, farmers, builders, vintners, and servants. There were few 
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nineteenth century occupations that were not represented on the list. 
Furthermore, the addresses of those not normally resident in Cork highlight the 
most important locations for Cork’s commerce with investors from Bristol, 
Liverpool, Dublin and Birmingham listed.128 Cork was still a prosperous port city and 
it benefitted foreign investors to have a stake in the transportation of goods from 
the city to England. Over the centuries there had been a consistent level of shipping 
between Cork city and England and there was no reason to think that would abate. 
Furthermore, proposed railway lines tantalisingly promised future increases in 
trade.  
The introduction of steam packet services between Ireland and Britain soon 
became essential for the further growth of commerce. Cork’s mercantile 
community were active not just in the development of indigenous services but also 
in furthering the expansion of packet services in England. In December 1841 a 
meeting of those interested in developing communications between Cork and the 
South of England met with a deputation from Bristol. This meeting agreed that the 
packet service that operated between Milford and Waterford was ‘totally useless’ 
and that ‘any communication from any point of England thro Waterford [would] be 
useless to the South and South West of Ireland, comprising the great counties of 
Cork, Kerry, and Limerick’.129 The Committee gave their support to a proposed 
packet station at Portishead, as long as it connected to Cork,  
but if it shall be designed to [send] the intercourse through any other Irish port, 
such line of intercourse would decidedly be hostile to our interests and so 
subversive of every due or first consideration.130 
It is unsurprising that merchants in Cork and in Bristol showed a preference for 
opening a new intercourse from Portishead to Cork that would remove the Milford 
to Waterford packet.  
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Part of the problem with the latter route was that mail had to transit 
overland from Waterford to Cork. The mail was sent as far as Clonmel on the 
Limerick coach, was offloaded in Clonmel and then picked up by the Dublin to Cork 
coach for delivery. This route meant that evening mail that arrived in Waterford 
could take nearly twenty three hours to make the journey to Cork.131 An 1842 
report on post office communication found that the existing packet route via 
Milford was inefficient. The report argued that Cork was superior in terms of 
population, had higher passenger numbers, greater safety within the harbour, and 
most importantly a rendezvous point for outbound vessels. However, the 
committee refrained from making any specific recommendation on changing packet 
stations.132 
As shown in Table 4-1, by 1838 several regular steam services operated from 
Cork to trading cities in England. The size and traffic out of Cork was reflected in the 
number of routes. The Dublin and Glasgow Steam Packet Company stopped in 
Dublin before continuing to Glasgow, providing an important connection between 
Cork and the capital. Phearsall has called this period in the development of steam 
services in the Irish Sea as the ‘first railway’ period.133 It was predominantly based 
upon a number of small businesses. Table 4-1 shows four companies that operated 
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Returns Relating to Government and Merchant Steam Vessels 
Company Ship Route Tonnage  
City of Dublin Steam Packet 
Company Margaret Liverpool 370 
The St. George Steam Packet 
Company Herald London 174 
The St. George Steam Packet 
Company Emerald Isle London 220 
The St. George Steam Packet 
Company Victory Bristol 256 
The St. George Steam Packet 
Company City of Bristol Bristol 209 
The St. George Steam Packet 
Company William IV Bristol 176 
The St. George Steam Packet 
Company Ocean Liverpool 207 
The St. George Steam Packet 
Company Juno London & Bristol 362 
The St. George Steam Packet 
Company Sirius London 411 
Dublin and Glasgow Steam 
Packet Company Arab 
Dublin & 
Glasgow 213 
Dublin and Glasgow Steam 
Packet Company Mercury 
Dublin & 
Glasgow  
City of Cork Proprietors Eagle (Iron) Cove 119 
City of Cork Proprietors Air Cove 71 
City of Cork Proprietors Lee Cove 87 
City of Cork Proprietors Waterloo Cove & Kinsale 47 
City of Cork Proprietors City of Cork Cove  59 
City of Cork Proprietors Shannon Deepening River 57 
Table 4-1 Returns Relating to Government and Merchant Steam Vessels134 
As well as furthering their interests in the development of steam packets 
between Cork and Bristol, the Committee of Merchants again demonstrated that 
they were not prone to sentiment. Only a few short years after they had lent their 
support to a Portishead route they sent a memorial to the commissioners in charge 
of constructing harbours of refuge along the English coast. They sought more direct 
communications between Cork and London so they could capitalise on the new 
railway lines being constructed in Ireland. As always if their petition was not 
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acceded to, they maintained that ‘this great commercial city will lose the position it 
has hitherto maintained as the Southern Capital of Ireland’.135 The source of this 
complaint was the tidal nature of the River Avon, which meant that at certain times 
it could add over twelve hours to the journey to London. This weakened the 
potential value of rail travel in England to Southern Irish merchants. The merchants 
desired improvements to the port at Padstow as it was closer to Cork. Not only 
that, the petitioners wanted a London to Padstow railway and to reduce the transit 
time from ‘the Capital of the South of Ireland’ to London to twenty hours.136 This 
would make the transit between Cork and London almost the same as between 
Cork and Dublin.  
Rail was arguably more important in the development of Cork’s commerce 
than steam services. A reliable steam service had great advantages in granting rapid 
transit across the Irish Sea and helped improve Cork’s connections with the major 
British ports. However, Cork already had strong connections and regular sail 
services to these ports. The introduction of internal rail networks, first in Britain and 
then in Ireland, gave greater opportunities for penetrating the internal British 
market. Furthermore, it helped to encourage increased exportation of more 
perishable goods as well as increasing the livestock trade. It was well and good to 
get produce to the British ports as long as re-exportation to foreign destinations 
was the intent, but penetrating the British market required railways. 
Rail 
‘Do not talk about the broad streets of Cork, when the question is of the broad 
gauge through Ireland.’ — Benjamin Disraeli137 
One of the earliest discussions of rail in Cork in the Committee of Merchants 
minutes was in 1834, though undoubtedly private discussions had taken place prior 
to this. The Committee received a delegation from England, which had come to 
                                                     
135 ‘Committee of Merchants Minute Book, May 1837-March 1857’ 18 Mar 1845. Committee of 
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discuss the Great Western Railway Company and a line connecting Bristol and 
London. The Committee resolved that the idea was ‘an object of great interest to 
the landed proprietors of Southern Ireland’.138 A rail link between Bristol and 
London would increase the connectivity between Cork and London, because, 
combined with the steam tramps across the Irish Sea, Cork would be in a position to 
profit from Bristol’s connectivity with the Imperial capital. The 1830s saw much 
petitioning from Cork and Bristol based merchants to improve their respective 
cities’ connections both to London and each other. The commercial interests of 
these two cities presented a unified force and a testament to their long-standing 
partnership in the trans-Atlantic trade. A year and a half after this the Committee 
approved fifty pounds to survey a potential railway route between Cork and 
Limerick, though their reticence in investing in the ultimate expense of such a 
project is indicated by the caveat that the sum would only be paid upon completion 
of the survey.139 If the Committee truly believed that there were substantial gains 
to be made from such a route they would have been more forthcoming with their 
finances. As demonstrated by the failure to secure private funding for the Cork to 
Limerick canal, Cork’s wealthier classes exhibited an inherent reticence to finance 
such immense projects. They were more than happy to lend their support to 
projects undertaken at others’ expense or projects in Britain that would benefit 
their interests, but this support did not mean they would finance such projects 
themselves.  
Their fiscal conservatism was seen in a discussion of the project in 
December 1835, where they suggested that the 
Committee should attentively observe the course of these proceedings and 
cautiously examine into the probable success of the undertaking, previous to giving 
it sanction as an advantageous investment of capital.140 
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Rail connections may have been the future, and the merchants could see the 
potential gains in term of British rail connectivity, but they were not men who easily 
parted with their money without a guaranteed return. Yet again this is an example 
of a perennial issue in terms of Irish investment patterns that Lee identified.141   
The Second Report of the Second Railway Commissioners of Ireland contains 
valuable information regarding the state of trade and transport in Ireland for the 
mid-1830s. However, this data contains over-estimations of the true figures for Irish 
trade, though mainly related to trade goods.142 Nonetheless it provides a good 
sense of the contemporaneous state of Cork’s transport infrastructure. The report 
puts the population of Cork at 110,000 and estimates that the city handled 400,000 
tons of traffic per year.143 It supports the trend of declining exports of processed 
meat products discussed in earlier chapters, but suggests that this was balanced by 
increased exports of livestock and cereal exports, as well as increased importation 
of tea and textiles. The advent of steam vessels had led to some of these changes, 
as it was previously impractical to transport some goods by sailing vessels.144 An 
example of such a trade is livestock. The transportation of livestock by sail vessels, 
combined with the requirement to both herd them across land to the point of 
embarkation and again to their destination from the point of discharge led to the 
loss of weight in transit and a commensurate decline in market value. The advent of 
both steam tramps on the Irish Sea and improved rail connectivity internally in 
Britain decreased the time in transit and therefore the loss of value. The Railway 
Commissioners held the opinion that  
to give full effect to this superior means of transport, and to render in advantages 
generally and extensively available to the country, it is of the first importance to 
improve and extend the communications from the great ports to the interior.145 
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Due to the population distribution of Ireland and the structure of the Irish economy 
their recommendation was to send the main trunk line through the centre of 
Munster and on to Cork. The proposed railway route was to undertake a ‘highly 
objectionable’ gradient into Cork city, but by connecting the railroad to the harbour 
it would take advantage of the new quays constructed in Passage West.146 The 
arguments in favour of the Cork and Limerick railway were the same as those made 
for the canal. It would greatly benefit rural agriculture, improve connectivity to 
Dublin and England, and benefit distribution from the main shipping ports.  
The Railway Commissioners’ report considered the viability of improving 
Irish internal communications. They concluded that Ireland was of little importance 
for the trans-Atlantic trade by the 1830s as they saw no way that vessels leaving 
Irish ports could compete with those leaving Britain. However, there was an 
inherent value in developing a railway connection between Cork and Dublin to 
facilitate British ships calling there on the trans-Atlantic voyage. Cork was identified 
over Berehaven, Valentia and the Shannon as it united the advantages of a well 
situated port with the benefits of improved internal Irish communication. The 
Commissioners estimated that a Dublin to Cork line would reduce the transit time 
for packages from London to Cork from three days to twenty-nine hours and similar 
savings in time would be made for other major British cities. Improving the 
communications of Cork would create  
a more certain, expeditious and convenient, if not a cheaper communication would 
be effected with America than from any port of Great Britain directly… we may 
then safely urge the construction of these railways as a consideration of national 
importance.147 
Part of the reason this construction of a packet station in Ireland was considered of 
‘national importance’ for the United Kingdom was the potential loss of American 
commerce to continental Europe due to the growth of Le Harve. Improving Ireland’s 
internal communications and the transit across the Irish Sea opened the possibility 
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for trade with North American being ‘accelerated to the utmost degree’. It was 
agreed that Cork was the most convenient port in Ireland for trans-Atlantic trade.148 
Although the nature of the trans-Atlantic trade had changed dramatically during the 
early nineteenth century Cork’s position on the Irish coast still had benefits to 
confer. Whereas in the eighteenth century it was as a provisioning stop due to the 
expertise developed by Irish merchants, by the 1830s the importance of Cork to the 
trans-Atlantic trade was diminishing. Cork’s location on the southern coast, 
combined with its harbour, were still of some use, especially in the development of 
postal communication routes to England and to America.  
The financing of railways in Ireland was not without criticism. Private capital 
in Ireland was notoriously difficult to secure for large infrastructure projects. This 
was demonstrated by the ignoble end of the Cork canal project and it was also true 
of railway investment. Lord Morpeth sought parliament to advance two and a half 
million pounds to construct the Dublin to Cork line, but this met with vocal criticism 
from Peel. He asserted that he was not opposed to the financing per se, but was in 
favour only if he thought Ireland would derive proportionate benefit from such an 
outlay. Ireland’s comparative poverty was no rationale for financing the project, as 
Wales was similarly poor. Peel’s opposition represented a political opinion on 
Ireland that would devastate the country in a few short years. He opposed the 
project because ‘it would prevent them [the Irish] from relying on their own efforts, 
and teach them to lean always on the government’.149 Peel argued that Ireland’s 
wealthy classes should fund improvements to internal communication themselves, 
rather than relying on government bonds. It was this reliance that partially led to 
the failure of the canal four decades earlier, as once public money was withdrawn 
investment dwindled. Irish opinions were best expressed some years later when the 
Cork Examiner attributed the poor levels of investment into the Cork and Fermoy 
railway to English ignorance of Irish affairs.150 
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Committee of Merchants’ interest in developing rail communications 
disproportionately focused on developments in England. In 1845 they lent their 
support to planned railway lines in Liverpool, Bury, Cornwall, Devon and Lancashire 
so they could ‘supply with Irish produce the importation towns of Wigan, Bolton, 
Bury, Heywood and Rochdale and their vicinities’.151 This change reflects the 
growing importance of the English markets for Cork. Rather than looking across the 
Atlantic for commercial opportunities, or seeking to open new ventures in foreign 
countries, they now focused on the internal British markets that the rapidly 
expanding rail network opened up. These markets were previously outside the 
purview of the Committee of Merchants. They were too distant from the major port 
cities of England to be within reach and the effort was hardly worthwhile when 
there was a more profitable route in selling to port based merchants for 
transhipment across the ocean. Ironically the advent of the age of mass 
communications limited the view of Cork’s mercantile body rather than expanding 
it.  
Conclusion 
1844 saw the beginning of Cork’s entry into what has been termed the 
second industrial revolution, though for Cork it was the beginning of the decline of 
the city’s commercial and industrial innovations. On the 4th of May 1844 Lecky’s 
yard launched the first iron hulled ship in the port.152 Later that year the provisional 
committee for the Bandon and Cork railway was established to petition for a new 
railway connection. Also in 1844 the act to build the Great Southern and Western 
Railway line was passed, though it would take several more years before the lines 
reached the city.153  
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As previous chapters have demonstrated, Cork played a peripheral but 
important role in Western Europe’s trans-Atlantic trade in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth century. While it would be inaccurate to argue that Cork was 
representative of the experience of Ireland as a whole, it did represent the 
experience of the more economically developed urban environments in Ireland, 
such as Dublin and Belfast. Cork leveraged its ideal geographic location, the political 
niche Ireland held in the British Empire and regional agricultural and production 
specialities to create a unique commercial identity. However, despite these 
advantages trade from the city remained based upon a limited range of goods and 
services and this limited base was not used to develop new economic or industrial 
specialities. In many respects this is not surprising. The proximity to Britain and 
prevalence of British shipping took away much of the incentive to further 
industrialise. As a peripheral location Cork, and indeed Ireland as a whole, could 
have potentially developed a more sustainable industrial base, but unlike most of 
the peripheries of the Empire the proximity to the core economy took away at least 
some of the incentive to do so. Furthermore, as British legislation repeatedly 
demonstrated from the late seventeenth century onwards, there was a degree of 
apprehension as well as unwillingness in London to encourage or facilitate 
industrial development in Ireland. It was potentially both an economic threat and 
an Achilles’ heel in Britain’s engagement with Europe.  
This is not to place sole responsibility for industrial stagnation on Britain. 
Within Cork there was a noticeable lack of divestment of finance, with potentially 
lucrative capital projects such as the canal floundering without private investment. 
The Committee of Merchant’s themselves also suffered from a myopic view of 
Cork’s commercial networks. They relied almost exclusively on legislative 
interference from Westminster combined with internal regulation to forward their 
commercial interests. This was a heavy-handed approach that earned the ire of 
some of Cork’s commercial community. The structure of the Committee itself also 
left them open to charges of nepotism and mismanagement of funds. Within Cork 
such charges were irritating, but when this local opposition had the power to 
petition parliament it led to the disruption of bills that could have benefitted the 
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city. Some of the opposition, as evidenced by Latham’s complaints, stemmed not 
from fundamental disagreements with the legislation itself, but with the Committee 
of Merchant’s involvement. By the 1820s the Committee showed signs of becoming 





In 1843 the Freeman’s Journal printed an article on the state of Ireland’s 
trade in light of the ongoing treaty negotiations between Britain and Portugal. The 
author directed the readership to consider the views of Cork’s Committee of 
Merchants who had expended considerable energy on the protection of Irish trade. 
The author argued that ‘We [Ireland] have not much trade unfortunately left to us. 
Whatever remains is day by day departing, strangled by some measure of 
protection, or some provision for the extension of the commerce of “the empire”’.1 
British interference had devastated Ireland’s commercial development and 
deprived the country of its ability to maintain pre-existing trade relationships. 
Britain had undermined Irish commerce in favour of developing Imperial markets. If 
this entailed curtailing Ireland’s trade in the pursuit of other markets so be it. While 
there is a certain degree of truth to the sentiment behind this article, it overlooks 
the massive structural changes of the preceding fifty years. Of course the 
Committee of Merchants would have strenuously objected to any agreement with 
Portugal that they felt undermined their interests and they were correct in doing 
so, but they were also complicit in allowing Cork’s international trade to stagnate 
and decline during the early decades of the Union. The first half of the nineteenth 
century was a period of unprecedented changes in commerce, politics, 
communications and industry. Cork’s mercantile class simply failed to keep apace 
with these developments. In many respects they still operated as they would have 
during the eighteenth century and they remained oblivious to the new integrated 
world that was emerging around them.  
From the seventeenth century onwards Cork city metamorphosed into a 
thriving, internationally focused port city. This growth almost entirely derived from 
the expansion of Britain’s trans-Atlantic colonies and an early integration into the 
Atlantic economy.2 However, by the nineteenth century the structure of Europe’s 
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trans-Atlantic trade had fundamentally altered due to the disruptions caused to 
shipping routes by the Napoleonic Wars, the formation of the United States of 
America and the UK’s move towards a free trade environment. Although the full 
effects of these changes would take several decades to be realised, their 
foundations were laid by the close of the eighteenth century. Despite some 
industrialisation in Cork, the city’s exports remained predominantly based upon 
agricultural produce and provisioning. The declining requirements in the Caribbean 
islands for imported provisions, faster transit times and the growth of the United 
States all threatened to undermine the lynchpin of Cork’s international trade. 
Furthermore, the generous government provisioning contracts during the 
Napoleonic Wars combined with increased wartime demand served to hide a 
declining international provisions trade and hastened the redirection of Cork’s 
mercantile community away from distant colonies and towards an increasing 
dependence on British markets.  
The development of Cork’s commercial character in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries derived from the constraints Westminster had put in place to 
protect the English economy. The restriction on livestock export by the Cattle Acts 
pushed Cork towards developing an expertise in the packing and preservation of 
foodstuffs for export. This was, in the words of Crotty, ‘the one great industry of 
Ireland in the eighteenth century’.3 The restrictions of the Wool Acts preventing the 
export of woollen cloth led to the increased export of woollen yarn.4 Cork’s 
mercantile community was resilient and found alternative paths for the 
development of their commercial intercourse. Such versatility also helped it to 
circumvent wartime trading embargos through the use of intermediaries, such as 
using the Dutch to trade with France.5  However, the success of such adaptations 
could also be seen as a precursor to later stagnation. Cork’s most influential 
mercantile body, the Committee of Merchants, was founded in the mid-eighteenth 
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century and that era defined the very nature of the organisation. The relaxation of 
the Navigation Laws in the late eighteenth century opened up direct trade with 
British colonies. However, this was only the beginning of Britain’s gradual relaxation 
of their protectionist system and the opening of their economy to foreign trade. 
Irish merchants constantly protested at the relaxation of British protectionism to 
allow the United States to trade directly with the West Indies. They believed that 
the Union entitled them to protective rates and tariffs to preserve their trans-
Atlantic trade networks. It is likely that this stemmed from a misguided belief that 
duties and tariffs were the sole manner through which foreign markets could be 
secured, as such instruments had been used to exclude them for many decades. 
Right up to the 1840s the Committee of Merchants maintained a solidly mercantilist 
attitude towards foreign trade and felt that the Union entitled them to such 
protections. They were either unable or unwilling to learn the lessons of their 
predecessors and adapt to the changing nature of international trade.  
From the late eighteenth century and to the conclusion of the Napoleonic 
Wars Cork occupied a small, but important, position in Britain’s transportation 
network. As a victualling port for the Royal Navy, with an admiral seated in the city 
and the centre for the assemblage of convoys preparing to cross the Atlantic, Cork 
could exert a disproportionate amount of influence for a city of its size. However, 
Ireland was always a peripheral location in the context of Britain’s global reach, 
though the proximity to Britain gave her a unique context within the Empire. Smith 
classed Ireland’s relationship as a dependency, which by his definition was a 
marginal improvement on a true periphery.6 Whatever the terminology employed it 
ultimately meant that Cork’s relative importance was precarious. Cork’s 
overreliance on exported foodstuffs was always going to be problematic in the long 
term. Without a broader array of goods to export or better developed industrial 
capabilities Cork had little to offer when faster transit times and an increasingly 
open market changed the nature of international trade. Moreover the 
improvements in sea transportation had the ironic effect of limiting the focus of 
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Cork’s trade on Britain rather the increasing international trade. The city’s 
merchants instead began to try to exploit the development of Britain’s rail network 
to increase their penetration of a market that they were already overly dependent 
on, rather than to attempt to rebuild a more balanced trade network. 
There was a belief that the Union was the reason Ireland’s economic gains in 
the eighteenth century turned to decline in the nineteenth century, simply because 
the decline appeared to follow it. Cullen argues that the real cause of the decline in 
Ireland’s fortunes was a poor level of technological development and the growth of 
the Irish population, which removed part of the rationale for the industrialisation 
that occurred in Britain.7 The perception that Ireland’s commercial classes had been 
somehow cheated by the Union pervades the later records of the Committee of 
Merchants. Constant references appear to the market protections that they 
believed were due to them by Westminster. The major change for Cork’s, and 
indeed Ireland’s, merchants occurred in the mid-1820s. The final clauses of the 
Union had just come into effect, the prosperity of the Napoleonic Wars had given 
way to the depression of the early 1820s and the major markets exported to in the 
eighteenth century were slipping away through a combination of neglect by 
merchants and changing geo-political relationships. The Caribbean islands were 
increasingly supplied by the United States and exports of butter to Portugal were 
soon to suffer a dramatic collapse from a combination of direct British trade with 
Brazil through the Rio de Janeiro Treaty and later the Portuguese Civil War.   
The Act of Union had facilitated an increase in Ireland’s trade with the 
Britain, but this was a process that had occurred for several decades by 1800.8 The 
Union was a fundamental event in Ireland’s political and commercial development, 
but it simply accentuated a trend that had been in place since the 1780s. Ireland’s 
merchants had long pushed for the relaxation of the Navigation Laws, but by the 
time the Union was completed and duties were harmonised the world had begun to 
move away from such protectionist systems. The developing laissez faire system 
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left Cork’s merchants in a vulnerable position. Protections against the United States 
were lost, the limited protections against British manufactures were gone and 
rapidly decreasing transit times left a small market with limited export items such 
as Cork open to competition in foreign and home markets. For Cork’s merchants 
there were two major issues by the 1830s and 1840s that they were powerless to 
address. By 1829 they had lost the ability to regulate their butter trade free from 
parliamentary interference. The only alternative they had left to control their trade 
was to impose restrictive self-imposed diktats on the city’s butter merchants, 
buyers and coopers. Although this may have had some success in exercising their 
control it set a poor precedent for the future. By the later nineteenth century it 
meant that the city’s butter trade was unable to rapidly adjust to changing market 
requirements. They also lost much of their earlier advantages of being able to 
petition senior members of parliament and military officials regarding potentially 
injurious legislation. Cork no longer had the strategic value it held during the 
Napoleonic Wars. This was demonstrated most acutely during the renegotiation of 
Anglo-Portuguese treaties in the 1840s when the Committee of Merchants 
impotently protested the exclusion of Ireland’s commercial interests.  
Like many contemporary nationalist commentators, it would be easy to lay 
the roots of Cork’s commercial decline on both the Union and a disinterested 
parliament that happily left Ireland to be the granary of the United Kingdom, 
providing food and labour to the industrialising regions of England.9 In the case of 
Cork this overlooks a simple, unfortunate truth. Cork had always been in the 
business of supplying food for the Empire; that was the cornerstone of the region’s 
economic and commercial development. Yes, some industrial development had 
occurred in the region, most notably in linen, but also in glass, iron works and to a 
lesser extent shipbuilding, but it was all built around the wealth of the provisioning 
trade. When Cork was derisorily referred to as a ‘pork and salting provincial’, it was 
because the city had spent quite some time developing expertise in the production 
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of foodstuffs, but not much else.10 Of course this was not solely the fault of Cork’s 
mercantile class. There were no mineral resources to speak of in the region and the 
large labour force removed much of the need to invest in expensive capital 
infrastructure. This system had functioned reasonably effectively under market 
protections from the British industrial machine and massive provisioning 
requirements, but, as was demonstrated in the 1820s, it would collapse under any 
serious pressure from cheaper British imports. Cork’s merchants had capitalised on 
an eighteenth century problem. Food provision was a constant issue for all 
European Atlantic economies that depended on slave labour.11 Cork’s merchants 
became wealthy as a result, but they also became complacent and failed to seek 
out new ventures and opportunities. When these markets were lost Cork had very 
little left to replace them with.  
In the context of the eighteenth century Ireland was a highly developed and 
expanding commercial country. However, by the nineteenth century these proto-
industrial enterprises were vulnerable to the nearby industrial behemoths in 
Britain. Ireland simply had not developed sufficiently to compete.12 Contemporary 
British writers, such as Wakefield, were under no illusion as to the problems in Irish 
industrial development. He argued that the Irish character was, ‘deficient in 
energy’:  
The people of Ireland seem incapable of calling forth their own powers of exertion, 
unless when stimulated by adventitious assistance. A spinner, to become 
industrious, must be presented with a wheel; a weaver, before he will work, must 
be supplied with a loom; and a bleacher cannot carry on business, unless he be 
furnished with a house in Dublin for the purpose of selling his commodity. Even a 
gentleman will not plant for his own advantage, or amusement, until he be 
impelled by some extraordinary inducement.13 
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This assessment conveniently overlooks a number of conditions in Irish commerce 
that were perhaps not immediately obvious. Cork had several relatively well 
mechanised textile manufacturers in the early nineteenth century, at the time that 
Wakefield wrote. However, as Bielenberg notes, the loss of sailcloth contracts after 
the Napoleonic Wars, combined with the relative cheapness of labour through the 
putting out system, removed some of the necessity for investment in more modern 
equipment.14 Cork was barely emerging from a proto-industrial system by 1800. 
Wartime contracts boosted some industries, such as textiles, but this alone was 
insufficient to create a strong, competitive industrial base. The loss of wartime 
contracts was a blow to the region’s textile manufacturers and combined with the 
economic depression of the 1820s and British competition there was little chance 
of survival. To give Wakefield his due, he did go on to identify several areas through 
which Ireland’s linen industry could be improved and there is a kernel of truth in his 
arguments. Repeatedly the Committee of Merchants sought what he would term 
‘adventitious assistance’ from Westminster rather than developing their own 
opportunities. Perhaps the issues he identified in the linen industry would have 
been more appropriately applied to Ireland’s commercial classes. 
Wakefield did have some accurate insights into the Irish economy when he 
argued that ‘To promote a single manufacture at the expense of all the other 
branches of national industry, is inconsistent with every sound principle of political 
economy’.15 In this he described the precise issue that Cork’s merchants faced by 
the 1820s. They had encouraged their provisioning trade at the expense of all 
others, to the extent that a committee intended for butter regulation was able to 
exert their influence over all branches of trade. In 1812, when Wakefield wrote, 
business for Cork’s mercantile classes had never been so good, but this was more 
due to the large and generous government contracts available because of the 
                                                     
14 Andy Bielenberg, Cork’s Industrial Revolution 1780-1880 : Development or Decline? (Cork :, 1991), 
pp 22–23; David Dickson, Old World Colony: Cork and South Munster 1630-1830 (Cork, 2005), pp 
401–403. 
15 Wakefield, An Account of Ireland, Statistical and Political Vol 1, p. 169 
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Napoleonic Wars than any shrewd business sense.16 The loss of these contracts in 
1815 led Foster to identify that year as the turning point in nineteenth century Irish 
history.17 The debate surrounding whether it was 1815, as identified by Foster and 
Crotty, or 1830, as Solar argues, will never have a satisfactory solution.18 One way 
or another the fifteen years after the end of the Napoleonic Wars devastated 
nascent Irish industrial development. In terms of Cork’s, and indeed Ireland’s, 
development events of the mid 1820s — the full implementation of the Union, the 
opening up of the West Indian colonies to the United States, the negotiation of 
direct trade between Britain and Brazil and the loss of Cork’s exemption from 
parliamentary legislation for the butter trade — combined to destroy the fortunes 
of Cork’s international trade.  
Of course Cork’s merchants had not helped themselves. The preference for 
shipping under British account was less risky than using local shipping. However, 
reliance on transhipment through Britain and lack of investment in a local 
mercantile fleet remains baffling for a city that depended so heavily on the sea for 
its economic growth and that derived all of its advantage from a substantial port. 
Free trade with the West Indies had been in place since 1778, yet Cork still traded 
via Britain. The limited amounts of East India goods landed in the city were not of 
much account, but still represented an advantage conferred on very few ports. 
During the Napoleonic Wars Cork was the port of departure for British trans-
Atlantic convoys, with major British cities such as Liverpool and London deferring to 
the Committee of Merchants for guidance and advice regarding convoy departures. 
What benefits could have arisen from a better developed maritime infrastructure 
will remain unknown. However, they would have been of no small significance. Cork 
exhibited an ability at times to take the lead in Irish shipbuilding development, as 
demonstrated by the construction of their own iron clad ships, screw driven ships 
                                                     
16 John O’Donovan, The Economic History of Live Stock in Ireland (Cork, 1940), p. 156. 
17 R. F. Foster, Modern Ireland 1600-1972 (London, 1988), pp 318–319. 
18 Peter Solar, ‘Growth and Distribution in Irish Agriculture before the Famine’ (PhD thesis, Stanford 
University, 1987), pp 12, 38–40; R. F. Foster, Modern Ireland 1600-1972 (London, 1988), pp 318–319; 
Crotty, Irish Agricultural Production, p. 35. 
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and construction maritime engines within the city. What was lacking was 
investment. Those with access to such financial resources in Cork were inordinately 
careful with their financial investment within Ireland, as was seen with indigenous 
investment in the proposed Cork canal and Irish railways.19 Perhaps it was the same 
issue to which Cullen attributed the underdeveloped Irish financial sector, the lack 
of direct colonial trade.20 This is a likely candidate, though it again raises the point 
that there was little stopping Cork from conducting a direct colonial trade of its 
own.  
The lack of an indigenous maritime fleet is not simply a modern puzzle, it 
was one that puzzled contemporaries also. It was noted during the 1780s dispute 
with Portugal that part of the issue for Ireland was the lack of an indigenous navy to 
protect her interests.21 At the same time that Ireland’s international trade 
increased in the eighteenth century, the tonnage of Irish shipping actually 
decreased by almost twenty-five per cent from 1723 to 1772.22  It is difficult to 
attribute this to anything other than a myopic, singularly focused mercantile class in 
Ireland. This lack of an indigenous fleet exacerbated the reliance of Ireland on the 
British market in the first decades of the nineteenth century and, to a certain 
degree, prevented Irish merchants from reopening or strengthening the hard won 
trade routes that they operated in the eighteenth century. It was far simpler, and 
cheaper, to rely on British shipping and British merchants.  
By 1819, soon after the end of the Napoleonic Wars, steam services began 
their first operations on the Irish Sea.23 Not only would such rapid connectivity 
cement the over-reliance on exporting to Britain, it would also lead Ireland to 
abandon any alternative to becoming more than an agricultural hinterland for 
British growth. The massive dependence on Britain as an export market for Irish 
                                                     
19 J.J. Lee, ‘Capital in the Irish Economy’ in L.M. Cullen (ed.), The Formation of the Irish Economy (The 
Thomas Davis lectures, Cork, 1969), pp 54–55. 
20 Cullen, ‘Merchant Communities, the Navigation Acts and Irish and Scottish Responses’, p. 171. 
21 The Parliamentary Register, p. 25; Lammey, ‘The Irish-Portuguese Trade Dispute, 1770-90’, p. 36. 
22 Alice Murray, A History of the Commercial and Financial Relations between England and Ireland, 
from the Period of the Restoration (London, 1903), pp 77–78. 
23 Yrjö Kaukiainen, ‘Shrinking the world: Improvements in the Speed of Information Transmission, c. 
1820-1870’ in European Review of Economic History, v, no. 1 (2001), p. 12. 
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produce was an issue that continued right through the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. Despite some early attempts to redress this reliance in the early decades 
of an independent Ireland it was an issue that only began to slowly change with the 
gradual integration of Ireland into a wider European, and Atlantic, economy from 
the 1970s onwards.    
The commercial focus of Cork was too narrow and the lack of investment 
into more sustainable development or exploring new trade routes was detrimental. 
Further research into Ireland’s other urban areas will probably show similar trends. 
The issue of why Ireland’s industry was so underdeveloped when in such proximity 
to such opportunity will continue to cause much debate, but a partial answer is to 
look at both regional successes and failures. Exploration of the political 
representation at Westminster and how Irish MPs engaged with the more mundane 
legislative issues of importance to Ireland, such as butter and rates regulation, may 
provide some answers. Ireland had a comparatively large number of MPs, but they 
lacked cohesiveness beyond issues such as repeal or home rule that was required to 
push trade and economic issues. Catholic Emancipation and ‘monster meetings’ 
could draw crowds and attention, but the more mundane issues such as butter or 
duties lack such broad ranging appeal.  
Yet, within such mundane matters lay the potential for a successful Irish 
economy. The failure to achieve that was more complex than changing 
consumption and changing trade movements. It represented a lack of foresight on 
the part of Ireland’s commercial merchants and poor representation by Irish MPs. 
Suffrage is important, but it does not feed people unless translated to affirmative 
political support. The failure was due to a recalcitrant political class, an inflexible 
mercantile community and a disinterested Imperial Parliament. Corkonians may 
have perceived themselves as living in ‘the Capital of the South of Ireland’, but in 
truth Cork was a provincial city on the periphery of the British Empire that for a 






 1811 1823 
 British Foreign British Foreign 
 Ships Tons Ships Tons Ships Tons Ships Tons 
Ballyraine   1 71 1 55 1 122 
Baltimore     1 90 3 363 
Belfast 11 1570 46 8604 51 5595 42 6634 
Coleraine   9 1271 5 434 4 449 
Cork 51 6117 49 11364 45 4816 59 8708 
Drogheda   5 482 2 179 7 1024 
Dublin 45 4876 119 20775 115 11180 68 13223 
Dundalk 3 287 3 359 4 439 1 178 
Galway   4 728 1 93 5 872 
Killibegs   2 208 2 138 1 140 
Kinsale   3 798 2 171   
Larne   3 351 1 43 3 452 
Limerick 31 4025 20 4092 5 601 5 754 
Londonderry 2 282 13 2513 11 1024 19 2070 
Newry 2 248 25 4338 20 2058 22 3217 
Ross 2 239 1 401     
Sligo   3 251 8 686 9 1413 
Strangford 2 244 6 850     
Tralee 1 57 3 598   2 249 
Waterford 32 3233 24 4067 14 1310 8 1419 
Westport 1 84 2 278   1 156 
Wexford 2 197 6 884 2 133 2 276 
Youghal 3 175 1 193 1 73 3 311 
 188 21614 348 63476 291 29118 265 42030 
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1 An account of the Number of Vessels, with Their tonnage, that Entered the Ports of Ireland, in the 
Year 1811 and 1823, from the Several Countries on the Continent of Europe, from Norway to the 
streights of Gibraltar, Including the Baltic and the Mediterranean Seas, and Also Including the Islands 
of Guernsey, Jersey, Aldenay and Sark, The Countries and Islands from which,  and the Ports at 
which they had with the Number of Vessels, and Amount of Tonnage from each such ..Island to each 
Port Respectively, the each year, and further Distinguishing British from Foreign Vessels, Board of 
Customs: Statistics: Trade and Shipping, Cust 36/5, TNA. 
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2 (Ireland.) Wine. Accounts Relating to the Produce of Revenue Derived from Wine Imported into 
Ireland; Also, the Quantities of Wine Imported and Exported; &c. 1801-1822. H.C. 1823 (132) xvi, 
587.. From the 5th July 1802 the increases seen in 1803 came into force, and from the 14th July 
1803 10% was added on top of former rates. 
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Appendix 3  
Comparative view of whole duties on wines (there was some confusion by Portugal 
as to how duties were levied on Irish wines): 3 
Duty French  Port 
Custom 3.3.0 4.10.0 
Excise 5.13.5 5.13.5 
1st additional duty 11.17.7 10.10.7 
2nd additional duty 10.7.0 None 
Total 31.1.0 20.14.0 
“From hence it appears that with respect to the duties applicable to the 
uses of government, the treaty of 1703 has been strictly complied with.”  
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British Parliamentary Papers 
First report from the committee appointed to consider of the present high price of 
provisions. H.C. 1801 (174, 1800-01) ii, 1, 15, 37, 47, 51, 79, 89  
Second report from the committee appointed to enquire into the laws relating to the salt 
duties; &c., H.C. 1801 (142), iii, 389  
Report from the Committee upon Expired and Expiring Laws. For the IId session-Ist 
Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, H.C. 1801 (39) ii, 
191 
The Definitive Treaty of Peace, between His Britannick Majesty, and the French 
Republick, His Catholick Majesty, the Batavian Republick, signed at Amiens, the 
27th of March 1802., H.C. 1801-02 (004) iv, 503 
An account of the imports and exports of Ireland; for the year ending fifth January 1802: 
specifying the several articles, and the countries, and the value; and distinguishing 
the export of native products or manufactures: and also, distinguishing the import 
and export of foreign or colonial goods from British native products or 
manufactures, and their values respectively; together with the rate and amount of 
duties, bounty, or drawback, paid on each., H.C. 1802-03 (37(3)) vii, 199 
Resolutions reported on Thursday the 3d day of March 1803, from the Committee of the 
Whole House, to whom it was referred to consider of several acts, made in the last 
session of the Parliament of Ireland, and in the 41st and 42d years of the reign of 
His Present Majesty, relating to the revenue of Ireland; and which resolutions were 
then agreed to by the House., H.C. 1802-03 (19) vii, 45 
 (Ireland.) An account, presented to the House of Commons, respecting the official and 
the real or current value of the imports and exports of Ireland., H.C. 1803-04 (93) 
vii, 443 
Irish Customs and Excise Bill, H.C. Deb June 29 1804, Vol. 2 cc. 887-888 
Irish Customs and Excise Bill, H.C. Deb July 02 1804, Vo. 2 cc. 899-901 
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Irish Trade with Newfoundland, H.C. Deb July 12 1804, Vol. 2 c. 1027 
Accounts, presented to the House of Commons, respecting British ships which have 
cleared outwards, and entered inwards, to and from the West Indies; &c., H.C. 1805 
(84) ix, 17 
Trade between the West Indies and America, H.L. Deb July 4 1805, Vol. 5 cc. 731-736 
Minutes of evidence taken before the committee appointed to consider of the state of the 
woollen manufacture of England., H.C. 1806 (268a) iii, 595 
American Intercourse Bill, H.L. Deb 22 May 1806, Vol. 6 cc. 1031-1040 
Colonial Intercourse with America, H.L. Deb March 31 1806, Vol. 6 cc. 592-597 
Intercourse between America and the West India Islands, H.C. Deb April 21 1806, Vol. 6 
cc. 834-839 
American Intercourse Bill, H.C. Deb 6 May 1806, Vol. 7 cc. 336-347 
Protest Against the American Intercourse Bill, H.L. Deb May 13 1806, Vol. 7 cc. 116-
117 
American Intercourse Bill, H.C. Deb 17 June 1806, Vol. 7 cc. 686-730 
West India Accounts Bill, H.C. Deb  June 17 1806, Vol. 7 cc. 676-68 
American Intercourse Bill, H.C. Deb July 8 1806, Vol. 7 cc. 969-1010 
A Bill, Intituled, An Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade, H.C. 1806-07 (68) l, 41 
Copy of an Order of Council, dated 27th May 1807; For Making Regulations with 
Respect to the Navigation and Commerce, between His Majesty’s Subjects and the 
Subjects of the United States of America.,H.C. 1807 (1(2)) iv, 1 
Report from the Committee on the Commercial State of the West India Colonies, H.C. 
1807 (65) iii, 1 
West India Planters’ Petition, H.C. Deb March 12 1807, Vol. 9 cc. 96-101 
British and Foreign Shipping, HC. Deb 30 June 1807 Vol. 9 cc. 682-688 
 (Ireland.) An account of money received in the office of the Chief Secretary to the Lord 
Lieutenant of Ireland, from the 5th of January 1801 to the 30th of May 1805, for 
licences to export wool to Great Britain., H.C. 1808 (122) vi, 243 
 (Ireland.) An account of the quantity of sugar imported into Ireland, directly from the 
West Indies, in the ten years ending with the year 1806 inclusive;--together with the 
quantity of sugar exported from Ireland, from whatever place imported: 
distinguishing each year. H.C. 1808 (78) xi, 265 
Return to an order of the Honourable House of Commons, dated 14th March 1808;--for 
copy of the warrant of the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty’s Treasury, dated 
23d October 1807, giving authority to allow goods and the property of British 
subjects to be imported from Portugal in Portuguese or neutral ships., H.C. 1808 
(126) ix, 117 
Duties on Salt, H.C. Deb May 30 1809, vol. 14 cc. 785-787 
 (Ireland.) An account of the new and additional duties imposed, in the last session of 
Parliament, on foreign wines in merchants stores in Ireland, which had been 
imported previous to passing the act imposing said duties: and stating, what part of 
the said merchandize (if any) was exported, and the drawbacks allowed and paid, in 
the half year ended 5th January 1811., H.C. 1810-11 (159) vi, 1097 
 (Ireland.) (Customs.) A comparative statement of the quantities of goods, wares, or 
merchandize, imported into Ireland, in the years 1809 and 1810. Distinguishing, 
each denomination, and the duty received on each respectively;--also stating, what 
part of the said goods, wares or merchandize, were bonded, warehoused, or 




(Ireland) Return to an order of the Honourable House of Commons, of the 12th April 
1811;--for an account of all sugars admitted to entry, in the several ports of Ireland, 
from the islands Martinico and Gaudaloupe respectively, during six months last 
past; and of the duties received thereon;--specifying the rate per cwt. on which the 
said duties were computed:--together with a statement of any application which may 
have been made to the Lord Lieutenant and Privy Council, or the Board of Treasury 
of Ireland, respecting the duties imposed on such sugars; and the result of such 
application, H.C. 1810-11 (228) vi, 113 
Treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation, between His Britannic Majesty and His Royal 
Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal; signed at Rio de Janeiro, the 19th of 
February 1810., H.C. 1810-11 (010) xi, 523 
 (Customs.--Ireland.) Papers relating to Martinico sugars; discharge of Martinico 
sugars; collection of duty upon, and sale of Martinico sugars, H.C. 1812 (111) v, 
617 
(Ireland.) A bill [as amended] for the better regulation of the butter trade in Ireland., 
H.C. 1812 (312) l, 1207 
(Ireland,) Sugar, imported, exported, and duty paid for. Viz. 1. An account of the quantity 
of sugar imported into Ireland from all parts (Great Britain excepted) in each of the 
years ending 5th January 1810, 1811, & 1812; 2. An account of the quantity of 
sugar exported from Ireland, in each of the years ending the 5th of January 1810, 
1811, & 1812, to all parts; 3. An account of the amount of duty paid on sugar in 
Ireland (deducting the drawback on the quantity exported) in the years ending the 
5th of January 1810, 1811, and 1812., H.C. 1812 (260) (261) (262) v, 635 
Petition respecting the Regulation of Markets in the City of Cork H.C. Deb 5 Mar 1812 
Vol 21 cc 1169-1201 
(Ireland.) Accounts relating to sugar, and rum: viz. (1.)--Duties paid on sugar, in Ireland, 
in the year ending 5 January 1814. (2.)--Bonded sugar remaining in the several 
ports of Ireland, on the 5th January 1814. (3.)--Sugar imported into Ireland, in the 
year ended 5 January 1814. (4.)--Sugar exported from Ireland, to all parts, in the 
same period. (5.)--Rum imported into Ireland, in the year ended 5 January 1814. 
(6.)--Duties paid on rum, in Ireland, in the same period. (7)--Bonded rum remaining 
in the warehouses at the several ports of Ireland, on 5 January 1814. (8.)--Rum 
exported from Ireland, to all parts, in the year ending 5 January 1814. 1813-14 
(350) xii, 219 
(Ireland.) An account of all salt imported into Ireland, from 5th of October 1812 to the 
5th of October 1813;--distinguishing that imported from foreign parts, and from 
Great Britain; and specifying, the rate and total amount of the duties on each 
respectively., H.C. 1813-14 (55) vii, 455 
Treaty of Peace and Amity between His Britannic Majesty and the United States of 
America. Signed at Ghent, December 24, 1814, H.C. 1814-15 (011) xiii, 139 
(Ireland.) An account of the quantity of sugars, distinguishing East India, West India, and 
refined, imported into Ireland, in the year ended the 5th January 1815;--together 
with the amount of custom duty paid thereupon, and specifying the rate of duty. 4. 
H.C. 1814-15 (274) vii, 41 
America, H.C. 1807 (1(2)), iv, 1 
The Prince Regent's Speech at the Close of the Session, H.L. Deb July 12 1815, Vol. 31 
cc. 1153-1156 
Class B. Various treaties concluded between Great Britain and other powers, in the year 
1815, H.C. 1816 (002) xvii, 89  
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Papers relating to the residence of Napoleon Buonaparté at St. Helena: viz. (1.) Estimate 
of the probable annual expense of the island of St. Helena, during the period of its 
continuing to be the residence of Napoleon Buonaparté, and his suite. (2.) Copy of a 
letter from Mr. Croker to Mr. Goulburn, dated Admiralty Office, 11th April 1816., 
H.C. 1816 (340) xii, 533 
Sess. 1816. A bill for regulating the intercourse with the island of Saint Helena, during 
the time Napoleon Buonaparté shall be detained there., H.C. 1816 (127) 1, 71 
Sess. 1816. A bill for the more effectually detaining in custody Napoleon Buonaparté., 
H.C. 1816 (126) I, 67 
 (Ireland.) An account of the quantity of wine imported into Ireland, on which duty was 
paid, during the years ending the 5th of January 1815, 1816, and 1817, and 
distinguishing the several kinds of wine., H.C. 1817 (194) viii, 373 
Report from Select Committee on Newfoundland Trade: with minutes of evidence taken 
before the committee; and an appendix, H.C. 1817 (436) vi, 465 
Report from the Select Committee on the Use of Rock Salt in the Fisheries; &c., H.C. 
1817 (247) iii, 121 
 (Ireland.) An account of the coals imported into Ireland, for the years 1816 and 1817; 
distinguishing the different ports into which they were imported, and the place from 
which they were brought., H.C. 1818 (184) xvi, 321 
(Ireland.) An account of the quantities of rock and white salt exported from Ireland in the 
last three years; distinguishing the several countries to which they were exported., 
H.C. 1818 (385) xvi, 335 
(Ireland.) An account of the quantities of salt seized and condemned in Ireland, for the 
three years ended the 5th of January 1818, and the penalties paid thereon; as taken 
from the returns made by the several port collectors and officers., H.C. 1818 (388) 
xvi, 341 
(Ireland.) An account of the quantity of salt imported into Ireland; distinguishing, the 
kind, the place from whence imported, and the duty paid thereon; for the years 1815, 
1816, and 1817, H.C. 1818 (383) (384) xvi, 331, 333  
(Ireland.) An account of the several banks for savings, established in Ireland, and 
registered, under the act 57 Geo. III, cap. 105; specifying the date of each 
establishment, and the amount of the sums vested to their credit severally, in 
government securities, under the provisions of that act, H.C. 1818 (153) xvi, 384 
 (Ireland.) An account of all wines imported into Ireland, in the years 1816, 1817, and 
1818; distinguishing the country from whence they came, and the amount of duties 
paid on each sort of wine, with the total amount of such duties, for the above three 
years., H.C. 1819 (66) xvi, 315  
 (Ireland.) An account of coals imported into the various ports of Ireland from Great 
Britain, from the 5th January 1818 to the 5th January 1819., H.C. 1819 (67) xvi, 333 
Cork Harbour Bill, H.C. Deb 30 June 1819, Vol. 40 cc. 1424-1428 
Report from the committee upon expired and expiring laws: for the IId session - VIth 
Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland., H.C. 1819-20 (4) 
ii, 1 
Return to an order of the Honourable House of Commons, dated 27 May 1819; for an 
account of all exports from Great Britain to Spain, from the 5th January 1805 to the 
5th January 1819; distinguishing the amount in each year; and as far as possible, 
the articles of which they consisted, and the value of each article., H.C. 1819-20 
(472) xvi, 241 
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Imports and exports to and from Ireland. (No. 1.) An account of the quantities and several 
kinds or denominations of goods imported into Great Britain from Ireland, subject to 
duty thereon, in each year from 5th January 1801 to 5th January 1821; with the 
respective rate of such duty, and the amount thereof paid in each year. (No. 2.) An 
account of the quantities and several kinds or denominations of goods exported from 
Great Britain to Ireland, entitled to drawback thereon, in each year from 5th 
January 1801 to 5th January 1821; with the respective rate of such drawback, and 
the amount thereof allowed in each year., H.C. 1821 (654) xvii, 241 
 (Ireland.) Coals. An account of all coals imported into the different ports of Ireland, from 
the 1st January 1819 to the 1st January 1821., H.C. 1821 
 (Ireland.) Sugar. (1.) An account of the total quantity of East India sugar entered for 
home consumption, in the several years from 1813 to 1820 inclusive; distinguishing 
the quantity in each year. (2.) An account of the total quantity of West India sugar 
entered for home consumption, in the several years from 1813 to 1820 inclusive; 
distinguishing the quantity in each year. H.C. 1821 (582) xx, 93 
Staves. (Ireland.) Copies of all memorials and communications, addressed by Messrs. 
Harvey and Co. of Cork, to the Treasury, on the subject of the duties on staves, H.C. 
1821 (425) (652) xix, 397, 401 
3 Geo. IV.--Sess. 1822. (Ireland.) A bill [as amended by the committee] to continue the 
duties of customs payable on British salt imported into Ireland; to repeal the duties 
on foreign salt imported into Ireland; and to grant other duties in lieu thereof., H.C. 
1822 (510) iii, 1951 
Fourth report of the commissioners of inquiry into the collection and management of the 
revenue arising in Ireland; &c., H.C. 1822 (634) xiii, 1295 
 (Ireland.) Coals. A return of coals imported into the different ports of Ireland; from 5th 
January 1821 to 5th January 1822., H.C. 1822 (48) xviii, 481 
 (Ireland.) Spirits. Return to an order of the Honourable House of Commons, dated 18th 
May 1822;--for, an account of all home made spirits which have been exported to 
foreign countries and the British colonies, from Ireland, in each year during the last 
ten years; distinguishing English, Irish and Scotch made spirits, and the countries to 
which such spirits have been exported., H.C. 1822 (396) xviii, 493 
Salt duties. Extract from the journal of the House of Commons; vol. 73, p. 406.--Luna, 1° 
die Junij, 1818., H.C. 1822 (35) xx, 167 
(Ireland.) Imports and exports. --(1.)-- A return to an order of the Honourable House of 
Commons, dated the 8th of March 1822;--for, an account of the imports and exports 
of Ireland, in the years 1792, 1800, 1810, 1815, 1820, and 1821; distinguishing the 
countries from which imported, and to which exported, with the official and declared 
or real value thereof; stated in Irish currency. --(2.)-- An account of the shipping 
entered inwards and cleared outwards in Ireland, from or to all parts of the world, 
in the years 1792, 1800, 1810, 1815, 1820, and 1821; distinguishing such as entered 
inwards or cleared outwards, from or to Great Britain. H.C. 1822 (234), xviii, 473 
Irish Butter Trade, H.C. Deb June 20 1822, Vol. 7 cc. 1211-1216 
4 Geo. IV. Sess. 1823. A bill [as amended by the committee] to repeal the duties on 
certain articles, and to provide for the gradual discontinuance of the duties on 
certain other articles, the manufacture of Great Britain and Ireland respectively, on 
their importation into either country from the other., H.C. 1823 (245) iii, 637, 647  
4 Geo. IV. Sess. 1823. A bill to repeal the duties on certain articles, and to provide for the 
gradual discontinuance of the duties on certain other articles, the manufacture of 
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Great Britain and Ireland respectively, on their importation into either country from 
the other., H.C.  1823 (216)  
4 Geo. IV. Sess. 1823. (Ireland.) A bill [as amended by the committee] to repeal the 
several duties and drawbacks of customs chargeable and allowable in Ireland, on 
the importation and exportation of certain foreign and colonial goods wares and 
merchandize, and to grant other duties and drawbacks in lieu thereof, equal to the 
duties and drawbacks chargeable and allowable thereon in Great Britain., H.C. 
1823 (420) iii, 677 
Coals. An account of all coals shipped from Great Britain to Ireland, from the 5th 
January 1822 to the 5th January 1823; specifying the ports from whence they are 
carried, and where landed., H.C. 1823 (137) xiii, 399 
(Ireland.) Ships and tonnage. Accounts relating to the trade with the East Indies and 
China: 1793-1822., H.C. 1823 (253) xvi, 583 
(Ireland.) Sugar. Accounts relating to sugar imported into, and exported from Ireland: 
1822. 1823 (315) xiii, 519 
(Ireland.) Accounts of the exports and imports of Ireland; and official value thereof: 
1811-1822. H.C. 1823 (318) xvi, 131. 
 (Ireland.) Tonnage. An account of the amount of tonnage of vessels entered inwards, and 
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